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Qualifed terminable interest property (QTIP) trusts have become
extremely popular estate planning devices since Congress authorized
them in 1981. If elected by the executor, QTIP status allows an estate
to claim the federal estate tax marital deduction for a devise of a life
estate to the testator's spouse with the remainder passing to persons of
the testator's choosing. Professor Ascher analyzes the fiduciary duty
and tax implications of the QTIP election and concludes that the elec-
tion by itself does not offer the post-mortem estate planning flexibility
that previous commentators have claimed He suggests, however, that,
in certain situations, an estate planner can achieve the desired post-
mortem flexibility by drafting testamentary provisions for spousal dis-
claimer along with the QTIP provisions.
The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA)' reshaped marital de-
duction estate planning. Planning and drafting for full estate tax deferral at
the death of the first spouse to die, made possible by the unlimited marital
deduction, 2 have become the norm.3 The "qualified terminable interest prop-
1. Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (1981) [hereinafter cited as ERTA § -, 95 Stat. -].
2. ERTA § 403(a), 95 Stat. 301 (amending I.R.C. §§ 2056(a), (c)) eliminated all quantitative
restrictions on the estate tax marital deduction. See infra text accompanying notes 25-31.
3. See, ag., Adams, Questions andAnswers on the Tax Act of 1981, TR. & EST., March 1982,
at 61, 64-67; Blattmachr & Lustgarten, Selected Considerations in Structuring Wills (Or Will Substi-
tutes), TR. & EST., May 1982, at 37-42 [hereinafter cited as Blattmachr & Lustgarten, Selected
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erty" (QTIP) trust4 has replaced the marital-deduction power-of-appointment
trust 5 as the most frequently drafted marital deduction trust.6 To qualify a
potential QTIP interest for the estate tax marital deduction, however, the exec-
utor must make a QTIP election.7 This election has been widely acclaimed as
a method of achieving post-mortem flexibility.8 The purported advantages of
a full-deferral estate plan, however, have not always been evaluated carefully,9
and the fiduciary responsibilities that accompany the QTIP election remain
virtually unexamined.10
Considerations]; Blattmachr & Lustgarten, The New Estate Tax Marital Deduction: Many Ques-
tions and Some Answers, TR. & EST., Jan. 1982, at 18, 22 [hereinafter cited as Blattmachr & Lust-
garten, Many Questions]; Blazek & O'Donoghue, Use ofDisclaimers in Post-Mortem Planning, 40
INST. ON FED. TAX'N 1 7.05[1], [2] (1982); Dobris, Marital Deduction Estate Planning: Variations
on a Classic Theme, 20 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 801, 812 (1983); Eubank, When the Estate Plan Must be
Made Final- An Overview ofDecisions and Techniques Shortly after the Decedent's Death, 17 INST.
ON EST. PLAN. TT 2000, 2001.3 (1983); Hirschon, Qual#fled Disclaimers: The Key to Estate Planning
Flexibility, EST., GIFTS & TR. J., Sept.-Oct. 1982, at 4, 8; see generally Peckham, New Estate Plan-
ning Techniquesfor Small and Medium Sized Estates, 54 N.Y. ST. B.J. 514 (1982).
4. ERTA § 403(d)(1), 95 Stat. 302-03 (codified at I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7)-(8) (1982)) made the
marital deduction available for transfers to surviving spouses of certain life income interests for
which the deduction previously was not allowable. See infra text accompanying notes 11-24.
5. The marital-deduction power-of-appointment trust is described in I.R.C. § 2056(b)(5)
(1982). See infra note 12 and accompanying text.
6. See, e.g., J. PRICE, CONTEMPORARY ESTATE PLANNING 102 (1983); Dobris, supra note 3,
at 819 n.155; Farmer, ERTA "81: Estate and Gift Tax Aspects, 38 J. OF Mo. B. 88, 89 (1982);
Keydel, Estate and Gift Tax Changes Made by the Economic Recovery Tax Act of1981, 17 REAL
PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 18, 52 (1982); Moore, Conflicting Interests in Estate Planning andAdminis-
tration after ERTA: Recognition and Resolution, 17 INST. ON EST. PLAN. 11 601, 602.4 (1983)
[hereinafter cited as Moore, Conflicting Interests]; Moore, The New Marital Deduction Qualfied
Terminable Interest Trust: Planning and Drafting Considerations, 16 INST. ON EST. PLAN. 1 900
(1982) [hereinafter cited as Moore, New Marital Deduction]; Strauss, Qualifled Terminable Interest
Property Offers New Opportunities But Many Problems Are Unresolved, 9 EST. PLAN. 74, 74-75
(1982).
7. See I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7)(B)(i)(III), (B)(v) (1982).
8. See, e.g., Allevato, The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981: Implications ofthe Estate
and Gift Tax Changes Upon Estate Planning, 11 CAPITAL U.L. REv. 1, 25-26 (1981); Blattmachr &
Lustgarten, Many Questions, supra note 3, at 21; Brackney, Post-Mortem Planning Is Now Estate
Planning, TR. & EST., Aug. 1982, at 28, 29; Cornfeld, The Use andAbuse ofthe Unlimited Marital
Deduction, 16 INST. ON EST. PLAN. $T 1700, 1702.2 (1982); Covey, Recent Developments Concern-
ing Estate, Gift and Income Taxation-1981, 16 INST. ON ET. PLAN. 11 100, 110.7 to .9, 110.15,
(1982); Dobris, supra note 3, at 823; Eubank, supra note 3, 1 2000; Gutierrez, Fine Tuning the
QTIP Election, 17 INST. ON ET. PLAN. $ 1400 (1983); Horn, Marital Deduction Planning and
DraftingAferERTA, EST., GIFTS & TR. J., Jan.-Feb. 1982, at 23, 24; Joint Report of the Commit-
tee on Administration and Distribution of Decedent's Estates and the Committee on Special
Problems of Fiduciaries, The Qualfied Terminable Interest Trust Election, 18 REAL PROP., PROB. &
TR. J. 1, 6-8, 17 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Joint Report]; Ketchum & Johnson, Traditional Simul-
taneous Death Planning Must Be Reviewed in Light O/ ERTA, Social Changes, 10 EST. PLAN. 90, 92
(1983); Keydel, supra note 6, at 51-52; Kurtz, Marital Deduction Estate Planning Under the Eco-
nomic Recovery Act of1981: Opportunities Exist, but Watchfor the Pitfalls, 34 RUTGERS L. REV.
591, 605 n.32 (1982); McCaffrey & Kalik, Qualiffed Terminable Interest Property, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 18,
1982, at 1, col. 1, at 2, cols. 3-5; Ordower, TaxAct Offers New Choices, TR. & EST., Jan. 1982, at
35, 39; Strauss, supra note 6, at 78; Note, The Marital Deduction Changes in the Economic Recovery
Tax Act of 1981, 13 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 190, 207, 211 (1982).
9. For complete examinations of the economics of full-deferral estate planning, see Eubank,
ERTA: Estate Planning Aspects, New Options and Mental Reconditioning, 8 PROB. NOTES 47
(1982); Garlock, Estate Tax UnlimitedMarital Deduction Has LimitedAdvantage in Larger Estates,
56 J. TAX'N 236 (1982); Harris, Optimal Use of the Unlimited Estate Tax Marital Deduction, EST.,
GIFTS & TR. J., May-June 1982, at 13.
10. The most ambitious effort at identifying and resolving the issues facing the fiduciary who
must decide whether to make the QTIP election is the Joint Report, supra note 8, which deals,
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This Article examines the use of the QTIP election as an estate planning
tool. The Article begins with a summary of the changes made by ERTA and
their impact on marital deduction estate planning. It also reviews the mechan-
ics of the QTIP election and notes the now-accepted possibility of a partial
QTIP election. The Article then offers and evaluates three explanations for
the popularity of the full-deferral estate plan that relies on fiduciary exercise of
the QTIP election: the benefits of tax deferral, the attractiveness of post-
mortem flexibility, and the ease of planning and drafting. Thereafter, the Ar-
ticle examines the extent to which executors asked to make the QTIP election
are affected by the fiduciary duty to minimize taxes, the fiduciary duty of im-
partiality, and the fiduciary duty of loyalty, and describes possible adverse tax
implications of estate planning by QTIP election. Finally, the Article offers an
alternative to reliance on fiduciary exercise of the QTIP election as a means of
achieving post-mortem flexibility.
I. THE IMPACT OF ERTA ON MARITAL DEDUCTION ESTATE PLANNING
4. Qualfed Terminable Interest Property
The estate tax marital deduction is available only for interspousal trans-
fers of certain types of property interests. Prior to ERTA, three types of trans-
fers qualified for the marital deduction: a transfer of outright ownership;' 1 a
transfer of property in trust such that all income was payable at least annually
to the surviving spouse during her lifetime, and she possessed a general power
of appointment over the trust property; 12 and a transfer of property in trust
such that the surviving spouse was the only permissible recipient of distribu-
tions during her lifetime, and the remainder, including any undistributed in-
come, was payable to her estate. 13 The two trust alternatives thus shared a
common element with the outright ownership option-the surviving spouse
possessed the means to control the ultimate disposition of the transferred
property.
ERTA effected vast changes in the qualitative restrictions on the marital
deduction' 4 by allowing a deduction for "qualified terminable interest prop-
erty." 5 The primary characteristic of QTIP is that the surviving spouse must
however, almost exclusively with the conflict-of-interest problem. See also Stewart, Qualified Ter-
minable Interest Property Election Checklist, PROB. & PROP., Fall 1982, at 27 (listing factors for
fiduciary to consider in making QTIP election decision).
11. See I.R.C. § 2056(a), (b)(1) (1982); Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2056(a)-2(b)(4), 20.2056(b)-I(c)(1)
(1958).
12. I.R.C. § 2056(b)(5) (1982). This type of trust often is referred to as the "marital-deduc-
tion power-of-appointment trust."
13. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(e)-2(b)(l)(iii) (1958); Rev. Rul. 68-554, 1968-2 C.B. 412; Commis-
sioner v. Estate of Ellis, 252 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1958). Because no interest is granted to anyone
other than the surviving spouse, the "estate trust" qualifies for the marital deduction. See I.R.C.
§ 2056(b)(1)(A) (1982).
14. See generally Schulman, How and When to Use the New Marital Deduction Quali/ied Ter-
minable Interest Trust, 10 TAX'N FOR LAW. 196 (1982).
15. ERTA § 403(d)(1), 95 Stat. 302-03 (codified at I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7) (1982)). For legislative
background and analysis of the qualitative changes in the marital deduction made by ERTA, see
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be entitled to all of the income at least annually during her lifetime.' 6 In
addition, no person, including the surviving spouse, can have the power to
appoint the QTIP to anyone other than the surviving spouse during the surviv-
ing spouse's lifetime. 17 Furthermore, the decedent's executor must elect QTIP
status on the decedent's estate tax return.' 8 Finally, QTIP is subject to estate
tax in the estate of the surviving spouse if not spent, given away, or otherwise
dissipated prior to the survivor's death. 19
QTIP gives married persons unprecedented estate planning freedom.
Testators can retain control over the ultimate disposition of their property and
still obtain the marital deduction. Although QTIP, therefore, has wide appeal,
certain testators find it particularly attractive. Testators with children by a
previous spouse are attracted to QTIP20 because the marital deduction is ac-
companied by the certainty that these children will be provided for, regardless
of the surviving spouse's affections towards them or the existence of children
of the surviving spouse.2' Testators who are concerned that their property not
generally Note, The QualAed Terminable Interest Rule: An Overview, 34 U. FLA. L. Rav. 737
(1982).
16. I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7)(B)(ii)(I) (1982).
17. Id. § 2056(b)(7)(B)(ii)(II). Powers of appointment exercisable only after the surviving
spouse's death do not prevent qualification for the marital deduction. Id § 2056(b)(7)(B)(ii).
Thus, the surviving spouse may be granted a testamentary special power of appointment. If the
surviving spouse is granted a testamentary general power of appointment, the transfer may auto-
matically qualify for the marital deduction as a marital-deduction power-of-appointment trust.
Id. § 2056(b)(5).
18. Id § 2056(b)(7)(B)(i)(III), (B)(v).
19. Transfers that qualified for the marital deduction prior to ERTA generally were includi-
ble in the gross estate of the surviving spouse, either under I.R.C. § 2033 (1982), as an "interest" in
"property," or because of a general power of appointment described in I.R.C. § 2041 (1982).
QTIP would not have been includible, because income interests not created by the income benefi-
ciary were not includible in the gross estate. See I.R.C. § 2033 (1982); Frazier v. United States,
322 F.2d 221 (5th Cir. 1963). To remedy this disparate treatment, Congress enacted I.R.C. § 2044
(1982) to include QTIP, for which a marital deduction was allowed, in the gross estate of the
surviving spouse. ERTA § 403(d)(3)(A)(i), 95 Stat. 303-04. Congress also enacted I.R.C. § 2519
(1982) to subject the QTIP remainder to gift taxation in the event of a lifetime transfer of the
surviving spouse's income interest. ERTA § 403(d)(3)(B)(i), 95 Stat. 304.
Because Congress believed that the fairness of including in the gross estate of the surviving
spouse property over which she possessed no control and in which she had only an income interest
would not be readily apparent to the surviving spouse or the beneficiaries of her estate, ERTA
§ 403(d)(4)(A), 95 Stat. 304 (codified at I.R.C. § 2207A (1982)), granted the estate of the surviving
souse a right "to recover" from the QTIP recipient the incremental federal estate tax caused by
th inclusion of QTIP. SeeH.R. REP. No. 201,97th Cong., 1st Sess. 160 (1981), reprinted in 1981-2
C.B. 352, 378. A gift tax recovery mechanism also was provided. See I.R.C. § 2207A(b) (1982).
Unfairness, however, still may be apparent to the beneficiaries of the surviving spouse. State
death taxes are not recoverable under I.R.C. § 2207A(b) (1982). No part of the surviving spouse's
unified credit applied toward the gift tax on the QTIP remainder is recoverable from the recipients
of the QTIP. See I.R.C. § 2207A(b) (1982); H.R. REP. No. 201, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 162 (1981),
reprinted in 1981-2 C.B. 352, 379. State gift taxes also are not recoverable under I.R.C. § 2207A(b)
(1982), which similarly makes no provision for offsetting the permanently increased tax brackets
to which the surviving spouse's subsequent gifts will be subject. Finally, the recovery process may
prove difficult and expensive.
20. See Dobris, supra note 3, at 820-21.
21. The testator may fear that his spouse will not treat his children on an equal basis with her
children. See, e.g., Johnson, Some Postmortem Tax and Estate Planning Elections, ALI-ABA
CouRsE MATERLuAI.s J., June 1982, at 5, 18; Kahn, Introduction (to Symposium on Selected Topics
in Estate and Gift Taxation), 34 RurTGERs L. Rav. vi, vii (preceding 591) (1982).
1984]
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fall into the hands of successors to their spouses' affections also favor QTIP;22
they can obtain the marital deduction in a manner which ensures that the
surviving spouse will have no power to dispose of the trust principal. In either
case the testator nevertheless can ensure the comfort of the surviving spouse
through the income interest, the trustee's discretion to distribute principal to
the surviving spouse, or the surviving spouse's limited right of withdrawal.
Those who are concerned primarily with the simultaneous maximization
of estate tax benefit and minimization of spousal benefit are attracted by the
prospect of obtaining the marital deduction in exchange for only an income
interest, because the marital deduction is much less expensive. The possibility
of granting a special power of appointment exercisable at the death of the
surviving spouse 23 promises the additional benefits of flexibility. Not surpris-
ingly, preliminary indications are that the QTIP trust already has replaced the
marital-deduction power-of-appointment trust as the most frequently drafted
marital-deduction trust.24
B. The Unlimited Marital Deduction
ERTA's changes in the marital deduction provisions were not limited to
making the marital deduction available for transfers of property that previ-
ously did not qualify. It also eliminated the quantitative limitations on the
marital deduction.25 Prior to ERTA, the maximum estate tax marital deduc-
tion was the greater of $250,00026 or one-half of the "adjusted gross estate."
'27
Therefore, the marital deduction could eliminate the estate tax completely
only in estates of moderate size.28 Other devices, such as gifts to charity,
29
sometimes were used to obtain a tax-free disposition at the death of the first
spouse to die20 Because ERTA eliminated all quantitative restrictions on the
22. See Dobris, supra note 3, at 820-21.
23. See supra note 17.
24. See supra note 6.
25. ERTA § 403(a)(1)(A), 95 Stat. 301, amended I.R.C. § 2056(a) (1976), and repealed I.R.C.
§ 2056(c) (1976), which contained the quantitative limitations on the marital deduction. ERTA
§ 403(a)(1)(A) also redesignated I.R.C. § 2056(d) (1976) as § 2056(c) (1982).
26. I.R.C. § 2056(c)(1)(A)(i) (1976) (repealed by ERTA § 403(a)(1)(A), 95 Stat. 301).
27. Id § 2056(c)(1)(A)(ii) (repealed by ERTA § 403 (a)(l)(A), 95 Stat. 301). Prior to ERTA,
the decedent's debts and the estate administration expenses, deductible under I.R.C. § 2053, and
certain losses incurred by the estate, deductible under I.R.C. § 2054, were subtracted from the
"gross estate," see I.R.C. § 2001 (1982), to arrive at the "adjusted gross estate." I.R.C.
§ 2056(c)(2)(A) (repealed 1981). I.R.C. § 2056(c)(1)(B) (repealed 1981) further reduced the maxi-
mum allowable deduction in cases where the allowed gift-tax marital deduction exceeded 50,7 of
the value of marital gifts. I.R.C. § 2056(c)(1)(C) and (c)(2)(B) (repealed 1981) generally denied
the marital deduction for transfers of community property.
28. Prior to ERTA, the marital deduction could shield only estates of $250,000 or less from
the estate tax. By 1981 the unified credit equivalent, which equals the amount of property that can
pass free of tax by virtue of the applicable unified credit, had risen to $175,625. See Tax Reform
Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2001(a)(2), 90 Stat. 1520, 1846-47 (codified as amended at
I.R.C. § 2010 (1982)). Thus, in 1981, by using both the marital deduction and the unified credit,
an individual could pass tax-free up to $425,625 to, or for the benefit of, the surviving spouse.
29. The transfers to charities described in I.R.C. § 2055(a)(l)-(4) qualified for the charitable
deduction without quantitative limitation. Cf. I.R.C. § 2055(d) (1982) (deduction limited to value
of property included in gross estate).
30. Typically, the testator's wealth did not permit substantial gifts to charity. Thus, many
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marital deduction, any married person, no matter how wealthy, can immunize
his estate from the federal estate tax by qualifying his estate for the unlimited
marital deduction.
31
C. The Increased Unted Credit
ERTA also increased the unified credit available to offset the tentative
estate tax liability.32 By 1981, the unified credit,33 introduced by the Tax Re-
form Act of 1976,34 had reached its full, phased-in amount of $47,000.
35
ERTA provided a series of further annual increases in the unified credit.
36 If
the increases are allowed to become effective as scheduled,37 the unified credit
estate planners conceded an estate tax at the death of the first spouse to die. By passing that
portion of the estate that did not qualify for the marital deduction in a manner that excluded it
from the surviving spouse's gross estate, however, they ensured that this portion would not be
subject to tax again at the death of the surviving spouse. Although these assets could be passed to
children or grandchildren, they were most often devised in trust for the benefit of either the sur-
viving spouse or the entire family. Such trusts often were referred to as "nonmarital trusts."
31. Many states impose inheritance taxes that provide no or only a small exemption for
spousal transfers. In other states, QTIP may not qualify for a marital deduction, or quantitative
limitations on the marital deduction may apply. Thus, death taxes remain a possibility in these
states, even when use of the unlimited marital deduction eliminates federal estate tax liability. See
generally Schaeffer, Avoiding the State Death Tax Disadvantages of the Unlimited Marital Deduc-
tion in Large Estates, 10 EST. PLAN. 36 (1983). For a brief summary of state death taxes, see
Covey, supra note 8, 102.1, at 1-382 n.2. For a more detailed analysis of the death taxes of four
states, see Colloquium on Paradigmatic State Inheritance, State Estate and Gift Taxation, and The
ERT4, 34 ROERs L. REv. 699 (1982), which analyzes an estate tax (New York), two inheritance
taxes (Pennsylvania and New Jersey), and a sponge tax (Florida). For an explanation of a sponge
tax, see infra note 68. Similarly, federal estate tax may be due on an estate left solely to, or for the
benefit of, a surviving spouse. Property used to pay state death taxes or nondeductible administra-
tion expenses, for example, does not pass to, or for the benefit of, the surviving spouse. Therefore,
it cannot qualify for the marital deduction. When such amounts, together with the decedent's
"adjusted taxable gifts," exceed the applicable unified credit equivalent, federal estate tax is gener-
ated even though the entire estate seems headed for the surviving spouse. See Blattmachr & Lust-
garten, Many Questions, supra note 3, at 18-19; Cornfeld, supra note 8, 1702; Rothenberg, State
Death Taxes Can "Create" Federal Tax Even with Use of Unlimited Marital Deduction, 10 TAX'N
FOR LAW. 346 (1982).
32. See ERTA § 401(a)(1), (2), 95 Stat. 299 (amending I.R.C. § 2010 (a), (b)).
33. I.R.C. § 2010 allows a "unified credit" against the "tentative" estate tax liability, which is
computed by applying the rate table of I.R.C. § 2001(c) to the sum of the "taxable estate" and
"adjusted taxable gifts," and then subtracting the gift tax on the "adjusted taxable gifts." See
I.R.C. § 2001(b) (1982). The unified credit effectively exempts a certain amount of property pass-
ing either during an individual's lifetime or at death.
34. Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2001(a)(2), 90 Stat. 1520, 1848 (codified as amended at I.R.C.
§ 2010 (1982)).
35. See id. This unified credit was sufficient to shelter a taxable estate of $175,625. See supra
note 28.
36. The following chart illustrates the phase-in of the unified credit, as scheduled by ERTA.







See I.R.C. §§ 2001(c), 2010(a), (b) (1982).
37. The amount of property exempted from tax by ERTA is unprecedented. See generally S.
SURREY, W. WARREN, P. MCDANIEL & H. GUTMAN, FEDERAL WEALTH TRANSFER TAXATION:
CASES AND MATERIALS 1-13 (2d ed. 1982). But cf. Zelinsky, The Estate and Gif? Tax Changes of
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will equal $192,80038 by 1987, enough to shelter taxable wealth of $600,000.39
Although the increase in the unified credit is not a change in the rules relating
to the marital deduction, it has had a major impact on marital-deduction
planning 4
0
The marital deduction is primarily an estate tax deferral device.4 1 Al-
though it shields property from estate tax at the death of the first spouse to die,
the property is subject to estate tax at the death of the surviving spouse unless
spent, given away, or otherwise dissipated prior to her death.42 The unified
credit, however, can be used to transfer property in ways that avoid the estate
tax at the surviving spouse's death, further postponing the tax.4 3 Thus, the
"credit-shelter" trust seeks to secure exemption of the largest amount of prop-
erty from estate tax in both the testator's and surviving spouse's estates
through the use of the testator's unified credit.44 Even if the marital share45
1981: A Brie/Essay on HistoricalPerspective, 60 N.C.L. REv. 821, 823 (1982) (arguing that from a
"historical perspective" ERTA's changes "do not look like precedent-shattering alterations").
Since ERTA, the increasing federal deficit and the rethinking of estate tax policy have resulted in
suggestions that the unified credit be "frozen" at some level below its scheduled fully phased-in
level of $192,800. See Middleton, Tax Credit Chill?, 69 A.B.A. J. 723 (1983); Freeze ofEstate Tax
Cuts Proposed, PROB. & PROP., Summer 1983, at 21. But see Treasury News Release of June 27,
1983, [2 Estate & Gift] FED. TAXEs (P-H) 142,183, at 142,249 ("[T]he Administration fully sup-
ports Senate Resolution 126, which expresses the sense of the Senate that the estate and gift tax
reductions enacted in ERTA should remain undisturbed.").
38. I.R.C. § 2010(a), (b) (1982).
39. See id § 2001(c)(l).
40. See, e.g., Ascher & Kartiganer, Draftingfor the Marital Deduction under the Economic
Recovery Tax Act of.1981, 8 PROB. NOTES 3, 4-6 (1982).
41. See J. PRIcE, supra note 6, at 103; Zelinsky, supra note 37, at 825.
42. See I.R.C. § 2044 (1982). Actuarial studies indicate that the surviving spouse generally
outlives the decedent by eight years. Thomas, Esperti & Katz, New Variable Marital Deduction
Technique Eliminates Uncertainty in Estate Plans, 47 J. TAX'N 194, 195 (1977); Rosenfeld, Current
Change, Future Shock Estate Planning in the 1980", TR. & EST., Jan. 1982, at 27, 28.
43. Property intended to avoid estate tax at the surviving spouse's death likely will avoid
estate taxation for a significant period of time if potentially includible in the gross estate of one in
a younger generation. Those most likely to receive an interest subject to estate tax at death are the
testator's children, who generally outlive the surviving spouse (their parent) by at least 20 years. If
grandchildren receive such interests, the anticipated deferral period is even greater.
44. See Adams, Sweet & Herpe, The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981: Big Changes in
Storefor the Trust Industry, TR. & EST., Oct. 1981, at 16, 27; Ascher & Kartiganer, supra note 40,
at 4-6. See generally Barnett, Unexpected (and Often Irrational) Income Tax Consequences of
Funding the New Marital Deduction and Credit Shelter Bequests, 16 INST. ON EST. PLAN. 1900
(1982); Fruehwald, Credit Shelter Trusts Should not be Limited to Just the Unified Credit, 10 EST.
PLAN. 200 (1983); Mulligan, Drafting Marital Deduction Formula Clauses after ERTA to Achleve
Maximum Tax Savings, 57 J. TAX'N 362 (1982); Trapp, Drafting and Funding Marital and
Nonmarital Formula Bequests, 17 INST. ON EST. PLAN. 1200 (1983).
The credit-shelter trust's exemption from estate tax at the death of the surviving spouse does
not require that the surviving spouse be deprived of the benefit of the property passing to the
credit-shelter trust. She frequently is the sole income beneficiary of such a trust, and a trustee
power to invade principal for her benefit often is included. Alternatively, the credit-shelter trust
can be designed to sprinkle trust income and principal among the surviving spouse and the dece-
dent's children (or others) at the trustee's discretion, frequently with a "five and five" power in the
surviving spouse. See infra. In either case, the surviving spouse frequently is granted a testamen-
tary special power of appointment. Thus, the surviving spouse is entitled to both beneficial enjoy-
ment of, and significant control over, the entire estate.
A "five and five" power is one designed to fit within the protection of I.R.C. §§ 2041(b)(2)
and 2514(e) (1982). It allows the holder to withdraw the greater of $5,000 or 5% of the trust assets
each year. Usually, no significant adverse estate or gift tax consequences result from such powers.
But see Huff, he 'Tive and Five" Power and Lapsed Powers of Withdrawal, 15 INST. ON EST.
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passes outright to the surviving spouse, many include credit-shelter trusts in
their clients' wills to "save the second tax" at the death of the surviving spouse.
This approach increases the family wealth that remains after both spouses
die.
4 6
D. A Frequently Recurring Response
ERTA allows testators to achieve objectives that previously were unat-
tainable. The testator can control the ultimate disposition of his property by
using a QTIP trust to qualify for the marital deduction. When a credit-shelter
trust is combined with a transfer that qualifies the remainder of the testator's
estate for the marital deduction, generally no estate tax will be due at the testa-
tor's death. If both spouses utilize such planning, a couple with combined
taxable wealth of $1.2 million generally will pay no estate tax. Therefore, a
frequent drafting technique is a two-trust estate plan: a credit-shelter trust
designed to exhaust the unified credit of the first spouse to die and to avoid
inclusion in the gross estate of the surviving spouse; and a residual QTIP trust
designed to qualify for the marital deduction and to control the ultimate dis-
position of the client's property.
II. THE MECHANICS OF THE QTIP ELECTION
If a QTIP trust is to qualify for the marital deduction, there must be an
"election" 47 "by the executor."'48 Consequently, the election generally will be
made by a person subject to fiduciary obligations.
49
Although the Internal Revenue Code states that the QTIP election is to be
made "on the [estate tax] return,"' 50 it provides few details. Even though the
estate tax return is due nine months after the date of death,51 the QTIP elec-
tion probably can be deferred for at least six additional months52 if a filing
extension is obtained. 53 Moreover, the QTIP election should be valid regard-
PLAN. 9 700 (1981) (exploring potential estate, gift, generation-skipping, and income tax conse-
quences of such powers).
45. A "marital" share is that portion of an estate that qualifies for the marital deduction.
46. See, e.g., Allevato, supra note 8, at 24-45.
47. I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7)(B)(i)(III) (1982).
48. Id. § 2056(b)(7)(B)(v).
49. The term "executor" includes not only executors, administrators, and personal represent-
atives, but also anyone holding property of a decedent if a legal representative has not been ap-
pointed. See I.R.C. § 2203 (1982). Thus, there may be occasions when the QTIP election is made
by one not in a fiduciary capacity.
50. I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7)(B)(v) (1982).
51. Id § 6075(a).
52. Eg., Eubank, supra note 3, 1 2001.1; Gamble, New Tax Law May Reduce Estates Subject
to Tax by 90%, TR. & EsT., Oct. 1981, at 39,48 n.20; Gutierrez, supranote 8, 1 1401.1; Ketchum &
Johnson, supra note 8, at 92; Keydel, supra note 6, at 39; Moore, New Marital Deduction, supra
note 6, IT 904, 906; Mulligan, Proposed Regulations Do Not Solve Ambiguities in Planning for
Effective Use of Disclaimers, 10 EST. PLAN. 8, 11 (1983); Strauss, supra note 6, at 80.
53. The Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to grant extensions. I.R.C. § 6081(a) (1982).
Treas. Reg. § 20.6081-1(a) (1980) delegates that authority to IRS District Directors'and the direc-
tors of IRS Service Centers. Generally, such extensions may not exceed six months. I.R.C.
§ 6081(a) (1982).
1984]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
less when made and regardless whether an extension has been obtained if the
election is made on the estate's first estate tax return. 5 4 The prudent executor,
however, will make every effort to exercise the QTIP election on a timely re-
turn until the IRS provides formal guidance on this issue. 55
The Code also specifies that the QTIP election is irrevocable.5 6 Thus,
important tax consequences to both the estate and its beneficiaries depend
upon the exercise of an irrevocable election by one who usually is subject to
fiduciary obligations.
Immediately following ERTA's enactment, commentators speculated
whether a "partial" QTIP election-one that would qualify only a portion of
an interest that could qualify-was possible.5 7 The temporary regulations
state that partial QTIP elections of certain types are permissible.5 8 Under
these regulations the election may not be made for specific property but must
be made for a "fractional or percentile share. '5 9 Use of a formula election
provision is permitted expressly.60
III. UNDERSTANDING THE FULL-DEFERRAL ESTATE PLAN THAT RELIES
ON FIDUCIARY EXERCISE OF THE QTIP ELECTION
A. The Myth of Deferral
One reason for the popularity of the full-deferral 6' estate plan is the com-
monly held belief that deferral of estate tax necessarily produces economic
advantages derived from the time value of money.62 Although the surviving
54. See Farmer, suprldnote 6, at 90; Joint Report, supra note 8, at 4-5; McCaffrey & Kalik,
supra note 8, at 2, col. 2.
No legislative history is directly relevant to the timeliness of a QTIP election. The legislative
history of ERTA's amendment of I.R.C. § 2032A(d)(l), however, evidences congressional intent
to render timely any special use valuation election made on an estate's first estate tax return. See,
e.g., CONF. REP. No. 215, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 249 (1981), reprinted in 1981-2 C.B. 481, 508
("[The election is permitted to be made on a late return, if that return is the first estate tax return
filed by the estate."). Because ERTA amended § 2032A(d)(l) to describe the special use valuation
election in words virtually identical to those used to describe the QTIP election, no timeliness
requirement should be imposed on the QTIP election. Compare I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7)(B)(v) (1982)
("An election. . . shall be made by the executor on the return of tax imposed by section 2001.")
with id. § 2032A(d)(1) ("The election . . . shall be made on the return of the tax imposed by
section 2001.").
55. See Joint Report, supra note 8, at 4.
56. I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7)(B)(v) (1982).
57. See, e.g., Adams, Questions andAnswers on the Tax Act of 1981, TR. & EST., April 1982,
at 53, 55-56; Blattmachr & Lustgarten, Many Questions, supra note 3, at 21; Cornfeld, supra note 8,
1 1702.2; Moore, New Marital Deduction, supra note 6, 1 905; Strauss, supra note 6, at 80; The
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981: A Panel Discussion, 40 INST. ON FED. TAX'N 52.01,
52.04[4] (1982) (remarks of Julian S. Bush) [hereinafter cited as Panel Discussion].
58. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 22.2056-1(b), T.D. 7833 (1982).
59. Id But c. Estate of Alexander, 82 T.C. 34 (1984) (pecuniary amount qualified for mari-
tal deduction).
60. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 22.2056-1(b), T.D. 7833 (1982).
61. In this Article, "full deferral" means qualification of the entire estate for the marital
deduction, subject only to carving out the unified credit equivalent in such a way as not to be
subject to estate taxation at the death of the surviving spouse.
62. See, eg., Backman & Frank, Five Factors to Consider in Determining How Much of the
Unlimited Marital Deduction to Use, 9 EST. PLAN. 194, 198, 201 (1982); Blattmachr & Lustgarten,
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spouse does realize economic benefits from deferral of the estate tax, deferral,
if viewed from the perspective of the QTIP remaindermen, does not necessar-
ily work the same magic.
63
Full deferral stacks the QTIP of the first spouse to die on top of the taxa-
ble estate of the surviving spouse.64 Thus, full deferral generally ensures that
the property on which the estate tax is deferred eventually will be taxed at a
higher marginal rate.65 When the highest applicable marginal estate tax
bracket of the estate of the surviving spouse is greater than that of the first
spouse to die, more estate tax dollars will be paid at the death of the surviving
spouse than the total that would have been paid had a portion of the taxes
been paid at the death of the first spouse to die.
6 6
Full deferral can cause, from the perspective of the QTIP remaindermen,
a further substantial depletion of assets because it deliberately foregoes an op-
portunity to "freeze" the surviving spouse's estate. At the death of the surviv-
ing spouse, the estate tax will be assessed not only on the QTIP, but also on all
appreciation and accumulated income.67 Thus, if the combined estates' assets
are likely to increase in value, whether through appreciation or accumulation
of income, full deferral can prove especially costly to the QTIP remaindermen.
Many Questions, supra note 3, at 21-22, 25 n.24; Covey, supra note 8, 1 110.15; Koehler, The
Marital Deduction After the Economic Recovery Act of 1981, in THE PLANNING AND ADMINISTRA-
TION OF A LARGE ESTATE 75, 92-93 (1982); Neufeld, When to Avoid or Cut Back on the Use of the
New Unlimited Marital Deduction, 10 TAX'N FOR LAW. 132, 135 (1981); Ordower, supra note 8, at
35-36, 40-41 n.36; Rodriguez, Marital Deduction Planning after the Economic Recovery Tax Act of
1981, 7 REV. OF TAX'N OF INDIVIDUALS 134, 140-42 (1983); Weiss & Etkin, New Law Overhauls
Estate and Gift Taxes, Triggering New Planning Strategies, 55 J. TAX'N 274, 275-76 & n.19 (1981);
Note, supra note 8, at 204-06. This explanation of the popularity of full deferral also is noted by
Adams, Sweet & Herpe, supra note 44, at 28-29; and Kahn, supra note 21, at 611-32.
There are, of course, economic benefits available from deferral. Unless some dispersal of the
assets occurs prior to the death of the surviving spouse, however, those benefits may accrue only to
the surviving spouse; taxes imposed at the death of the surviving spouse can convert economic
benefit into a loss. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 9.
63. Assume an estate exceeding $2,500,000, subject to the post-1984 50% estate tax bracket. If
the first spouse to die qualifies property valued at $1.00 for the marital deduction and the property
triples in value prior to the death of the surviving spouse (also in the 50% estate tax bracket), the
property remaining after the surviving spouse's death is $1.50. If the first spouse to die chooses
not to qualify the property valued at $1.00 for the marital deduction, an estate tax of 50 cents is
paid. No additional estate tax, however, need be paid at the death of the surviving spouse. The
remaining 50 cents, when similarly tripled, likewise amounts to $1.50 after the surviving spouse's
death.
64. See, e.g., Note, supra note 8, at 203.
65. Marital deduction property potentially is includible in the surviving spouse's gross estate.
See supra note 19 and accompanying text. Thus, if the surviving spouse has property of her own,
full deferral stacks the property of the first spouse to die in the highest estate tax bracket applica-
ble to the estate of the survivor;, it may even push the survivor's estate into a higher bracket. Even
if the surviving spouse has no assets of her own, full deferral frequently results in a higher applica-
ble estate tax rate in the survivor's estate than would be the case if approximately one-half of the
property had by-passed the survivor's estate. The typical full-deferral estate plan guarantees a
significant disparity in the applicable marginal estate tax brackets since the highest applicable
estate tax bracket at the death of the first spouse to die is zero percent.
66. Cf. Edwards, Use of Marital Deduction Equalization Clauses: Planning and Caveats, 39
INST. OF FED. TAX'N T 46.01 (1981) ("In a progressive tax structure, two equal amounts subject to
tax will result in the smallest possible tax liability.").
67. For those who believe that a picture is worth a thousand words, Reinders, Boehlje &
Harl, The Marital Deduction: How Much Should You QualfyZ 1981-82 AGI. L.J. 262, 263, has a
helpful diagram illustrating the concept described in the text.
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Assume that a married individual dies in 1987 with a taxable estate
(before the marital deduction) of $5,000,000. His spouse dies in 1998 and has
no assets of her own. The state death tax applicable to both estates is a sponge
tax,68 neither spouse has made any adjusted taxable gifts, and the value of the
assets remains constant. Property not consumed by death taxes at the death of
the first spouse to die generates an annual after-tax return of seven percent.
The surviving spouse annually consumes $80,000,69 which is obtained from a
marital trust. If the executor of the will of the first spouse to die elects full
deferral, no death taxes are paid at the first spouse's death, the credit-shelter
trust receives $600,000, and the marital trust receives $4,400,000. If the surviv-
ing spouse dies eleven years later, the credit-shelter trust will have grown to
$1,262,911, and the marital trust will have grown to $7,998,661. Death taxes at
the surviving spouse's death will be $3,582,330, leaving $5,679,242 for the
QTIP remaindermen. If the first spouse to die instead had elected to pay the
estate tax on one-half of his estate (equalization),70 the marital trust would
68. A sponge tax is a tax equal to the amount of the federal credit for state death taxes under
I.R.C. § 2011 (1982). If the entire estate, other than the unified credit equivalent, qualifies for the
marital deduction, the state death tax credit is zero. See I.R.C. § 2011(f) (1982). Therefore, the
sponge tax also is zero. Since a sponge tax always is equal to the state death tax credit, the total of
the federal estate tax and a state sponge tax always is equal to the federal estate tax computed
without reference to the state death tax credit. One reason why this analysis must include state
death taxes is Congress' failure to coordinate its change in the maximum estate tax rates with the
state death tax credit. ERTA § 402, 95 Stat. 300, amended I.R.C. § 2001(c) to decrease the maxi-
mum estate tax rate from 70% to 50% during the period 1982 through 1985. I.R.C. § 201 l(b)
(1982), which also fixes the maximum allowable state death tax credit on a graduated basis, how-
ever, was not amended. Thus, after 1984 the highest net federal estate tax bracket for an estate
slightly in excess of $600,000 will be 33% (37% less a 4% credit), and that for an estate in excess of
$10,000,000 will be 34% (50% less a 16% credit). An estate slightly in excess of $2,500,000, how-
ever, will be subject to a federal estate tax bracket of 42% (50% less an 8% credit). Thus, in certain
situations, the highest federal estate tax bracket applicable to a very large estate will be lower than
that applicable to an estate one-half its size. See Clark, Sweeping Changes in Estate and GOft
Taxation Are Part of the New Economic Recovery Tax Act, 10 TAX'N FOR LAw. 78, 78 (1981);
Keydel, supra note 6, at 26; Panel Discussion, supra note 57, 52.04[2]. To date, Congress, how-
ever, has ignored this obvious and embarrassing blunder.
The costs of full deferral often are magnified when state death taxes are considered, In some
states there may be no marital deduction or only a small marital deduction. See supra note 31. In
these states, an estate plan calling for the entire estate to pass to, or for the benefit of, the surviving
spouse could trigger a large state death tax liability. If this state death tax liability exceeds the
otherwise unused portion of the unified credit equivalent, it also will trigger federal estate tax
liability by decreasing the amount qualifying for the federal marital deduction. In any event, in
many states the state death tax imposed on the estate of the first spouse to die is likely to exceed
significantly the allowable state death tax credit, which, in a full-deferral estate, is zero. See supra.
The adverse effects of state death taxes often can be reduced by splitting the estates and, therefore,
reducing the amount of property subject to the highest marginal state death tax bracket. See
Garlock, supra note 9, at 239-41; Rothenberg, supranote 31, at 348-49; Schaeffer, supranote 31, at
37-38.
69. In a $5,000,000 estate, the surviving spouse's $80,000 annual consumption may appear
unrealistically low. If the facts assumed in the text are modified by allowing the surviving spouse
an annual consumption of $200,000, however, equalization, see infra note 70, still provides
$242,321 more for the QTIP remaindermen than full deferral.
70. In this Article, "equalization" generally means qualification for the marital deduction of
that amount necessary to make the taxable estate of the first spouse to die equal to the potential
estate of the surviving spouse. In combined estate plans involving less than $1,200,000 per couple,
there generally will be no need for equalization after 1986 since the credit-shelter provisions of full
deferral usually will be capable of effectuating the tax-free disposition of both spouse's estates.
(Two unified credit equivalents of $600,000 will exempt the couple's entire wealth.) Therefore,
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receive $2,500,000, and $833,000 in death taxes would be paid immediately,
leaving $1,667,000 for the credit-shelter trust. After eleven years the credit-
shelter trust would have grown to $3,508,788 and the marital trust to
$3,999,442. Death taxes at the surviving spouse's death would be $1,582,721,
leaving $5,925,509 for the QTIP remaindermen. Full deferral would cost the
QTIP remaindermen $246,267 more than equalization.7 1 In fact, regardless
this Article does not attempt to analyze the benefits of equalization at combined wealth levels of
$1,200,000 or less.
In situations when the first spouse to die has a taxable estate (before consideration of the
marital deduction) exceeding $5,000,000, the benefits of equalization can be achieved without
fully equalizing the couple's estates. After 1984, the 50% maximum federal estate tax bracket will
begin at $2,500,000. Prepayment of taxes at a marginal rate equal to that amount at which the
taxes ultimately will be imposed is economically unjustified since the same amount of tax deple-
tion occurs regardless when the tax is paid. Prepayment of tax on more than $2,500,000 would
forfeit the benefits of deferral during the surviving spouse's lifetime. It would not optimize family
wealth and, therefore, never should be used for that purpose. See Blattmachr & Lustgarten, Many
Questions, supra note 3, at 21-22; Dobris, supra note 3, at 812 n.87; Halbach, Reorientation: Tax
Deferral under an Unlimited Marital Deductiong 9 COMMUNITY PROP. J. 42, 43, 45 (1982); Under-
wood, Estate Planning after ERTA.: 0 Death, Where Is Thy Sting, 2 Miss. COLL. L. REv. 203, 217
(1981).
Prior to 1985, when the maximum federal estate tax bracket gradually is being lowered to
50%, see I.R.C. § 2001(c)(2) (1982), it is important that equalization not be used to tax, in the
estate of the first spouse to die, more than enough property to reach the 50% estate tax bracket,
since the surviving spouse might live beyond 1984 and, therefore, be subject to no greater than a
50% marginal estate tax rate. See Backman & Frank, supra note 62, at 197.
71. The example in the text is adapted from Kalik, Economics of the Marital Deduction After
ERT4, in SEVENTH ANN. Amiz. EsT. PLAN. INST. FOR 1982, 248.
The following chart shows the amount of property ultimately available for the QTIP remain-
dermen upon the death of the surviving spouse when the size of the estate of the first spouse to die
varies. The other assumptions made in the text remain unchanged.
Taxable Estate Assets Ultimately Assets Ultimately
(Prior to Marital Available for the Available for the Increase in QTIP
Deduction) of QTIP QTIP Remainder
First Spouse to Remaindermen Remaindermen Attributable to
Die (Full Deferral) (Equalization) Equalization
$1,500,000 $1,882,869 $1,777,771 ($105,098)
2,000,000 2,501,169 2,533,530 32,361
3,000,000 3,574,390 3,747,242 172,852
4,000,000 4,626,815 4,862,559 235,744
5,000,000 5,679,242 5,925,509 246,267
For other examples that arrive at similar conclusions, see Cornfeld, Marital Deduction: Planning
and Drafting, 34 MAOR TAX PLAN. 1 1400, 1404 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Cornfeld, Marital
Deduction]; Cornfeld, supra note 8, 1702.3; Garlock, supra note 9, at 238; Harris, supra note 9, at
15; Keydel, supra note 6, at 73 (Exhibit 4); Kurtz, supra, note 8, at 606-07; Salus, The Income Tax
Aspects of The Unlimited Marital Deduction, C.L.U.J., Oct. 1982, at 22, 23-25; Letter of Martin
Sirfen, Tax Practitioners' Shop Talk, 56 J. TAX'N 128 (1982).
The charts and conclusions set forth in Gutierrez, New Marital Deduction Strategies, ALI-
ABA CouRsE MATERIALS J., Oct. 1981, at 15, seem contrary to those presented herein. In fact
they are not; Gutierrez makes a very different comparison: full deferral versus no deferral (other
than sheltering the unified credit equivalent). Therefore, for very large estates, his charts in es-
sence compare the effect of paying all of the tax at the death of the first spouse with that of paying
all of the tax at the death of the surviving spouse.
The conclusions and computations of many commentators also are contrary to those herein.
E., Backman & Frank, supra note 62, at 198-99 & Exhibit IV; Blattmachr & Lustgarten, Many
Questions, supra note 3, at 25 n.24; Covey, supra note 8, 110.15; Koehler, supra note 62, at 99
(Table C); Ordower, supra note 8, at 40-41 n.36; Rodriguez, supra note 62, at 140-41; Underwood,
supra note 70, at 216 & n.41; Note, supra note 8, at 204-06 & n.84. Such analyses ignore the estate-
freezing characteristics of equalization. Instead of adding assumed appreciation or accumulated
income to both of the equalized estates and then computing the total amount of property that
would have remained after taxes at the death of the surviving spouse, they conclude that coin-
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how great an after-tax return is obtained and how long the period of survival
of the surviving spouse, deferral alone cannot provide the QTIP remainder-
men any net economic benefit.
72
By wasting the lowest estate tax brackets of the first spouse to die and
subjecting QTIP appreciation and income to taxation at the death of the sur-
viving spouse, full deferral can increase dramatically the total tax burden.
73
Thus, full deferral can deplete substantially the family wealth remaining after
the death of the surviving spouse.74
B. The Attractiveness of Post-Mortem Flexibility: How Much Marital
Deduction is Appropriate?
For many clients the cost of full deferral is academic. Understandably,
many clients wish to defer taxes until they are unavoidable.75 Moreover, in
many situations the surviving spouse is the overwhelmingly predominant ben-
eficiary,76 and any estate plan that would increase the assets eventually pass-
ing to the QTIP remaindermen at the expense of the surviving spouse is
pounded earnings from the tax dollars that might be deferred at the death of the first spouse
eventually could exceed the amount of taxes that equalization would save if there were no appre-
ciation or accumulated earnings on any estate property other than the deferred tax dollars,
72. See Adams, Sweet & Herpe, supra note 44, at 28-29; Garlock, supra note 9, at 238-39:
Harris, supra note 9, at 14; Keydel, supra note 6, at 39-40.
If the annual after-tax return is significantly greater than 7% and the period of deferral is
significantly longer than 11 years, equalization even more dramatically outperforms full deferral.
If the facts assumed in the text are varied by assuming an annual after-tax return of 20% and a
survival period of 20 years, equalization ultimately provides a staggering $4,485,499 more for the
QTIP remaindermen than full deferral.
73. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
74. The analysis offered in notes 71-72 and the accompanying text assumes that not only the
property for which the marital deduction is allowed, but also the appreciation and accumulated
income, eventually will be taxed at the death of the surviving spouse. Such an assumption has
been termed "speculative" and "conjectural" elsewhere. See Backman & Frank, supra note 62, at
194, 201; Kurtz, supra note 8, at 605; Kurtz, The Impact of the Revenue Act of.1978 and the 1976
Tax Reform Act on Estate Tax Marital Deduction Formulas, 64 IowA L. REv. 739, 794 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Kurtz, Formulas]. The inappropriateness of equalization in family situations
in which depletion rather than augmentation is likely to occur after the death of the first spouse is
discussed infra notes 119-29 and accompanying text. Equalization, however, is a meaningful con-
cept only at taxable wealth levels exceeding $1,200,000 (after 1986). See supra note 70. Even if
conservatively invested in tax-exempt municipal bonds yielding 7% per annum, $1,200,000 would
yield an annual after-tax return of $84,000, an amount that might exceed the surviving spouse's
expenditures. If more aggressively invested, the total return (appreciation and income) from as-
sets in excess of $1,200,000 frequently should exceed the surviving spouse's expenditures. There-
fore, in many of the situations in which equalization is feasible, an assumption that the family's
wealth will grow during the surviving spouse's life is not speculative. See Garlock, supra note 9, at
237-38, which demonstrates that equalization can outperform full deferral in a $10,000,000 estate,
even though the surviving spouse withdraws $500,000 per year. See also Comfeld, MaritalDeduc-
tion, supra note 71, % 1404, which demonstrates that with only a 5% after-tax return on a
$5,000,000 estate, equalization can outperform full deferral, even though the surviving spouse
withdraws $120,000 per year.
75. See, e.g., Cornfeld, supra note 8, 11702.3; Garlock, supra note 9, at 239; Halbach, supra
note 70, at 45; Halbach, Interspousal Transfers and Ownership after ERT4 '81, 8 PROD, NOTES 122,
128 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Halbach, Transfers]; Panel Discussion, supra note 57, 1 52.04[3];
Ruh, Drafting Marital Deduction Clauses after ERT4, II COLO. LAW. 678, 684 (1982).
76. See, e.g., Polasky, The Sound andthe Furry-Passing the Buck (Thoughts on Passing Prop.
erty to Spouses and Children), 9 INST. ON EST. PLAN. $1 2000, 2003.1 (1975).
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inappropriate. Another reason for full deferrars popularity must therefore
exist.
When a client's estate plans are formulated, no one can predict with cer-
tainty many of the factors on which the decision to defer the estate tax must be
based.77 Thus, it is arguable that a lawyer should attempt to preserve the no-
tax option. The need for a subsequent reevaluation of that decision, however,
is implicit in such a decision. Periodic reviews of clients' dispositive docu-
ments is one way to perform this reevaluation. Unfortunately, many of the
uncertainties that make full deferral a popular drafting technique disappear, if
at all, only after the client has died. Thus, many draftsmen rely, instead, on
the QTIP election to secure subsequent reevaluation of the full-deferral deci-
sion at the time they believe it is most needed-after the client's death.78 Be-
cause the temporary regulations allow partial QTIP elections, 79 they have
been hailed as the "go ahead" for using the QTIP election to "fine tune" an
estate plan after the client's death.80 The decision on the appropriate amount
of the marital deduction is thus deferred until more of the facts necessary to
make an informed decision are known.
The validity of using the QTIP election to plan the estates of the dead
depends on the proposition that the executor will be in a better position to
answer the question, "How much marital deduction is appropriate?," than the
client. To test that proposition, the considerations that assist in answering the
question must be analyzed.
81
1. Simultaneous or Nearly Simultaneous Deaths of the Spouses
Full deferral is inappropriate when spouses die simultaneously or nearly
simultaneously.82 Because there is not time for the benefits of full deferral to
77. See, eg., Kurtz, Formulas, supra note 74, at 776.
78. See supra note 8.
79. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 22.2056-1(b), T.D. 7833 (1982).
80. See, e.g., Eubank, supra note 3; Gutierrez, supra note 8; McCaffrey & Kalik, supra note 8,
at 2, cols. 3-5.
81. The order that the factors are discussed in the text represents the author's judgment re-
garding their relative conclusiveness in making the full deferral/equalization decision. For exam-
ple, if the testator agrees strongly that his spouse is his overwhelmingly predominant beneficiary,
the author believes that, other than in planning for the simultaneous or nearly simultaneous
deaths of the spouses, full deferral generally will be appropriate, regardless of any other factor.
Accordingly, the inquiry as to the surviving spouse's position in the client's dispositional hierarchy
is discussed second, infra text accompanying notes 96-104, following only the discussion of plan-
ning for simultaneous or nearly simultaneous deaths, infra text accompanying notes 82-95. Vari-
ous lower-level factors may, and often will, point in opposite directions. For example, if it appears
that the couple's combined taxable wealth will increase dramatically during the surviving spouse's
lifetime, equalization is indicated. See infra text accompanying notes 117-21. But if the testator
trusts his surviving spouse to undertake a faithful program of giving to the testator's QTIP remain-
dermen, full deferral is indicated. See infra text accompanying notes 122-29. Rethinking thus
may reveal that the couple's combined taxable wealth is likely to decrease, and therefore no con-
flict exists. In other situations, actual conflicts will exist. The author suspects that these decisions
often will be made on the basis of factors that the testator is most firmly committed to, that the
testator and his attorney believe they have made the most accurate estimates of, or that appear
highest on the list in the text.
82. Even full deferral advocates agree with this proposition. See, e.g., Kurtz, stpra note 8, at
605 n.32; Note, supra note 8, at 206.
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be realized, 83 full deferral provides few advantages to the surviving spouse.84
Thus, if the sum of either spouse's taxable estate and adjusted taxable gifts, in
addition to the property that full deferral would confer, reasonably can be
expected to exceed the unified credit equivalent, provision must be made for a
more appropriate response should the spouses die simultaneously or nearly
so.8 5 The best way to anticipate this possibility is to include an equalization
clause in the dispositive document of the "wealthier" spouse that would equal-
ize the spouses' estates' highest applicable estate tax brackets 86 if the "poorer"
spouse died within six months of the wealthier spouse.87 The poorer spouse's
dispositive document, either expressly or by the effect of a similar equalization
clause, would not benefit the wealthier spouse if the wealthier spouse died
within six months of the poorer spouse. This automatically would optimize the
property passing to the QTIP remaindermen. 88
Some commentators contend that the QTIP election and disclaimers by
83. See Kurtz, Formulas, supra note 74, at 795.
84. See Dobris, supra note 3, at 828-29 n.232.
85. See id at 828. Cf. Edwards, supra note 66, 1 46.05 (pre-ERTA recommendations for
nearly simultaneous deaths).
86. See 4 A. CASNER, ESTATE PLANNING 1377 (4th ed. 1980); J. PRICE, supra note 6, at 265-
67. For a concise discussion of equalization clauses, see Edwards, supra note 66. Many changes,
however, have occurred since Edwards' article. When he wrote, the quantitative limitations,
which generally limited the marital deduction to 50% of the adjusted gross estate, see supra text
accompanying notes 26-27, served to equalize spouses' estates whenever one spouse owned most
of the property. Thus, when formula clauses were used, overfunding the marital deduction trust
generally was only a possibility if both spouses had substantial amounts of property. See
Ordower, supra note 8, at 35; Rodriguez, supra note 62, at 136-39; Comment, Equalization Clauses
with Alternate Valuation: An Emerging Option for Estate Planners, 63 IoWA L. Rav. 486, 490
(1977). ERTA opened the door to unlimited marital deduction estate planning and increased the
likelihood that the marital deduction would be overfunded in cases when the property of the first
spouse to die exceeded twice the applicable unified credit equivalent. (Two unified credits are
available: one for each spouse's estate.) This dramatically increased the risk of overfunding.
At the time that Edwards wrote, the principal reason for not using equalization clauses was
the Service's opposition to their use. The Service's position was that the surviving spouse's interest
in property passing under an equalization clause was a nondeductible terminable interest. See
IRS Explains Why Equalization Clause Bars Marital Deduction, Tax Practitioner's Shop Talk, 42 J.
TAX'N 254 (1975) (reproducing large portions of what appears to be an early I.R.S. Technical
Advice Memorandum). All three cases that had considered this position, however, were decided
against the IRS. SeeEstate of Meeske, 72 T.C. 73 (1979); Estate of Smith, 66 T.C. 415 (1976), a]J'd
per curlam, 565 F.2d 455 (7th Cir. 1977); Estate of Laurin, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 644 (1979). Because
the IRS had issued a nonacquiescence in Smith, 1978-1 C.B. 3, however, the threat of loss of the
marital deduction was real. Since then, in Estate of Laurin v. Commissioner, 645 F.2d 8 (6th Cir.
1981), the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has affirmed both Laurin and
Meeske, and the IRS has acquiesced in Laurin, Meeske, and Smith, 1982-1 C.B. 3. Thus, the
threat has disappeared.
87. I.R.C. § 2056(b)(3) (1982) allows a marital deduction transfer to be conditioned upon
spousal survival for up to six months. For examples of provisions requiring equalization if the
surviving spouse fails to survive the first spouse to die by at least six months, see Cornfeld, Marital
Deduction, supra note 71, 1409, Forms 6, 7, and 10. Similar provisions in Backman & Frank,
supra note 62, at 197, contain an equalization mechanism that automatically adjusts to the de-
creasing maximum marginal estate tax rates during the period 1982-85. Until 1985 such a self-
adjusting mechanism is important. After 1984 the highest marginal estate tax bracket will be fixed
at 50%. See I.R.C. § 2001(c) (1982). If the first spouse to die was to die in 1984 and the surviving
spouse was to die in 1985, but within six months of the death of the first spouse, a straightforward
equalization clause might be construed to require prepayment of the estate tax at a higher rate in
the estate of the first spouse to die than would be possible in that of the surviving spouse. See
generally supra note 70.
88. If the spouses' dispositive documents do not provide for the same beneficiaries or do so in
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the executor of the "surviving" spouse are preferable techniques for resolving
simultaneous death cases89 since such mechanisms provide flexibility if the
surviving spouse's death occurs more than six months after the death of the
first spouse to die.90 Drafting for equalization, however, does not foreclose
utilization of these methods. It merely ensures that equalization will occur
when appropriate. Drafting for equalization, therefore, does not diminish the
purported attractiveness of the QTIP election or the executor disclaimer. To
the extent that these techniques work at all, they can be used to reduce the
surviving spouse's share if she dies more than six months after the death of the
first spouse to die.
Another argument favoring reliance on the QTIP election or executor dis-
claimer is that availability of the credit for property previously taxed9' may
represent a more desirable tax option than equalization.92 Planning for use of
this credit, however, requires that a tax be imposed on both estates. 93 Since
equalization ensures that a tax will be imposed on both estates, it is a step in
the right direction.94 Furthermore, it does not foreclose additional fine-tuning
using a partial QTIP election or disclaimers by the executor of the "surviving"
spouse.9
5
Full deferral usually is totally inappropriate in the case of the simultane-
ous or nearly simultaneous deaths of spouses. Because an equalization clause
automatically approximates the optimal tax result in these cases, reliance on
different amounts or terms, equalization might be inappropriate. Unless QTIP is used, equaliza-
tion might deflect a portion of the wealthier spouse's estate to the poorer spouse's beneficiaries.
89. Eg., Covey, Recent Developments Concerning Estate, Gift and Income Taxation-1982, 17
INST. ON EsT. PLAN. 100, 130.7 (1983); Covey, supra note 8, 5 110.9; Ketchum & Johnson, supra
note 8, at 92-94; Le Van, Simultaneous Death after ERT4, 17 INsT. ON EsT. PLAN. 1800, 1821-
22, 1823(11)(D) (1983).
90. Compare I.R.C. § 2056(b)(3) (1982) (six months for marital transfers conditioned upon
survival) with supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text (apparently no time limit for the QTIP
election) andI.R.C. § 2518(b)(2) (1982) (nine months for qualified disclaimers).
91. An estate tax credit is allowable for certain property recently subjected to estate tax in
another's estate. See I.R.C. § 2013 (1982). This credit is available for an income interest, even
though the interest is not includible in the gross estate of the second decedent. See Treas. Reg.
§ 20.2013-5(a) (1973); Rev. Rul. 59-9, 1959-1 C.B. 232 (estates of lifetime income beneficiaries
qualify for credit).
92. E.g., Covey, supra note 8, 110.9; Ketchum & Johnson, supra note 8, at 92. In the case of
nearly simultaneous deaths, minimizing the marital deduction may generate a substantial I.R.C.
§ 2013 credit, because the surviving spouse is always the income beneficiary of the QTIP trust.
This credit then reduces the surviving spouse's estate tax. See Moore, New Marital Deduction,
supra note 6, 904. The § 2013 credit, however, has been held to be unavailable in a case involv-
ing simultaneous deaths. Estate of Lion, 52 T.C. 601 (1969), af'a[ 438 F.2d 56 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 870 (1971).
93. See I.R.C. § 2013(a)-(c) (1982).
94. Cf. Adams, Questions andAnswers on the Tax Act of1981, TR. & EsT., July 1983, at 53, 54
(providing an example where use of the § 2013 credit was slightly superior to equalization but that
required less (not more) marital deduction than equalization provided).
95. The possibility that a partial QTIP election or a disclaimer could approximate equaliza-
tion and thus salvage a full-deferral primary estate plan, see supra notes 89-94 and accompanying
text, is no excuse for failing to ensure, by drafting, an appropriate result. See Schaeffer, supra note
31, at 40; Trapp, supra note 44, 1200.3. Unfortunately, mistake and delay occur even in the best
of law firms. When attorneys with little estate planning experience or lay executors undertake to
probate wills, mistake and delay are probable.
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fiduciary exercise of the QTIP election offers at most only incremental
advantages.
2. Surviving Spouse is Overwhelmingly Predominant Beneficiary
The surviving spouse frequently is the testator's overwhelmingly predom-
inant beneficiary. 96 This is true if the testator desires that the surviving spouse
have every economic opportunity that the testator's money can provide. It is
also true if the testator desires that the largest amount possible be available to
the surviving spouse as a safety net against ill health, unexpected longevity, or
adverse economic forces.97 Because full deferral eliminates estate tax deple-
tion at the testator's death,98 it is appropriate if these objectives are the testa-
tor's primary concern.
The propriety of full deferral when the surviving spouse is the testator's
overwhelmingly predominant beneficiary is evidenced not only by the fact that
equalization's prepayment depletes funds that generate the surviving spouse's
income, but also by the fact that the surviving spouse almost certainly will
have some access to principal. The testator may grant the marital bequest out-
right, or, if the marital bequest is in a marital-deduction power-of-appoint-
ment trust or QTIP trust, he may grant the surviving spouse a lifetime right of
withdrawal. Alternatively, the testator may authorize the trustee to invade
principal for the benefit of the surviving spouse. Consequently, prepayment of
estate tax reduces the amount of principal available for the surviving spouse's
needs, as well as her income stream.
The surviving spouse, however, may not be the testator's overwhelmingly
predominant beneficiary. In an unsuccessful marriage, the testator's desire to
provide his surviving spouse with a substantial interest in his estate may be
consistent with a primary desire to optimize the QTIP remainder.99 Thus,
drafting for equalization (or some step in that direction) as the primary estate
plan may be more appropriate than drafting for full deferral.100 In other situ-
ations-those involving multiple marriages-the surviving spouse must share
with others not only the testator's affections, but also the testator's bounty.10 1
Drafting for full deferral probably is inappropriate in these circumstances,
even if intended only as a starting point for post-mortem planning designed to
reduce the marital deduction.102 Instead, optimization of the QTIP remainder
96. See supra note 76.
97. The testator's desire to ensure against the adverse effects of inflation is such an example.
See Backman & Frank, supra note 62, at 194, 197.
98. See Joint Report, supra note 8, at 14-15.
99. See generally Kramer, Estate Planningfor the Stable and Not-So-Stable Marriage and
Nonmarital Cohabitation, 39 INST. ON FED. TWX'N 56.01, 56.03 (1J81) (a pre-ERTA account of
income, gift, and estate tax considerations in premarital, marital, and postmarital estate planning,
supplemented by overviews of state-law property rights of spouses and cohabitants).
100. See Blattmachr & Lustgarten, Selected Considerations, supra note 3, at 21 (full deferral
may not be appropriate, even as a primary estate plan).
101. See Polasky, supra note 76, 2003.7 (suggesting, even prior to ERTA, use of maximum
marital deduction might be inappropriate "where it is desirable to provide for children of a prior
marriage").
102. Intentionally "overfunding" the marital share requires an effective means of reducing the
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may be the testator's foremost objective. Thus, a primary estate plan aimed at
or amounting to equalization would be appropriate. 103 Similarly, tle testator
may want his children to receive a substantial benefit immediately upon his
death.104 If the children are required to wait until the death of the surviving
spouse, they could predecease the surviving spouse, and, therefore, never ben-
efit from the marital share. This possibility is particularly likely (and poten-
tially disastrous) if the surviving spouse is not the parent of the testator's
children and is significantly younger than the testator.
The question, "Is my spouse my overwhelmingly predominant benefici-
ary?" cannot be answered better after the testator's death; only the testator can
answer it. Reliance on the executor to make the QTIP election, however, re-
quires the executor to answer it.
3. Charitable Remaindermen
If the QTIP remaindermen are charities, full marital deferral is appropri-
ate unless the testator desires to benefit charities immediately upon his death.
Since the entire QTIP remainder will qualify for the charitable deduction in
the surviving spouse's estate,105 the testator can benefit his spouse without fear
of affecting the overall estate tax consequences at her death. 10 6 Thus, there is
no estate tax borne by the charitable QTIP remaindermen. Since the testator
who creates a charitable QTIP remainder almost certainly does not envision
any situation in which it would be appropriate for his executor to prepay the
estate tax, fiduciary discretion to make the QTIP election adds only the possi-
bility of confusion.
4. Possible Changes in the Estate Tax Law
Prepayment of a tax assumes that the tax ultimately will be required.
Thus, if the tax ultimately will not be required, it makes no sense to prepay the
tax. Similarly, if a tax is prepaid to make the ultimate tax less burdensome, a
subsequent reduction of that tax probably will render the amount prepaid ex-
marital deduction after the testator's death. See supra text accompanying notes 77-81. For rea-
sons developed at length, infra notes 144-293 and accompanying text, fiduciary exercise of the
QTIP election may not be a reliable means to accomplish that goal. Furthermore, reliance upon a
spousal disclaimer in the situation described in the text would be foolhardy.
103. When the testator desires an immediate bequest of more than $600,000 to, or for the
benefit of, his children, full deferral is impossible since post-1986 full deferral will require that the
children receive a maximum of $600,000 prior to the surviving spouse's death.
104. See Cormfeld, supra note 8, 1700, 1702.2.
105. The Technical Corrections Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-448, § 104(a)(1)(B), 96 Stat. 2380
(codified at I.R.C. § 2044(c) (1982)) eliminated any doubt whether the remainder to charity would
qualify as having "passed from" the surviving spouse to charity for purposes of the charitable
deduction under I.R.C. § 2055 (1982). See S. REP. No. 592, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 20, reprinted in
1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4149, 4166.
106. But ef. Letter of Richard A. Williams, in Tax Practitioners' Shop Talk, 59 J. TAx'N 287
(1983) (fear that charitable deduction might not be available to estate of surviving spouse in Ar-
kansas, because, under Arkansas law, surviving spouse's estate tax liability, which might arise on
account of surviving spouse's own assets, could be apportioned to the charitable QTIP remainder).
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cessive. 10 7 Therefore, if the testator believes that there is a significant possibil-
ity that the transfer taxes will be repealed or reduced between his death and
the death of his spouse, full deferral is indicated.108
Speculation concerning the future of the transfer tax system, however, is
extremely perilous. Some commentators suspect that the federal transfer taxes
currently are at the end of a pendulum swing.109 If so, a probability exists that
the federal transfer taxes will become more burdensome.110 In any event, the
possibility of repeal or amelioration of the federal transfer taxes argues against
equalization only if the predicted repeal or amelioration is likely to occur dur-
ing the period of survival of the testator's spouse. One who would make such
a prediction is indeed self-confident. Although such a self-confident client's
opinion indicates full deferral, his opinion is, nevertheless, available only dur-
ing his lifetime.
Fiduciary exercise of the QTIP election contributes only the possibility of
a later glimpse at congressional attitudes toward the estate tax law. Although
such a glimpse should aid the executor in formulating an opinion on the likeli-
hood of imminent changes in the estate tax laws, only an extraordinarily rare
and risk-oriented executor would be willing to base his QTIP election decision
on such an opinion.
The risk-averse client, although not professing knowledge about the fu-
ture direction of the estate tax laws, may refuse to accept even the slightest risk
that the tax will be repealed during the period of survival of his spouse. In
such a case, full deferral is the only answer. Discretion in the executor to
make the QTIP election is superfluous.
5. Liquidity
The estate of the first spouse to die may be highly illiquid, depending on
the nature of its assets and the extent of its obligations. Liquidity, in fact, may
be one of the estate planner's primary worries if the principal asset is a closely-
held business, a farm, or a parcel of unimproved real estate. Full deferral
offers relief from one of the major sources of illiquidity, the federal estate
tax.111 Consequently, liquidity is another consideration supporting full
deferral.
Eliminating tax-based liquidity concerns through full deferral, however,
may only sweep them under the carpet. At the death of the surviving spouse
the tax-based liquidity problem may resurface in a more acute state. 112 There-
107. Cf. supranotes 70 & 87 (discussing equalization during the phase-in of the 50% maximum
transfer tax bracket).
108. See Cornfeld, supra note 8, 1 1702.2. Cf. A CASNER, ESTATE PLANNING 745-46 (4th ed.
Supp. 1982).
109. E.g., S. SURREY, W. WARREN, P. MCDANIEL, & H. GUTMAN, supra note 37, at xvii-xviii,
12-23; Zelinsky, supra note 37, at 829 ("ebb and flow").
110. But see Graetz, To Praise the Estate Tax, Not to Bury It, 93 YALE L.J. 259, 285-86 (1983)
(predicting and lamenting demise of estate tax).
I 11. See, e.g., Note, supra note 8, at 204.
112. See Cornfeld, supra note 8, 11702.2; Cornfeld, Marital Deduction, supra note 71, 1402.
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fore, if the long-term preservation of a family business or farm is a primary
goal of the testator, full deferral should be undertaken only if the deferred
liquidity concerns can be resolved prior to the death of the surviving spouse or
if the testator is willing to run the risk that they will not be addressed. 113
Determining the importance of liquidity in marital deduction estate plan-
ning thus requires an answer to another question: "Does the testator want the
family business eventually to pass intact to the QTIP remaindermen?" Al-
though the importance of liquidity may be diminished by the estate's ability-
which the executor may be able better to assess-to qualify for the various
relief provisions of the Internal Revenue Code,' 14 only the testator can answer
the crucial, underlying question.
6. Facts Peculiar to the Surviving Spouse
Even if the surviving spouse is either very old or terminally ill, she may
outlive the periods during which the marital deduction can be terminated au-
tomatically, nonelected, or disclaimed. 1t5 It may, nevertheless, be clear that
the surviving spouse will not live long enough to be harmed significantly by
prepayment of a portion of the estate tax. Similarly, the surviving spouse may
be so wealthy that no prepayment of estate tax at the death of the first spouse
to die is likely to affect her life style. Thus, both situations call for optimiza-
tion of the QTIP remainder and suggest equalization as the primary estate
plan. 16 In almost all cases, however, the old age, terminal illness, or great
wealth of the spouse will be apparent to the client. Reliance on fiduciary exer-
cise of the QTIP election, therefore, accomplishes little that the client cannot
do during his lifetime. Fiduciary exercise of the QTIP election only offers the
possibility of a reduced marital deduction if the surviving spouse becomes ter-
minally ill or very wealthy shortly after the death of the first spouse to die.
7. The Couple's Likely Combined Taxable Wealth
Equalization generally is appropriate only in the largest estates. If the
sum of both spouses' taxable estates, added to the sum of both spouses' ad-
justed taxable gifts, is unlikely to exceed the sum of the unified credit
equivalents available at the spouses' deaths, full deferral usually will avoid
imposition of any estate tax.1 17 After 1986, therefore, equalization rarely will
be appropriate at combined taxable wealth levels below $1,200,000.118
113. One way to provide for liquidity at the death of the surviving spouse is to obtain insur-
ance on her life.
114. E.g., I.R.C. §§ 303, 2032A, 6166 (1982).
115. See supra note 90.
116. Cf. Joint Report, supra note 8, at 14 (suggesting nonelection of QTIP status in such cases).
117. See I.R.C. §§ 2001(b)-(c), 2010(a)-(b) (1982).
118. See supra note 70.
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(a) Predictions whether the couple's combined taxable wealth will
increase or decrease
Even if a couple's likely combined taxable wealth exceeds the estimated
sum of their unified credit equivalents, equalization is not always economi-
cally appropriate." 9 Much of equalization's attractiveness derives from its
ability to freeze the estate of the surviving spouse. 120 Consequently, equaliza-
tion loses much of its appeal if the surviving spouse, either through consump-
tion or by gifts, or the trustees, through invasions of the credit-shelter trust in
favor of beneficiaries other than the surviving spouse, are likely to deplete the
couple's combined taxable wealth at approximately the same rate that income
and appreciation are likely to augment it. If depletion is likely to exceed aug-
mentation substantially, as, for example, when the couple's taxable wealth is
likely to undergo inherent depreciation, equalization based on the value of the
couple's taxable wealth at the death of the first spouse to die is inappropriate.
Full deferral, the simplest alternative, however, may be equally inappropriate.
If meaningful predictions about the rate of depletion, the life expectancy
of the surviving spouse, and the expected asset depreciation can be formu-
lated, the optimal solution, from the viewpoint of the QTIP remaindermen,
may be to qualify enough property for the marital deduction so that after all
the depletions and depreciations have occurred, the highest estate tax bracket
applicable to the surviving spouse's estate will equal that of the first spouse to
die.' 21 Although such predictions are exceedingly difficult, the executor may
be able to make them equally well as, or better than, the testator. The diffi-
culty of such predictions, however, suggests that executors rarely will be both
willing and able to provide meaningful post-mortem assistance.
(b) Gifts by the surviving spouse
If the testator trusts the surviving spouse to provide faithfully for the
QTIP remaindermen, 22 the best alternative may not require a choice between
full deferral and equalization. Because ERTA increased the annual per-donee
gift tax exclusion from $3000 to $10,000,123 the surviving spouse can deplete
substantially her potential estate at no transfer tax cost. If a couple had five
children and the surviving spouse outlived the first spouse to die by ten years,
a program of giving $10,000 per year to each child would reduce the survivor's
potential estate by $500,000 with no gift or estate tax costs.124 By depleting the
119. See, e.g., supra note 71 (chart showing that, under certain circumstances, equalization
may be inappropriate even in a $1,500,000 estate).
120. See supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text.
121. See Harris, supra note 9, at 15.
122. A testator may be willing to trust the surviving spouse to make gifts to the QTIP remain-
dermen if the remaindermen are the surviving spouse's children.
123. ERTA § 441(a), 95 Stat. 319 (amending pre-ERTA version of I.R.C. § 2503(b) (1982)).
124. Even when a QTIP trust is involved and the annual income is insufficient to accommo-
date such a giving program, a limited right of withdrawal in the surviving spouse effectively would
enable her to make gifts from principal. Under I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7)(B)(ii)(I) (1982), however, the
surviving spouse may not have a lifetime power of appointment over a QTIP trust.
[Vol. 63
QTIP ELECTIONS
surviving spouse's potential estate,' 25 this program of annual giving would re-
duce the adverse effects of stacking property in the surviving spouse's higher
estate tax brackets and would tend to freeze the surviving spouse's potential
estate.
A major gift made by the surviving spouse promptly after the death of the
first spouse to die could freeze further the survivor's estate.' 26 After 1986, in
addition to a program of annual gifts, up to $600,000 could be given free of
transfer tax.' 27 This gift would represent a significant freeze in all but the very
largest combined estates. Although such a gift would not remove the amount
of the property transferred from the surviving spouse's transfer tax base,
128 it
would remove any subsequent appreciation or accumulated income. Even
taxable gifts in excess of $600,000 would contribute to the viability of a full-
deferral decision. These gifts not only would remove all income from, and
appreciation on, the transferred assets from the surviving spouse's potential
gross estate, but also would remove the gift tax paid if the surviving spouse
lived at least three years after making the gifts.' 29
The propriety and availability of the estate planning benefits offered by
programs of giving initiated by the surviving spouse depend upon the testa-
tor's answer to the question, "Do I trust my spouse to undertake a faithful and
aggressive program of giving to my QTIP remaindermen?" In only one in-
stance does the executor charged with making the QTIP election have any
knowledge to contribute to the answer. If a surviving spouse entrusted to em-
bark on a giving program announced her intention not to make these gifts
after the testator's death but before the QTIP election, the executor could elim-
inate the need for the program by opting for equalization.
8. Income in Respect of a Decedent
Another argument against full deferral exists if the testator's estate is
likely to contain a significant amount of income in respect of a decedent.
130
The recipient of income in respect of a decedent must include the income in
gross income' 31 but may deduct a portion of the decedent's estate tax in com-
puting taxable income.132 Because full deferral seeks to avoid the estate tax,
recipients of income in respect of a decedent who had utilized a frill-deferral
125. ERTA's amendment of I.R.C. § 2035 (1982) ensures that, even if a valuation problem
later causes one or more of the annual gifts to exceed $10,000 for gift tax purposes, no estate tax
inclusion of transfers within three years of death will result in other than a gross-up of any gift tax
due. ERTA § 424(a), 95 Stat. 317 (codified at I.R.C. § 2035(d) (1982)).
126. Because the property received by the surviving spouses acquires a step-up in basis under
I.R.C. § 1014 (1982), such a gift may be more advantageous than a "split" gift made under I.R.C.
§ 2513 (1982) during the lifetime of the first spouse to die. See Backman & Frank, supra note 62,
at 201.
127. See I.R.C. § 2010(a) (1982) (unified credit); i d § 2001(c)(1) (rate table).
128. See id. § 2001(b)(1)(A)-(B).
129. See id. § 2035(c), (d). See also supra note 125.
130. See Gamble, supra note 52, at 47-48 n.8.
131. See I.R.C. § 691(a) (1982).
132. See id. § 69 1(c).
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estate plan would be denied the income tax deduction. 133 Equalization gener-
ates an estate tax; therefore, an estate that utilizes equalization does not forfeit
the income-in-respect-of-a-decedent deduction.
Clients likely to have a large amount of income in respect of a decedent
generally can approximate the amount of this income with sufficient accuracy
to plan their estates. An executor, however, will have a more accurate percep-
tion of the scope of the problem. Thus, in theory, reliance on the executor to
make the QTIP election in estates with large amounts of income in respect of a
decedent offers flexibility not otherwise available.
9. Basis
Appreciated property included in the gross estate of the surviving spouse
receives a step-up in basis to the fair market value of the property at the death
of the surviving spouse.134 Thus, any appreciation occurring between the
deaths of the spouses escapes income tax. If property is likely to appreciate,
full deferral therefore confers an additional advantage over equalization-a
larger portion of any gains not realized during the surviving spouse's lifetime
will be forgiven for income tax purposes. But because any gains that by-pass
the surviving spouse's estate will not be subject to the estate tax, 13 5 the relative
benefits of equalization also are maximized. Given that the maximum net in-
come tax bracket for capital gains generally is twenty percent, 136 and, after
1985, the lowest effective estate tax bracket will be thirty-seven percent, 37 the
prospect of a stepped-up basis will be a significant factor in making the full
deferral/equalization decision only in an otherwise close case. Moreover, the
value of the stepped-up basis is extremely difficult to quantify. 138 Not only
must the amount of appreciation between the deaths of the spouses be pre-
dicted, but also the length of time between the death of the surviving spouse
and any sale must be estimated to discount the value of the additional estate
tax that full deferral might generate at the surviving spouse's death.' 39 If the
property depreciates after the death of the surviving spouse or if the seller is in
a low income tax bracket, little or no income tax will be due in any event.
Reliance on fiduciary exercise of the QTIP election cannot help determine
the effect that basis should have in deciding the appropriate size of the marital
deduction. In many cases the client's ability to predict the long-term growth
or decline in the value of his assets is superior to that of the executor. The
133. See id. § 691(c)(I)(A), (2)(A).
134. See id § 1014(a), (b)(1), (b)(9), (b)(10). The Technical Corrections Act of 1982, Pub. L.
No. 97-448, § 104(a)(1)(A), 96 Stat. 2365, 2379, added I.R.C. § 1014(b)(10) (1982) to ensure that
QTIP included in a surviving spouse's gross estate under I.R.C. § 2044 (1982) would receive a
step-up in basis. See S. REP. No. 592, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 20, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CONO. CODE
& AD. NEws 4149, 4166-67.
135. See supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text.
136. See I.R.C. § 1, 1202(a) (1982). In some cases, however, the alternative minimum tax
imposed by id. § 55 also may apply.
137. Compare I.R.C. § 2010(a), (b) (1982) with id § 2001(c)(1).




client built, bought, or inherited the assets and, in many cases, is more familiar
with them. The executor will be able to observe any changes in value that
occur after the client's death. It is not clear, however, whether fluctuations
occurring shortly after the client's death should influence the decision or
whether the executor's assessment of the assets' prospects should be substi-
tuted for those of the client. Only the client can resolve these questions.
10. Investment Considerations
Some commentators have argued that full deferral makes the federal gov-
ernment the surviving spouse's investment partner by allowing her to keep
money that in a sense belongs to the federal treasury. 140 The surviving spouse,
therefore, may be willing to invest these funds more aggressively. Although
this freedom may be attractive to some testators, unless the funds are be-
queathed outright to the surviving spouse, restrictions on fiduciary investment
probably will result in conservative investment decisions in any event.
14 1
Moreover, the question, "Do I want to increase the odds that my property will
be invested aggressively during my spouse's lifetime?" can be answered only
by the testator.
C Ease of Planning and Drafting
Simplicity is another reason for the popularity of the full-deferral estate
plan that relies upon fiduciary exercise of the QTIP election. Because of the
unlimited marital deduction, the surviving spouse can receive all of an estate's
income, undiminished by estate taxes, for life. Moreover, the testator can be
assured that others (typically his children) eventually will receive the estate.
Thus, the full-deferral estate plan assures the draftsman that the typical testa-
tor's dispositive goals are approximated, and that those primarily interested
are included. The purported ability of the executor to switch from full defer-
ral to some form of equalization by exercise of the QTIP election after the
testator's death eases the occasional worry that full deferral may not be per-
fectly tailored to the estate at hand.
Although full deferral simplifies estate planning and drafting, it is not
appropriate for all couples, particularly the very wealthy. Draftsmen therefore
must not be lured into using it as a substitute for thoroughly assessing the
client's ultimate dispositional priorities. As courts have become increasingly
willing to impose liability on draftsmen for negligent estate planning,
14 2 a
140. See Blattmachr & Lustgarten, Many Questions, supra note 3, at 22.
141. See generally infra note 190 and accompanying text.
142. E.g., Heyer v. Flaig, 70 Cal. 2d 223, 74 Cal. Rptr. 225, 449 P.2d 161 (1969); Stowe v.
Smith, 184 Conn. 194, 441 A.2d 81 (1981); Needham v. Hamilton, 459 A.2d 1060 (D.C. 1983);
McAbee v. Edwards, 340 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Ogle v. Fuiten, 112 111. App. 3d
1048, 445 N.E.2d 1344 (1983); Woodfork v. Sanders, 248 So. 2d 419 (La. Ct. App.). cert. denied,
259 La. 759, 252 So. 2d 455 (1971); and Guy v. Liederbach, 501 Pa. 47, 459 A.2d 744 (1983), all
held that intended beneficiaries stated cognizable claims against lawyers whose malpractice in
planning, drafting, or supervising the execution ofwilis caused losses to the beneficiaries. See also
Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821, 364 P.2d 685, cert. deniea 368 U.S. 987 (1961),
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draftsman risks a malpractice claim for rote prescription of a dispositionally
inappropriate, tax-inefficient marital deduction scheme.143
IV. WILL RELIANCE ON FIDUCIARY EXERCISE OF THE QTIP ELECTION
WoRK?
Existing commentary has not analyzed the fiduciary duty problems that
arise when an executor makes the QTIP election. 44 As a fiduciary, the execu-
tor presumably is subject to various fiduciary duties in determining whether to
make the election. 145 Among these duties are the duty to minimize taxes, to
treat beneficiaries impartially, and to serve the estate loyally. Possibly because
of these duties, one observer has noted that "the new qualified terminable in-
terest property election is potentially the most difficult election that the profes-
sional fiduciary will be called upon to make."'
146
A. The Fiduciary Duty to Minimize Taxes
Although neither the major treatises 47 nor the Restatement 48 articulates
a discrete fiduciary duty to minimize taxes, it is obvious that one does exist.' 49
which, despite its denial of lawyer liability on facts involving the rule against perpetuities, is a
landmark case for the proposition that lack of privity is not a bar to a legal malpractice suit by a
disappointed beneficiary. See generally Johnston, Legal Malpractice in Estate Planning-Perllous
Times Aheadfor the Practitioner, 67 IOwA L. REV. 629 (1982); Eckhardt, The Estate Planning
Lawyer's Problems: Malpractice and Ethics, 8 INST. ON EST. PLAN. 1 74.600 (1974).
143. Bucquet v. Livingston, 57 Cal. App. 3d 914, 129 Cal. Rptr. 514 (Ct. App. 1976), held that
trust remaindermen stated a cause of action by alleging that a lawyer's faulty marital deduction
estate planning proximately caused them loss by failing to accomplish the grantor's goal of mini-
miing the estate tax at both his and his wife's death.
144. See supra note 10.
145. It could be argued that Congress, by requiring executors to make the QTIP election,
preempted the states from enforcing their fiduciary conduct rules insofar as they may relate to the
election. Preemption might be grounded on a combination of either the "power to lay and collect
taxes," U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, or the commerce clause, U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, and the
supremacy clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. See generally. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW §§ 6-23 to -27 (1978). The United States Supreme Court, however, "is generally reluctant to
infer preemption." Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 132 (1978). Moreover,
the law of decedents' estates traditionally has been a matter of local concern. See United States v.
Oregon, 366 U.S. 643, 649, 654 (1961); see also P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHS-
LER, HART AND WECHSLER's THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1186-89 (2d ed.
1973); Martin, Perspectives on Federal Disclaimer Legislation, 46 U. CH. L. REV. 316, 352 n. 150
(1979). The Supreme Court begins with the assumption that the state law is "not to be superseded
by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress." Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). With respect to the QTIP election, no hint appears in
either the Internal Revenue Code or the legislative history that Congress intended to release exec-
utors from their fiduciary obligations in making the election. Cf. Marital Deduction Problems,
PROB. & PROP., Winter 1982, at 10, 24 ("Federal law does not grant the power to make a partial
[QTIP] election .... ").
146. Ritchie, Reviewing Wills and Trust Agreements by Trust Legal Counsel, TR. & EST., Nov.
1982, at 35, 38.
147. G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (2d ed. & rev. 2d ed.
1980) [hereinafter cited as BOGERT]; A. SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS (3d ed. 1967).
148. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS (1959) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT].
149. See Copley v. Copley, 126 Cal. App. 3d 247, 178 Cal. Rptr. 842 (Ct. App. 1981); In re
Veith's Estate, 26 Fla. Supp. 145, 149 (Judges' Ct. 1965); Estate of Rappaport, 121 Misc. 2d 447,
467 N.Y.S.2d 814 (Sur. Ct. 1983); Browne, Effect ofElections by an Executor Upon the Estate and
Upon the Benfciares, 23 INST. ON FED. TAX'N 1239, 1243, 1249-51 (1965); Carrico & Bondurant,
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This duty can be inferred from the recognized duties to preserve assets, 150 to
defend against claims,'5 1 and to use reasonable care and skill in administra-
tion.152 Nevertheless, the duty to minimize taxes has received relatively little
attention. 153
In only a few instances has judicial scrutiny of an executor's fiduciary
conduct in tax matters broken down because of the absence of a coherent body
of law.' 54 Nevertheless, some of the most complex cases decided in this
area-those involving executor responsibilities such as the alternate valuation
election' 55 and the election to deduct administration expenses for income tax
purposes 156 -usually have had relatively small monetary consequences.'
57
The QTIP election, in conjunction with the unlimited marital deduction, how-
ever, permits an executor to decide whether all, part, or none of an estate will
be subject to federal estate tax. Executors of large estates involving QTIP thus
have the option of paying no tax, some tax, or a tax approaching fifty percent
of the total value of the estate. Because the QTIP election will be less likely to
go unnoticed than other executor duties, it may cause commentators and
courts to examine and define the fiduciary duty to minimize taxes more
closely.' 5
8
The executor whose mistakes in administering the estate's tax affairs
cause the estate to incur additional taxes or expenses generally is liable for the
additional taxes or expenses. The executor who fails to file a tax return or fails
to pay a tax and thereby causes the estate to incur additional expenses is liable
Equitable Adjustments: A Survey andAnalysis of Precedents and Practice, 36 TAX LAW. 545, 545-46
(1983); Dobris, Equitable Adjustments in Postmortem Income Tax Planning: An Unremitting Diet
of Warms, 65 IowA L. REv. 103, 113-16 (1979); Report of Subcommittee on Trust Administration
and Accountability of Trustees, Tax Burden Genesis of Beneficiary Conflicts, 102 TR. & EST. 989,
991-96 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Subcommittee Report]; Taggart, Fiduciary's Liability in Utiliz-
ing Post-Mortem Estate Planning Techniques, in POST-MORTEM ESTATE PLANNING 1981 393, 403
(198 1); Comment, Surcharging an Executorfor NegligentAdministration of Tax Responsibilities, 45
TEMP. L.Q. 42 (1971). Cf. Joint Report, supra note 8, at 10 ("The statutes do not unequivocally
state that estate tax minimization is a personal representative's duty, but considering potential
impact of estate taxes certainly is a duty that can be implied."); Note, Administration of Estates:
Income and Estate Taxation: Discretionary Deductions of Administration Expenses As Affecting
Substantive Rights of Individual Beneficiaries, 4 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 111, 111 n.3 (1956) (asking
whether such a duty exists).
150. See BOGERT, supra note 147, § 582; RESTATEMENT, supra note 148, § 176; 2 A. ScoTr,
supra note 147, § 176.
151. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 148, § 178 & comment c; 2 A. ScoTr, supra note 147,
§ 178.
152. See BOGERT, supra note 147, § 541; RESTATEMENT, supra note 148, § 174; 2 A. ScoTr,
supra note 147, § 174; UNIFORM PROBATE CODE §§ 3-703(a), 7-302 (West 1982).
153. Comment, supra note 149; Annot., 55 A.L.R.3d 785 (1974), and Annot., 47 A.L.R.3d 507
(1973), appear to be the fullest published discussions of the fiduciary duty to minimize taxes.
154. Will of Raible, N.Y.L.J., May 10, 1977, at 14, col. (Sur. Ct. 1977), and Estate of Colp,
N.Y.L.J., Jan. 20, 1976, at 8, coL2 (Sur. Ct. 1976) may be examples. See infra notes 185 & 192.
155. I.R.C. § 2032 (1982).
156. Id. § 642(g).
157. See, e.g., Estate of Colp, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 20, 1976, at 8, col. 2 (Sur. Ct. 1976) ($8,500 could
have been saved by use of alternate valuation election in estate valued at $1,100,000 on alternate
valuation date).
158. Cf. Engel, Estate Planning under ERTA: Questions Without Answers, TR. & ET., Jan.
1982, at 30, 31 (asking whether executor has "a fiduciary obligation" to make QTIP election).
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for those expenses.' 5 9 Similarly, an executor who files a tax return or pays a
tax in an untimely fashion and thereby harms the estate is subject to
surcharge.' 60 If an executor fails to claim a clearly allowable deduction or
credit in computing a tax, he is liable for the excess tax;161 liability also may be
imposed for payment of tax on an item of income or property that clearly is
not subject to tax.1 6
2
The fiduciary duty to minimize taxes, however, is not absolute.' 63 The
executor will not be surcharged for additional expenses caused by late pay-
ment of taxes if the estate did not have sufficient funds to pay the taxes when
due. 64 If an estate is involved in litigation or negotiations such that a tax
cannot reasonably be paid in a timely fashion, the executor also may be ex-
cused from liability for the resulting expenses.165 Finally, if the estate must
pay an avoidable tax to gain a greater offsetting advantage,166 or to avoid a
159. See, e.g., In re Estate of Pitt, I Ariz. App. 533, 405 P.2d 471 (1965); InreEstate of Har-
vey, 224 Cal. App. 2d 555, 36 Cal. Rptr. 788 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964); Sanford v. Sanford's Adm'r,
262 S.W.2d 827 (Ky. 1953).
160. See, e.g., Estate of Lock, 122 Cal. App. 3d 892, 176 Cal. Rptr. 358 (Ct. App. 1981); In re
Ducas' Estate, 109 N.Y.S.2d 17 (Sur. Ct. 1950), aff'dmem. sub nom. In re Gorski, 279 AD. 730,
108 N.Y.S.2d 1016 (1951); Hooker v. Hoskyns, 328 P.2d 404 (Okla. 1958); In re Estate of Jones,
400 Pa. 545, 162 A.2d 408 (1960).
Although the great majority of cases that involve late payment, nonpayment, late filing, or
nonfiling concern only the interest or penalties caused by the fiduciary's conduct, others have
required executors to reimburse their estates for the additional estate tax incurred as a result of
having forfeited the alternate valuation election. See, e.g., Estate of Gerber, 73 Cal. App. 3d 96,
140 Cal. Rptr. 577 (Ct. App. 1977); In re Estate of Lohm, 440 Pa. 268, 269 A.2d 451 (1970).
161. See In re Estate of Frohnknecht, 7 Misc. 2d 896, 162 N.Y.S.2d 400 (Sur. Ct. 1957) (in-
come tax-failure to claim distributions deduction for capital gains allocable to principal distribu-
tions); In reEstate of Jones, 400 Pa. 545, 162 A.2d 408 (1960) (inheritance tax- failure to claim, as
a deduction for debts, excess of amount actually required to settle a claim over the amount ini-
tially claimed as debt deduction); McCune Estate, 76 Pa. D. & C. 39 (Orphans' Ct. 1950) (inheri-
tance tax-failure to claim widow's allowance). Cf In re Estate of Maurice, 433 Pa. 103, 249 A.2d
334 (1969) (remanding for inquiry into why executor failed to claim credit for property previously
taxed under 1969 version of I.R.C. § 2013 (1982)). But see Ohio Valley Nat'l Bank of Henderson
v. Edwards, 492 S.W.2d 195, 198 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973) (when executor failed to claim business loss
deductions in computing the tax on decedent's final income tax return, surcharge was inappropri-
ate because the contention that such deductions had been allowable constituted "an impermissible
collateral attack on the income tax determination").
162. See, e.g., In re Estate of Estes, 134 Ariz. 70, 654 P.2d 4 (Ct. App. 1982); In re Buhl's
Estate, 300 Pa. 29, 150 A. 86 (1930).
163. See In re Estate ofWehrhane, 41 N.J. Super. 158, 165, 124 A.2d 334, 338 (Ch. Div. 1956)
(rejecting contention that fiduciary must "at its peril" resolve correctly "the ultimate merits" of
allowability of deduction). See also Browne, supra note 149, at 1251.
The courts, however, are much less interested in determining why a fiduciary failure has
occurred in tax minimization cases. Compare Estate ofYalden, N.Y.L.J., June 24, 1976, at 13, cot.
3 (Sur. Ct. 1976) (no discussion of reason for surcharge for failure to minimize taxes) with Estate
of Beach, 15 Cal. 3d 623, 542 P.2d 994, 125 Cal. Rptr. 570 (1975), cerl. deniedsub nom. Edwards v.
Superior Court, 434 U.S. 1046 (1978) (detailed analysis concerning an executor's investment du-
ties). See generally Comment, supra note 149.
164. See, eg., Succession of Benoit, 196 La. 509, 199 So. 625 (1940); In reEstate of Pettigrew,
115 NJ. Eq. 401, 171 A. 152, aft'dper curiam, 116 N.J. Eq. 566, 174 A. 478 (1934); In re Gibson's
Will, 40 N.Y.S.2d 727 (Sur. Ct. 1943). If the lack of funds was caused by improper distributions
by beneficiaries, however, the executor may be surcharged. See, e.g., In re O'Neill's Estate, 266
Pa. 9, 109 A. 526 (1920).
165. See, e g., In re Stevens' Estate, 95 F. Supp. 694 (D.D.C. 1951); Chemical Bank & Trust
Co. v. Ott, 274 N.Y. 572, 10 N.E.2d 557 (1937).
166. See Powel's Estate, 28 Pa. D. & C. 623 (Orphans' Ct. 1937) (unnecessary stock transfer
tax of $123 paid to obtain speedy sale of stock, which resulted in $600 gain to estate).
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greater expense,' 67 the executor will not be surcharged.
Courts frequently state that a fiduciary must have been negligent in han-
dling tax matters before he will be surcharged.168 For example, if the taxabil-
ity of income or property is subject to question, a court may absolve the
executor who pays the tax if he acts in "good faith" and "believes with justifi-
cation that such sums were due."'169 It has even been suggested that in some
instances the techniques required to minimize taxes are so complex that it is
reasonable for an executor not to utilize them.17
0
The fact that many executors have escaped liability for failure to mini-
mize taxes has led one commentator to state that there is "a substantial discre-
tionary element to the powers the fiduciary must exercise to discharge the duty
to save taxes."' 7 ' One court has stated that "tax considerations are not the be
all and end all."'172 Indeed, the primary task of the executor is to administer
the estate, 173 maximizing it where possible. If minimizing taxes interferes with
that task, taxes need not be minimized. For example, if defending against a
167. See Selleck v. Hawley, 331 Mo. 1038, 56 S.W.2d 387 (1932) (cost of defending against tax
exceeded amount of tax); Estate of Berkowitz, 36 Luz. L. Reg. Rep. 125 (Pa. Orphans' Ct.,
Luzerne County 1941), afd' 344 Pa. 481, 26 A.2d 296 (1942); RESTATEMENT, supra note 148,
§ 178 comment c; Subcommittee Report, supra note 149, at 993-94 (considering possibility that
income tax savings to the estate might justify increased estate taxes incurred as a result of execu-
tor's election, for alternate valuation purposes, of higher estate tax value). See also In re Estate of
Fullerton, 375 P.2d 933, 947 (Okla. 1962) (failure to file corrected return excluding item from gross
estate excused where "a good overall settlement of the estate tax liability had been made that
might have been lost if the matter of tax liability were reopened").
168. Eg., In re Estate of Stephens, 117 Ariz. 579, 574 P.2d 67 (Ct. App. 1978) (remanding for
findings on fiduciary negligence); In re Wheeler's Will, 19 Misc. 2d 335, 340, 186 N.Y.S.2d 134,
140 (Sur. Ct. 1959) ("Unless there is impropriety or negligence in the conduct of the estate repre-
sentative followed by loss to the estate, there can be no surcharge."); In re Estate of Lohm, 440 Pa.
268, 273, 269 A.2d 451, 454 (1970) (fiduciary surcharged for negligent tax overpayment). But see
In re Estate of Oakes, 127 Misc. 779, 781, 217 N.Y.S. 638, 640 (Sur. Ct. 1925) ("Irrespective of the
fact that . . . it was the result of ill advice of counsel and not to negligence on the part of the
executor ... the residuary legatees should not be compelled to bear this loss."), a f'dmem., 220
A.D. 758, 222 N.Y.S. 864 (1927), rev'd on other grounds, 248 N.Y. 280, 162 N.E. 79 (1928).
169. In re Estate of Miller, 259 Cal. App. 2d 536, 550-51, 66 Cal. Rptr. 756, 766 (Ct. App.
1968). See also United States v. Mason, 412 U.S. 391, 398-99 (1973) ("[M]ost courts which have
considered the problem have given a trustee broad discretion to pay taxes . . . so long as the
trustee's judgment that the taxes are valid. . . is not wholly unreasonable."); Henshie v. McPher-
son & Citizens State Bank, 177 Kan. 458, 479, 280 P.2d 937, 953 (1955) (trustees "exercised their
judgment" and paid disputed taxes in good faith); In re Estate of Pettigrew, 115 N.J. Eq. 401, 404,
171 A. 152, 154 (Prerog. Ct. 1934) ("The executors were not under a legal duty to decide with
faultless judgment and legal nicety the legality or constitutionality of the Kansas statute in ques-
tion before paying the tax under it. They were only required to act in good faith and as the
average person of ordinary prudence and caution would under like circumstances have done
"), aff9dper curiam, 116 N.J. Eq. 566, 174 A. 478 (1934); Scudder v. Ames, 142 Mo. 187, 231,
43 S.W. 659, 671-72 (1897) (allowing payment of real estate taxes later declared void, because
"paid in good faith" and "under the belief that the. . . estate was legally liable therefor"). But see
Mason v. United States, 461 F.2d 1364 (Ct. Cl. 1972) (where issue of taxability is raised, fiduci-
ary's duty is to refuse to pay the tax), rev'd, 412 U.S. 391 (1973); In re Estate of Estes, 134 Ariz. 70,
78-79, 654 P.2d 4, 12-13 (Ct. App. 1982) (executor surcharged for inclusion of certain life insur-
ance policies in the gross estate for estate tax purposes, even though a "question" existed as to
their mcludibility; executor also had refused to pursue refund).
170. Taggart, supra note 149, at 403.
171. Dobris, supra note 149, at 115.
172. Estate of CoIp, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 20, 1976, at 8, cols. 2, 3 (Sur. Ct. 1976).
173. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 148, § 6 comment b; UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 3-703(a)
(West 1982).
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tax would cost more than the amount of the tax, there is no duty to minimize
taxes. 174 A reduction of taxes in such a case would not maximize the estate.
Even estate maximization, however, is subsidiary to orderly estate admin-
istration.175 Although minimization of taxes may be possible at a minimal
cost to the estate, nevertheless, it may interfere with orderly administration. In
such cases, tax minimization is not required. 76 For example, an executor gen-
erally can avoid income tax on the estate by making annual distributions
equal to the estate's distributable net income. 177 A duty to reduce the estate's
income tax in this manner, however, often would force the executor to make
distributions prior to the time they otherwise would be appropriate. Perhaps
for this reason, no case or commentator has extended the fiduciary duty tominimize taxes to require estate distributions solely to reduce the estate's in-
come tax.178 Similarly, there is no fiduciary duty to avoid capital gains tax on
the sale of estate assets by distributing them in kind 179 if the sale reasonably
appears to the fiduciary to be in the best interests of the estate. 180 In both
cases, minimization of taxes "costs" the estate something. To obtain a distri-
butions deduction, the executor has to part with property.' 8' Similarly, to
avoid capital gains tax, the executor must forego certain sales.' 82 Because the
executor's primary duty to administer the estate could be prejudiced, minimi-
zation of taxes in such cases is not required.
174. See supra note 167.
175. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 148, § 188 ("The trustee can properly incur expenses
which are necessary or appropriate to carry out the purposes of the trust .... ").
176. For example, when a decedent left a haberdashery business to three employees of the
business, and "it was important for the temporary administrators to have always on hand suffi-
cient cash to meet current obligations," In re Estate of Kennedy, 116 Misc. 267, 269, 189 N.Y.S.
671, 672 (Sur. Ct. 1921), the court approved the temporary administrators' decision not to pay
taxes as they fell due, even though tax penalties thereby were incurred. Subsequently the estate
was able to pay both the taxes and the penalties. Similarly, when a trustee was charged with
maintaining the decedent's residence during the widow's lifetime and paying an annuity to the
widow, the court upheld the trustee's "business judgment," In re Weir's Will, 182 Misc. 845, 852,
46 N.Y.S.2d 551, 557 (Sur. Ct. 1943), to use its liquid funds for those purposes rather than in
paying real estate taxes on unimproved land during a depressed market. Cf. In re Gibson's Will,
40 N.Y.S.2d 727, 736 (Sur. Ct. 1943) ("The amount of principal, if any, that should be applied in
payment of tax arrears is a question of business judgment to be determined by the trustee, with the
proper exercise of which this Court will not interfere."). Likewise, when the trustee of seven trusts
sought to liquidate a holding company in which the trusts owned a majority interest to improve
the individual administration of each trust, judicial approval was granted over the objection of the
guardian ad litem that the liquidation would cause unnecessary taxes. Estate of Fales, 106 Misc.
2d 419, 431 N.Y.S.2d 763 (Sur. Ct. 1980).
177. See I.R.C. §§ 641(b), 643(a)-(b), 661-663 (1982).
178. Several cases have surcharged executors for taxes unnecessarily incurred after the time
that the estate reasonably should have been distributed. Eg., In re Macky's Estate, 73 Colo. 1, 213
P. 131 (1922); Schott v. Schott's Ex'r, 298 Ky. 55, 182 S.W.2d 220 (1944); Booker v. Armstrong, 93
Mo. 49, 4 S.E. 727 (1887); In re Williams' Estate, 55 Mont. 63, 173 P. 790 (1918). These cases,
however, appear to be failure-to-distribute-in-a-timely-manner cases rather than failure-to-mini-
mize-tax cases.
179. Generally, an executor must honor a request for a distribution in kind, unless sale of the
asset is reasonably necessary to pay the estate's debts, administration expenses, or legacies. See,
e.g., In re Minichello's Estate, 368 Pa. 639, 644, 84 A.2d 511, 513 (1951).
180. In re Estate of Vandergrift, 406 Pa. 14, 177 A.2d 432 (1962) (trust). See also In re Kurrus'
Will, 42 Misc. 2d 832, 249 N.Y.S.2d 272 (Sur. Ct. 1964) (trust).
181. See I.R.C. § 661(a) (1982).
182. See id §§ 61(a)(3), 1001(a).
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On the other hand, if tax minimization can be achieved at no "cost" to the
estate, no reason exists why an executor should not be required to do so.18 3 In
Estate of Yalden' 84 an executor was surcharged for failure to elect alternate
valuation. Apparently, the court believed that the election could have been
made at no "cost" to the estate.' 8 5 Another method of minimizing taxes at no
"cost" to the estate is to elect to deduct administration expenses for income tax
rather than estate tax purposes. Thus, in In re Estate of WallsI86 the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court reversed the trial court's award of "additional com-
pensation" to the executor because the executor had deducted administration
expenses for estate tax rather than income tax purposes, even though the estate
had been in a ninety percent income tax bracket but only a forty-nine percent
estate tax bracket.'
8 7
183. On the contrary, there are excellent reasons for requiring the executor to minimize taxes
in such a situation. For a fact pattern demonstrating the need for a requirement that, in the
absence of offsetting "cost" to the estate, the executor must use the alternate valuation election to
minimize taxes, see Fisher, Human Drama in Death and Taxes, 114 TR. & EST. 298, 360 (1975). A
surviving spouse serving as executor of an estate valued at $435,000 at the date of death but only
$200,000 on the alternate valuation date is said to have incurred $28,500 in avoidable taxes by
declining to elect alternate valuation. Because the surviving spouse was the beneficiary of a pecu-
niary-formula maximum marital deduction clause, she succeeded not only in increasing her own
financial interest in the estate but also in cutting her sister-in-law, the residuary beneficiary, en-
tirely out of the estate.
184. N.Y.L.J., June 24, 1976, at 13, col. 3 (Sur. Ct. 1976).
185. Browne, supra note 149, at 1243, agrees that, if there is no cost to the estate, the executor
breaches his fiduciary duty if he fails to use the alternate valuation election to minimize the estate
tax. The alternate valuation election, however, is not always free of cost to the estate, for the
election also determines the estate's income tax basis in its assets. See I.R.C. § 1014(a)(l)-(2)
(1982). Thus, if an estate is in a high income tax bracket and sells a portion of its assets, the
executor may be able to minimize the estate's overall tax burden by electing the higher estate tax
valuation. See, e.g., Browne, supra note 149, at 1242-43; Subcommittee Report, supra note 149, at
993-94. In re Estate of Levine, 26 Misc. 2d 307, 203 N.Y.S.2d 643 (Sur. Ct. 1960), appeared to
present the issue whether an executor in such a position should be surcharged for not electing the
higher value. The date-of-death value of the estate was only $28,000, however, and the court
refused to surcharge the executor for failing to elect an alternate valuation that Treas. Reg.
§ 20.2032-1(b)(1) (1972) denied to an estate of that size. Levine, 26 Misc. 2d at 318-19, 203
N.Y.S.2d at 655-56. Estate of Colp, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 20, 1976, at 8, col. 2 (Sur. Ct. 1976), also
involved the alternate valuation election. There, although the alternate valuation was higher, the
income taxes that would have been saved by the estate would have exceeded the resulting estate
taxes by $8,500. Id at col. 3. Nevertheless, the Surrogate strongly suggested that election of the
lower valuation was required, because one of the executors was the surviving spouse, whose inter-
est under the will would have been increased by electing the higher valuation. Id at col. 3. The
precedential value of Cop, however, is limited. Not only did the Surrogate expressly limit his
"remarks" to "the facts of the case"; by dismissing the petition, he purported to leave the executors
free to decide how to make the election. Seeid at cols. 3-4. Later, in Estate of Fales, 106 Misc. 2d
419, 431 N.Y.S.2d 763 (Sur. Ct. 1980), the same Surrogate, referring to Coip, wrote: "It may well
be. . .that fiduciaries should minimize taxes for their estates whether or not their choice benefits
themselves... ." Id. at 422, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 764.
Election of the higher estate tax valuation could confer other benefits on an estate, such as
increased depreciation deductions, qualification for an I.R.C. § 303 (1982) corporate stock re-
demption, qualification for I.R.C. § 2032A (1982) special use valuation, or qualification for I.R.C.
§ 6166 (1982) estate tax deferral. See generaly Browne, supra note 149, at 1245; Koehler, Alterna-
ie Tax Elections and AdJustments Required Among Estate Beneicaries, in THE PLANNING AND
ADMINISTRATION OF A LARGE ESTATE 391, 406-08 (1982).
186. 421 Pa. 104, 218 A.2d 732 (1966).
187. Id at 112-13, 218 A.2d at 736. See also In re Estate of Bixby, 140 Cal. App. 2d 326, 351,
295 P.2d 68, 74 (Dist. Ct. App. 1956) ("[I]t would be judicious [for the executor] to avail himself of
the [I.R.C. § 642(g) (1982)] deduction in the place where the optimum advantage will accrue to the
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The QTIP election similarly has no extraneous "cost" to the estate. The
election consists of deciding how much of a predetermined amount of prop-
erty-which in any event will remain in the fiduciary's hands (except for any
taxes generated) until distribution in due course-is to qualify for the marital
deduction. Consequently, an executor who incurs an avoidable estate tax by
failing to elect QTIP status for any portion of a qualifying interest breaches
the fiduciary duty to minimize taxes.'
88
Another argument suggests that an executor may not use the QTIP elec-
tion to cause prepayment of the estate tax. Generally, fiduciaries must invest
in income-producing assets' 89 and may not speculate.190 Intentional prepay-
ment of an avoidable tax to optimize property at the death of the surviving
spouse, however, arguably is a speculative' 91 "investment" in a nonincome-
producing "asset' that cannot be "liquidated" and may not yield a "gain."
Therefore, by analogy to the fiduciary investment duties, an executor should
not be allowed to use the QTIP election to cause prepayment of estate taxes. 192
Stated in an alternate form, fiduciary prepayment of estate taxes to opti-
mize the ultimate family wealth may not be "reasonable." Although the
amount of tax prepaid would be immediate and certain, the potential property
augmentation after the death of the surviving spouse would depend on numer-
ous unknowables. 193 Consequently, a court could find that an executor who
prepaid estate taxes was engaged in unreasonable speculation in violation of
his fiduciary duty.
estate, that is, by diminishing the aggregate of taxes payable to the federal government."); Browne,
supra note 149, at 1250; J. PRICE, supra note 6, at 726.
188. See Dobris, supra note 3, at 825 (executor "may have a duty to minimize estate taxes in
the first spouse's estate") & n.194; Marital Deduction Problems, supra note 145, at 24.
189. See Miller v. Phillips, 235 Ala. 298, 178 So. 531 (1938) (administrator); In re Macky's
Estate, 73 Colo. 1,213 P. 131 (1922) (executor); In re Estate of Tolfree, 347 Mich. 272, 27 N.W.2d
629 (1956) (executors); In re Estate of McCrea, 475 Pa. 383, 380 A.2d 773 (1977) (executors); In re
Estate of Lare, 436 Pa. 1, 257 A.2d 556 (1969) (administrator); In re Estate of Kugler, 344 N.W.2d
160 (Wis. 1984) (administrator); BOGERT, supra note 147, § 611; RESTATEMENT, supra note 148,
§§ 282, 240; 2, 3 A. ScoTr, supra note 147, 
§§ 181, 240.
190. See Vredenburgh v. Jones, 349 A.2d 22, 43-44 (Del. Ch. 1975); In re See's Estate, 38
N.Y.S.2d 47, 50 (Sur. Ct. 1942); BOGERT, supra note 147, § 612; RESTATEMENT, supra note 148,
§ 227(a) & comment e; 3 A. ScoTr, supra note 147, § 227.3.
191. See supra note 74. See also Moore, Conflicting Interests, supra note 6, 607. Cf. Kim-
brough, Optional Use of Deductions: Related Problems-Other Current Events in Estate Planning,
17 MAJOR TAX PLAN. 625, 637 (1965) (making such an argument about use of alternate valuation
election to increase beneficiaries' bases for future sales).
192. With respect to the alternate valuation election, Subcommittee Report, supra note 149, at
993-94, states that "if the assets are to be distributed, so that the income tax advantage is traceable
only to an increased basis in the hands of the distributees, the impossibility of valuing the ultimate
income tax saving should excuse the executor from increasing the immediate (estate) taxes by
electing the alternate valuation date, unless [otherwise] agreed to by all interested parties." See
also Browne, supra note 149, at 1243. But see Will of Raible, N.Y.L.J., May 10, 1977, at 14, col. 1
(Sur. Ct. 1977). In Raible the court stated that "it would not be imprudent" for executors to
exercise the alternate valuation election in favor of the higher estate tax value to make available
possible income tax savings on future sales of the estate's assets, even though there was "no evi-
dence that [the assets] soon [would] be sold." Id Because the Surrogate purported to leave the
executors free to exercise the alternate valuation election "as they deem[ed] proper," Id., however,
the precedential value of Raible is limited. Moreover, parties who the Surrogate strongly sug-
gested were capable of deciding the issue had consented to the proposed election. Id.
193. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 120-21.
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Finally, one further argument exists for barring fiduciary exercise of the
QTIP election to cause prepayment of estate taxes. Prepayment cannot benefit
the estate, to which the executor owes his fiduciary duties. 19 4 Rather, prepay-
ment depletes the estate to benefit others, the QTIP remaindermen, sometime
in the future. Since a fiduciary must account for all of the estate's funds,
195
payment of debts or taxes that were not owed by the estate' 96 or administra-
tion expenses that did not benefit the estate 197 are not permitted, even if a
beneficiary of the estate is benefited. In short, the "duty of the [executor] is to
the estate as a whole; he cannot take sides; he is not to champion some parties
and not others."'19 8 Thus, a potential benefit obtained for a remainderman at
the expense of prepaying estate taxes probably would amount to a breach of
fiduciary duty.199
194. That the executor owes his fiduciary duties to the estate as an entity is apparent from In
re Morse, 467 N.Y.S.2d 114 (Sur. Ct. 1983), which approved overall tax minimization at the ex-
pense of one of the estate's beneficiaries.
195. See 3 A. Scorr, supra note 147, § 226 (where trustee makes payment to wrong person, he
is liable "even if the mistake is a reasonable one").
196. See, e.g., In re Estate of Cross, 51 Cal. App. 3d 80, 123 Cal. Rptr. 825 (Ct. App. 1975)
(debts concerning which the estate may have had defenses); In re Taylor's Estate, 30 N.J. Super.
65, 103 A.2d 268 (Mercer County Ct. 1954) (real estate taxes on property that passed directly to
beneficiary); In re Stirling's Estate, 342 Pa. 497, 21 A.2d 72 (1941) (taxes paid on real estate not
under executor's control); Carolina Life Ins. Co. v. Arrowsmith, 174 S.C. 161, 176 S.E. 728 (1934)
(inheritance tax on life insurance proceeds payable to decedent's wife and mother).
197. See, e.g., In re Brack Estate, 121 Mich. App. 585, 329 N.W.2d 432 (Ct. App. 1982) (ex-
penses incurred in contesting a common-law-widow status claim viewed by court as having bene-
fited not estate but heirs); In re Stutchbury's Will, 138 N.Y.S.2d 653 (Sur. Ct. 1954) (post-death
expenses relating to decedent's residence while occupied rent-free by decedent's executor husband,
who was one of four estate beneficiaries); Herman's Estate, 90 Pa. Super. 512 (1927) (expenses of
painting farm property that did not pass through estate).
198. Hildreth, Fiduciary's Duty: Skill and Effort Owed to All, N.Y.L.J., June 16, 1975, at 21,
cols. 1, 2. See also In re Morse, 467 N.Y.S.2d 114, 117 (Sur. Ct. 1983). Cf. In re Estate of Estes,
134 Ariz. 70, 78, 654 P.2d 4, 12 (Ct. App. 1982) ("Where an executor is confronted with several
alternatives, he is absolutely bound to follow the course which is most beneficial to the estate.");
Estate of Colp, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 20, 1976, at 8, cols. 2, 3 (Sur. Ct. 1976) ("It is the obligation of the
executors to consider the estate as a whole. Decisions should not be made with a view toward
benefiting one beneficiary to the detriment of another."). See generally BOGERT, supra note 147,
§ 543; REsTATEMENT, supra note 148, § 170; 2 A. ScoTT, supra note 147, § 170.
199. Cf. In re Dwight's Trust, 204 Misc. 204, 128 N.Y.S.2d 23 (Sup. Ct. 1952) (surcharging
trustee for losses borne by remaindermen as a result of investments in tax-exempt securities cho-
sen to complement income beneficiary's high income tax bracket); RESTATEMENT, spra note 148,
§ 170, comment q (trustee is under a duty "not to be guided by the interest of any third person");
Ledwith, Conflict of Interest Problems Not Limited to Actions Affecting Fiduciary Personally, 10
EST. PLAN. 22 (1983) (discussing conflicts involving third-party interests).
Several commentators have suggested that the alternate valuation election may be exercised
to increase estate tax presently due to offset the capital gains tax that eventually might be paid by a
beneficiary who sold the distributed assets. Eg., Dobris, Limits on the Doctrine ofEquitableAdjust-
ment in SophisticatedPostmortem Tax Planning, 66 IowA L. REv. 273, 303 & n.199 (1981); Koeh-
ler, supra note 185, at 424; Moore, Conflicting Interests in Postmortem Planning, 9 INST. ON EST.
PLAN It 1900, 1903 (1975); Taggart, supra note 149, at 228. Other commentators have suggested
that the executor make the I.R.C. § 642(g) election by comparing the estate tax benefits not only
with the estate's income tax benefits but also with the income tax benefits that might accrue to
likely beneficiaries. See Hale, Executor Elections: A Checklist, When and How to Make Them, 30
INST. ON FED. TAX'N 793, 813 (1972); Randall, Consequences of Executor's Elections as to
Administrative Expenses, 15 INST. ON FED. TAX'N 93 1011, 1021 (1957). See also CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 45-100e(35)(b) (West Supp. 1984) (authorizing executor to consider both estate and
beneficiaries in using I.R.C. § 642(g) (1982) election to minimize taxes, if statute is incorporated
by dispositive document). For the reasons stated in the text, such conduct could constitute a
breach of the common-law fiduciary duty to minimize taxes. Subcommittee Report, supra note
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If it is reasonable to expect that the courts will surcharge executors who
choose to prepay the estate tax in an effort to optimize the QTIP remainder, or
even that litigation over the propriety of such conduct will occur, estate plans
that rely on fiduciary exercise of the QTIP election as a means to achieve post-
mortem flexibility appear to be flawed. These plans depend on the possibility
that the executor will not elect QTIP status automatically for the entire es-
tate.200 If the dispositive document does not contain language remitting the
fiduciary duty to minimize taxes,20 the executor may feel compelled to make
the full QTIP election,202 regardless of its propriety, unless valid consents of
all beneficiaries or judicial approval can be obtained in advance.
B. The Fiduciary Duty to Treat Benefciaries Impartially
1. In General
The fiduciary duty to treat beneficiaries impartially 20 3 likewise may influ-
149, at 993-94, distinguishes the case in which sales are by the executor from the case in which
sales are by distributees and concludes that the executor need consider only the former.
Vanderbilt v. Balsan, 190 Misc. 824, 77 N.Y.S.2d 403 (Sup. Ct. 1948), presented a situation
somewhat similar to that of the QTIP election but resolved the question of fiduciary duty in a
manner that appears to contradict the conclusion in the text. In Vanderbilt, an English court had
determined that various English taxes, in the amount of £175,000, had become due upon the death
of the Ninth Duke of Marlborough, a beneficiary of a trust administered by an American trustee.
Id. at 826-28, 77 N.Y.S.2d at 407. If the disputed taxes were paid, no further taxes would be due
on the death of the succeeding life beneficiary. If the disputed taxes were not paid, however, taxes
in the amount of £326,750 would be due at the succeeding life beneficiary's death. Id. at 834, 77
N.Y.S.2d at 413. The court directed the trustee to pay, compromise, or otherwise discharge the
disputed taxes, because to do otherwise "would expose the trust to the risk of an inordinately
greater liability on the death of [the succeeding income beneficiary]." Id at 850, 77 N.Y.S.2d at
427. Two distinctions limit the applicability of Vanderbilt to the QTIP election. First, the case
involved a trustee, not an executor. Therefore, the trustee was responsible for administering the
trust for the long-term benefit of both the succeeding life beneficiary and the remainderman,
rather than merely until a distribution of assets could be made (prior to the imposition of the
future tax). Thus, future tax was directly relevant to the trustee. Cf. MICH. STAT. ANN.
§ 27.5829(1) (Caliaghan 1980) ("[A] trustee shall exercise his best judgment and discretion for
what he believes to be the best interest of the trust and for the persons designated to benefit from
the trust."). Second, both the succeeding life beneficiary and the indefeasibly vested remainder-
man consented to payment of the tax. Id at 835, 77 N.Y.S.2d at 414.
200. Cf. Gutierrez, supra note 8, 11404.1(A) (executors will tend to elect full QTIP to mini-
mize estate tax on present estate).
201. See infra text accompanying notes 294-300.
202. In a situation where the full unified credit otherwise would not be used, the executor
might decline to elect QTIP status as to that portion of the marital trust necessary to exhaust the
unified credit. Thus, the executor's decision would generate no federal estate tax.
203. See In re Estate of Miller, 259 Cal. App. 2d 536, 66 Cal. Rptr. 756 (Ct. App. 1968); In re
Veith's Estate, 26 Fla. Supp. 145, 149-50 (Judges' Ct. 1965); RESTATEMENT, supra note 148,
§§ 183, 232; 2, 3 A. ScoTr, supra note 147, §§ 183, 232; E. SCOLES & E. HALBACH, PROBLEMS AND
MATERIALS ON DECEDENTS' ESTATES AND TRUSTS 802 (3d ed. 1981); Browne, supra note 149, at
124 1; Carrico & Bondurant, supra note 149, at 546; Weigel & Trost, Tax Elections-: When andHow
to Make Compensatory Adjustments, 6 ET. PLAN. 130, 130 (1979). See generally Dobris, supra
note 149 (considering equitable adjustments that are required by duty of impartiality); Dobris,
supra note 199 (considering instances in which duty of impartiality does not require equitable
adjustment); Dunham, A Trustee's Dilemma as to Principal and Income, 26 U. CHI. L. REV. 405
(1959) (dealing with duty of impartiality in context of a fiduciary's holding of investments on
which extraordinary dividends are likely); Phillips, Some Instances ofthe Trustee'r Duty to Act
Fairly Between Dfferent Classes ofBenficiaries, 10 U. QUEENSLAND L.J. 83 (1977) (considering
the duty to treat beneficiaries impartially in (1) powers of sale, (2) making investment decisions,
and (3) voting shares held as trustee).
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ence fiduciary exercise of the QTIP election. 2° 4 By electing QTIP status for
the decedent's entire estate (other than the credit-shelter portion), an executor
maximizes the surviving spouse's interest2° 5 but may deplete substantially
what the QTIP remaindermen stand to receive at the death of the surviving
spouse.
2 0 6
If courts subject the QTIP election to the rigors of the fiduciary duty to
treat beneficiaries impartially, what is the correct standard to judge the propri-
ety of an executor's decision? In the case of another election thrust upon exec-
utors by the Internal Revenue Code-that available under section 642(g) to
deduct administration expenses for income tax, rather than estate tax, pur-
poses-some courts and legislatures have required the income beneficiaries to
reimburse principal for the tax cost of forfeiting estate tax deductions gener-
ated by principal expenses.20 7 The rationale for this requirement is clear: the
beneficiaries of an interest that bears the expense of generating a tax deduction
are "entitled" to the tax benefit of that deduction,208 at least if the denial of the
deduction is the result of an executor's election rather than the mandate of the
Internal Revenue Code.
20 9
There is no similar "entitlement" from which to judge the impartiality of
an executor's exercise of the QTIP election.210 Consider an executor who
elects to qualify the entire estate, less the credit-shelter amount, for the marital
deduction. The executor thereby minimizes the estate tax on the estate of the
204. See Ritchie, supra note 146, at 38.
205. Because the surviving spouse necessarily is the sole income beneficiary of any portion of
an estate subject to a QTIP election, the election augments her interest (or at least fails to decrease
it) by avoiding taxes that typically are borne by the QTIP trust. Taxes generated by a partial
QTIP election generally cannot be allocated to the credit-shelter portion, because the decedent's
unified credit has, by definition, been exhausted if taxes are being generated, and the formula
clause generally used to fund the credit-shelter portion automatically reduces the credit-shelter
portion to zero. See Blattmachr & Lustgarten, Selected Considerations, supra note 3, at 42-43, 45
n.31.
206. See supra notes 64-74 and accompanying text.
207. See In re Warms' Estate, 140 N.Y.S.2d 169 (Sur. Ct. 1955); In re Estate of Bixby, 140 Cal.
App. 2d 326, 295 P.2d 68 (Dist. Ct. App. 1956); In re Veith's Estate, 26 Fla. Supp. 145 (Judges' Ct.
1965); In re Kent's Estate, 23 Fla. Supp. 133 (Judges' Ct. 1964); In re Backus, 106 Misc. 2d 463,
434 N.Y.S.2d 106 (Sur. Ct. 1980); Matter of Herbert, N.Y.L.J., June 4, 1969, at 42 (Sur. Ct. 1969);
In re Will of Dupuy, 29 A.D.2d 965, 289 N.Y.S.2d 581 (1968); In re McTarnahan's Estate, 27
Misc. 2d 13, 202 N.Y.S.2d 618 (Sur. Ct. 1960); In re Levy's Estate, 9 Misc. 2d 561, 167 N.Y.S.2d 16
(Sur. Ct. 1957); Bell Estate, 8 Ches. Co. 21, 7 Pa. Fiduc. 1 (Orphans' Ct. 1956), ak4 393 Pa. 623,
144 A.2d 843 (1958); MD. EST. & TRUSTs CODE ANN. § 11-106(a) (1974); N.Y. EST. POWERS &
TRusTs LAW § 11-1.2(a) (McKinney Supp. 1983). Cf. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-100e(35)(B)
(West Supp. 1983-84) (if statute is incorporated in dispositive document, the adjustment is re-
quired in certain cases). But see MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27.5829(l)(e), (2) (Callaghan 1980) (no
adjustment required).
208. See Dobris, supra note 149, at 145-47. If the executor's decision is to deduct administra-
tion expenses for estate tax purposes, no adjustment is required. SeeJ. PRICE, supra note 6, at 725-
26; Taggart, supra note 149, at 244. This fact confirms that the reason for the reimbursement is to
restore the tax benefit of a deduction to those who have paid for it.
209. For conflicting authorities as to whether the beneficiaries of an interest that generates a
tax deduction are entitled to the benefit of that deduction when the Internal Revenue Code itself
shifts the benefit to other beneficiaries, compare Dobris, supra note 149, with Dobris, supra note
199. See also Carrico & Bondurant, supra note 149.
210. When the QTIP election is relied upon to fix the size of the marital deduction, the elec-
tion would appear to be the sole determinant of the relative interests of the estate's beneficiaries.
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first spouse to die but arguably fails to treat the estate's beneficiaries impar-
tially, because the executor augments the surviving spouse's income interest at
the possible expense of the QTIP remaindermen. The amount of depletion of
the QTIP remainder, however, depends entirely on how much of the dece-
dent's estate is "supposed" to qualify for the marital deduction. Given that the
testator signed a will that relies on fiduciary exercise of the QTIP election, the
testator's actual intentions on the relative interests of the beneficiaries under
his will, if he had any, will be difficult to determine. Since no standard exists
by which to judge the fiduciary's exercise of the QTIP election, 211 it should be
reviewed under the same standard that generally applies to the exercise of
fiduciary discretion.2t2 Thus, fiduciary exercise of the QTIP election should
be subject to judicial review only for an abuse of discretion.213
A similar situation exists in trust law. The duty of impartiality has lim-
ited impact in the administration of trusts that authorize the fiduciary to sprin-
kle income or principal among various beneficiaries.214 The settlor's intention
211. In In re Veith's Estate, 26 Fla. Supp. 145 (Judges' Ct. 1965), the court held that no adjust-
ment between the interest of the surviving spouse and the interests of the remaindermen of the
nonmarital trust was required to offset the "swing" that occurred when the executor elected, under
I.R.C. § 642(g), to deduct administration expenses for income tax purposes rather than for estate
tax purposes. The "swing" occurred because, under the pre-ERTA quantitative restrictions on the
marital deduction, only one-half of adjusted gross estate (AGE) could qualify for the marital
deduction. Therefore, when administration expenses that could have reduced the AGE were de-
ducted instead for income tax purposes, both the AGE and, pursuant to the formula clause in the
decedent's will, the marital share were increased. This decreased the nonmarital share. The court
reasoned that the decedent, by placing a formula clause pegged to the AGE in his will, indicated
an intention that the beneficiaries' relative interests were to be defined solely by reference to the
AGE, which could be calculated only after consideration of the executor's election under I.R.C.
§ 642(g). Thus defined, the "swing" did not rearrange the beneficiaries' relative interests; no fixed
"entitlements" existed until the election had been made. Other cases also have denied an adjust-
ment for the "swing." See, e.g., In re Modisette's Estate, 53 Misc. 2d 1050, 280 N.Y.S.2d 611 (Sur.
Ct. 1967); In re Will of Kennedy, 39 Misc. 2d 688, 241 N.Y.S.2d 894 (Sur. Ct. 1963); In re
McTarnahan's Estate, 27 Misc. 2d 13, 202 N.Y.S.2d 618 (Sur. Ct. 1960); In re Estate of Inman, 22
Misc. 2d 573, 196 N.Y.S.2d 369 (Sur. Ct. 1959). Only one case, In re Levy's Estate, 9 Misc. 2d 561,
167 N.Y.S.2d 16 (Sur. Ct. 1957), has required the adjustment, and its author later reached the
opposite conclusion in McTarnahan. Several states have enacted statutes that deny adjustments
for the "swing." MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 11-106(b) (1974); MicH. STAT ANN.
§ 27.5829(l)(e), (2) (Callaghan 1980); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 11-1.2(b) (McKinney
Supp. 1983). See also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-100e(35)(B) (West Supp. 1984) (applicable
only if incorporated in dispositive document). Estate of Rappaport, 121 Misc. 2d 447, 467
N.Y.S.2d 814 (Sur. Ct. 1983), cited the New York cases and statute barring an equitable adjust-
ment for the "swing," but nevertheless directed the executors to make the election in such a way
that the "swing" would not cause "a grotesque perversion of the testator's plan." Apparently the
court distinguished the cases and statute on the basis that they involved judicial evaluation of
already accomplished elections rather than judicial supervision of exercise of the election. Why
the result should depend upon the timing of judicial intervention is not apparent. The court men-
tioned but did not provide the details of a stipulation between the parties.
212. See Joint Report, supra note 8, at 12.
213. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 148, § 187. Cf InreVeith's Estate, 26 Fla. Supp. 145, 150
(Judges' Ct. 1965) (executor's election under 1965 version of I.R.C. § 642(g)(1982) to deduct ad-
ministration expenses for income tax purposes not criticized; exercise of executor's "discretion"
was not "detrimental to the estate" and executor did not act "capriciously, arbitrarily, mischie-
vously, or ruinously"); Griffith v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 249 Ga. 143, 147, 287 S.E.2d 526,
529 (1982) (reversing trial court, which should have "substituted its judgment for that of the
trustee only if the trustee had exhibited some abuse of discretion such as bad faith or fraud" in
making larger invasions of marital trust than of nonmarital trust).
214. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 148, §§ 183 comment a, 187; 2 A. Scor, supra note 147,
§§ 183, 187; Dobris, supra note 149, at 107-08 n.33 (distinguishing "discretionary administrative
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to remit the duty of impartiality is said to be implied in fact.215 Similarly, the
testator who is aware of the executor's obligation to make the QTIP election
arguably intends for the executor to act as his delegate in making a decision
that will affect the relative interests of the estate beneficiaries. In short, the
testator who empowers an executor to make the election necessarily confers
authority on the executor to rearrange the interests of the testator's benefi-
ciaries. The fiduciary duty to deal impartially with beneficiaries, therefore,
should require only a reasoned, disinterested decision.
216
Although in many respects the fiduciary duties of an executor are identi-
cal to those of a trustee,217 a distinctive characteristic of the executor's role is
to parcel out estate assets in strict accordance with the testator's expressed
wishes.218 Moreover, substantial differences exist between a client's reliance
on a lawyer's advice that the typical full-deferral estate plan is appropriate to
provide for his surviving spouse and the decision to grant a trustee broad dis-
cretionary powers over the distribution of income or principal. Courts, there-
fore, may decline to interpret every full-deferral estate plan as evidence that
the testator actually intended to confer a dispositive power upon the executor
and thereby to remit the fiduciary duty of impartiality.
Comparison of the QTIP election with two other familiar executor elec-
tions, however, strongly suggests that the fiduciary duty to treat beneficiaries
impartially will have only limited impact on the QTIP election, regardless of
the courts' interpretation of the testator's intentions. With the exception of the
Warms adjustment,2 19 both elections have been unfettered by the fiduciary
duty to treat beneficiaries impartially. Substantial authority exists for the
proposition that the executor whose election to deduct administration expenses
for income tax purposes shifts the interests of the marital and nonmarital
powers" from "discretionary dispositive powers"); Dobris, supra note 199, at 286-87 & n.102, 300
n.180 (same). See generally Halbach, Problems of Discretion in Discretionary Trusts, 61 COLUM. L.
REv. 1425 (1961).
215. See Dobris, supra note 199, at 284-86.
216. See, e.g., Costabadie v. Costabadie, 6 Hare 410 (1847) (court may require only "honest
and reasonable exercise" of trustee's discretion over payment of income); Tabor v. Brooks, 10 Ch.
D. 273 (1878) (judicial interference with trustee's exercise of discretion over payment of income
available only where "malafides" is shown); Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Johnson, 326
Mass. 664, 665, 96 N.E.2d 155, 157 (1951) (because there was "no contention that the trustees
acted in bad faith, or arbitrarily or capriciously," court refused to interfere with trustee's exercise
of discretion over payment of income and principal). The rule generally is stated that the trustee
must not abuse his discretion. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 148, § 187 & comment e; 3 A.
Scorr, supra note 147, § 187 (citing numerous cases).
2i7. See, e.g., In re Johnson's Estate, 187 Wash. 552, 60 P.2d 271 (1936); BOGERT, supra note
147, § 12; 1 A. ScoTr, supra note 147, § 6; UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 3-703(a) (West 1982);
Dobris, supra note 149, at 107 n.32; Taggart, supra note 149, at 396.
218. See UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 3-703(a) (West 1982) ("A personal representative is
under a duty to settle and distribute the estate of decedent in accordance with the terms of any
probated and effective will...."). For other distinctions between trustees and executors, see
Estate of Beach, 15 Cal. 3d 623, 638, 541 P.2d 994, 1003, 125 Cal. Rptr. 570, 579 (1975), cert.
denied sub nom. Edwards v. Superior Court, 434 U.S. 1046 (1978); Note, Executor Distinguished
from Trustee, 52 MARQ. L. REV. 303 (1968). See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 148, § 6 ("An
executorship ... is not a trust.") & comments a, b.
219. In re Warms' Estate, 140 N.Y.S.2d 169 (Sur. Ct. 1955). See supra note 207 and accompa-
nying text.
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shares does not thereby fail to treat beneficiaries impartially.220 Although no
judicial authority speaks directly to the issue,221 the few statutes that apply
and several commentators agree that the executor does not fail to treat benefi-
ciaries impartially by making the alternate valuation election. 222 Thus, even
when tax elections are exercised by the executors of testators who have neither
expressly nor impliedly authorized these elections, the executors are largely
free of the duty of impartiality. Since the QTIP election is possible only if the
testator chooses a certain type of marital bequest, it is even clearer that the
QTIP election should not be subject to the fiduciary duty to treat beneficiaries
impartially. Moreover, because the executor can minimize taxes on the cur-
rent estate only by making the QTIP election, there is an important reason to
allow him to do So. 2 2 3 Prior to the enactment of ERTA, Professor Dobris
noted:
Currently, no situation generally arising in fiduciary administration
requires a court to approve a large tax savings obtainable only by
unfair action which in turn could only be made fair by a very com-
plicated equitable adjustment. Perhaps a court could legitimately al-
low such action to go unadjusted in order to save taxes. 224
The QTIP election will occur frequently. 225 Large amounts of taxes can be
saved by it (at least temporarily),226 and "correction" would be very compli-
cated.227 Courts facing the QTIP election, therefore, may imply in law228 a
remission of the fiduciary duty of impartiality.229
220. See supra note 211.
221. In re McTarnahan's Estate, 27 Misc. 2d 13, 202 N.Y.S.2d 618 (Sur. Ct. 1960), approved
an account of an executor whose exercise of the alternate valuation election decreased the marital
share. The surviving spouse, however, did not contest the accounting, and the opinion did not
expressly consider the issue.
222. See MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 11-106(b)(2) (1974); MICH. STAT. ANN.
§ 27.5829(2) (Callaghan 1980); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRuSTS LAW § I l-l.2(b)(l)(B) (McKinney
Supp. 1982-83); J. PRICE, supra note 6, at 724-25; Dobris, supra note 199, at 305-06; Moore, supra
note 199, 1903; Moore, Conflicting Interests, supra note 6, 605.3; Cf. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 45-100e(35)(A) (West Supp. 1983-84) (statute must be incorporated by reference in dispositive
document). But see Midonick, Trial Tactics, 16 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 725, 731 (1981) (Sur-
rogate of New York County suggesting equitable adjustment after alternate valuation election);
Taggart, supra note 149, at 247 (suggesting that the New York statute does not preclude an equita-
ble adjustment where date-of-death value is elected).
223. See Copley v. Copley, 126 Cal. App. 3d 248, 178 Cal. Rptr. 842 (Ct. App. 1981) (approv-
ing fiduciary conduct later determined to have been unfair to certain beneficiaries, because such
conduct minimized estate taxes).
224. Dobris, supra note 199, at 288.
225. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
226. See supra text accompanying note 158.
227. Unknowables, such as the rate the surviving spouse will deplete QTIP income and any
principal that may be available to her, the date of death of the surviving spouse, and the total
return (income and growth) available from the combined estates' assets during the life of the
surviving spouse, are involved in determining whether prepayment of the estate tax should be
undertaken. See supra notes 82-141 and accompanying text. The necessarily multifaceted analy-
sis, in which so many of the factors are interrelated, might prove exceedingly difficult for the
courts. See generally Fuller, The Forms andLimits of4dudicalon 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 394-404
(1978).
228. See Dobris, supra note 199, at 287.
229. The execution of a will that enabled the executor to avoid estate taxes entirely might be
read as evidence of an intention that taxes be minimized at the testator's death. Cf. Estate of Colp,
N.Y.L.J., Jan. 20, 1976, at 8, cols. 2,3 (Sur. Ct. 1976) (deriving such an intention from a maximum
marital clause); Browne, supra note 149, at 1252 (same); Moore, supra note 199, 11902 (same). If
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A final reason exists to exempt the QTIP election from the duty of impar-
tiality. Because the fiduciary would be required either to make a partial QTIP
election or, in the event of a full election, to make an equitable adjustment
from the income interest to the remainder interest, imposition of the duty
would affect adversely the interests of beneficiaries the courts often presume
the testator favored. In either case, the surviving spouse, often presumed to be
the testator's primary beneficiary,230 would be affected adversely. By the same
token, the interest of the income beneficiary, often presumed to occupy a simi-
larly special place in the testator's heart,23' would be decreased. Since the
surviving spouse always is the income beneficiary of a QTIP trust, the two
presumptions coincide, allowing a court to conclude that a full QTIP election
does not implicate the duty of impartiality.
232
The theory that the QTIP election can be made with little consideration
of the fiduciary duty to treat beneficiaries impartially depends upon a pres-
ently unavailable judicial interpretation. As a result, unless the dispositive
document contains language remitting the fiduciary duty to treat beneficiaries
impartially,233 the draftsman who relies on the executor to make the QTIP
election to achieve post-mortem flexibility runs a substantial risk that the fidu-
ciary will refuse to elect other than full deferral. 34 Even if the fiduciary does
elect to make a partial election, the surviving spouse, whose interest is de-
creased thereby, may wish to litigate the propriety of the fiduciary's conduct if
the fiduciary has not obtained the surviving spouse's consent or judicial ap-
proval of his proposed conduct. In short, full QTIP elections will be the inva-
riable rule.
235
so, it would be even easier for a court to forego requiring a complicated adjustment to "correct" an
election that minimized taxes.
230. See, e.g., Delaware Trust Co. v. Bradford, 30 Del. Ch. 277, 282, 59 A.2d 212, 214 (Del.
Ch. 1948).
231. See BOoERT, supra note 147, §§ 802, 824.
232. On the other hand, the coincidence of such presumptions could influence a court to re-
quire an equitable adjustment in favor of the surviving spouse in the event of a partial QTIP
election. The opposite conclusion is reached infra notes 244-46 and accompanying text.
233. See infra text accompanying notes 294-300.
234. When the propriety of a particular course of action is in doubt, the fiduciary often opts
for the alternative that results in retention of the larger amount of trust property. Continued
commissions aside, the reason for doing so is clear. If a court later deems the fiduciary's conduct
improper, the fiduciary who has taken the approach that augmented the trust assets simply will be
required to pay, out of trust property already in hand, the portion that should have been paid
earlier. The fiduciary who later is determined improperly to have decreased the size of the trust
property, however, is surcharged. The surcharged fiduciary's right to recover the trust property
improperly paid may be worthless or unattractive and, in the usual case, will be expensive to
exercise. See Habach, supra note 214, at 1457 (discussing fiduciary's decision whether to make
distributions under discretionary trust). Thus, if the fiduciary's choice is whether to pay an op-
tional tax, which certainly will not be recoverable in the event that a court later determines that
the tax was paid improperly, the overwhelming temptation will be to elect full deferral, pay no tax,
and thereby maximize 
the estate.
The corporate fiduciary, highly risk averse and almost always counselled by lawyers special-
izing in the field of estate planning, is even more likely to take the conservative course. Thus,
reliance on a corporate executor to exercise the QTIP election to achieve post-mortem flexibility
may be particularly unwise. See infra note 235.
235. At a seminar titled "1983 Estate Planning and Drafting Workshop for Attorneys"
presented on May 18, 1983, in Tucson, Arizona, a representative of one of the nation's largest trust
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2. Are Equitable Adjustments Necessary?
Certain inequities between estate beneficiaries can be adjusted by the ex-
ecutor or by a court if tax-minimizing conduct has augmented the estate.
2 36 If
an executor chooses to minimize the estate's overall tax burden by deducting
administration expenses for income, rather than estate tax purposes, the un-
fairness of shifting to the income beneficiaries the tax benefits of deductions
obtained at the expense of principal can be corrected by charging the amount
of additional estate tax to income.237 Therefore, in the case of a full QTIP
election, an equitable adjustment between the surviving spouse's interest and
that of the QTIP remaindermen is possible. Given the number and complex-
ity of factors involved in determining whether the QTIP remaindermen's in-
terests actually will be harmed, however, both the propriety and the amount of
this adjustment are difficult issues.
In Third National Bank & Trust Co. v. Campbell2 38 the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court was asked to decide whether income should reim-
burse principal for capital gains tax incurred because of a reduction in basis
caused by income's receipt of cash dividends that were treated as a return of
capital by the Internal Revenue Code. The court concluded that reimburse-
ment was not necessary and rejected the suggestion that trustees receiving such
distributions should create reserves to reimburse principal for the capital gains
tax eventually incurred.
[It would be impractical to withhold a reserve] equal to the estimated
future capital gains tax on that portion of the dividend which repre-
sents a tax exempt return of capital, in order to provide for the even-
tuality that at some time in the future the shares producing the
dividend will be sold at a profit. . . . The shares may never be sold
during the life of the trust or may even be sold at a loss. Any capital
gain in fact realized may be offset by capital losses on other trust
investments or by a carry over capital loss. . . . The tax laws or the
rates of taxation on capital gains may change after the dividend is
paid, thus confusing any system of reserving for future capital gains
taxes.
239
In short, one of the principal reasons for the court's holding that no adjust-
ment was required was that the amount of future capital gains tax was un-
knowable.2 40 An equitable adjustment requiring the surviving spouse's
companies stated that its "QTIP Committee" had elected full deferral in every estate considered to
that date.
236. See Dobris, supra note 149, at 113-16; Dobris, supra note 199. See generally Carrico &
Bondurant, supra note 149; Taggart, supra note 149.
237. See supra note 207. On the other hand, those courts and legislatures that have considered
whether the marital share should reimburse the nonmarital share in the amount of the "swing"
caused by the executor's I.R.C. § 642(g) (1982) election have rejected the adjustment almost unan-
imously. See supra note 211.
238. 336 Mass. 352, 145 N.E.2d 703 (1957).
239. Id at 356-57, 145 N.E.2d at 706. See also In re Estate of Simmons, 30 Misc. 2d 1022, 220
N.Y.S.2d 515 (Sur. Ct. 1961).
240. In an entirely different setting, courts repeatedly have refused to consider potential tax
liabilities. In California, courts may not take potential capital gains tax liabilities into account in
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income interest to reimburse the QTIP remaindermen's principal interest for
the possibility of increased estate taxes at the surviving spouse's death neces-
sarily seeks to compensate for future taxes. Therefore, the increase in those
taxes is unknowable. Moreover, it may be that no increase ever will occur.
Thus, an equitable adjustment from income to principal is unlikely.
24 1
An executor's decision to reimburse principal from the surviving spouse's
income interest may be inappropriate for yet another reason. This reimburse-
ment could disqualify at least a portion of the QTIP from the marital deduc-
tion,242 because all income from the QTIP must be paid to the surviving
spouse to qualify for the marital deduction.243 Thus, adjustment in favor of
the QTIP remaindermen again seems unlikely.
If an executor depletes the estate to benefit a particular beneficiary, no
readily apparent fund is available for equitably "adjusting" the beneficiaries'
interests.244 Therefore, equitable adjustments seem conceptually inappropri-
ate in the case of a partial QTIP election when estate tax is incurred volunta-
rily.245 Only after the death of the surviving spouse, when another round of
estate taxes will be paid, can principal possibly exceed the level it would have
been if no taxes had been paid at the death of the first spouse to die.
Requiring the remaindermen to contribute the amount of prepaid estate
taxes to the trust in an effort to make whole the surviving spouse's income
interest is not a realistic possibility. First, the remaindermen would be re-
quired to make this reimbursement out of their funds to secure a future benefit
they might never receive. The remainder might be contingent, or the trust
might be depleted prior to termination. Second, even if reimbursement by the
remaindermen were practical, reimbursement would tend to defeat the major
dividing marital property following divorce, unless the tax liability is "immediate and specific."
Eg., In re Marriage of Epstein, 24 Cal. 3d 76, 154 Cal. Rptr. 413, 592 P.2d 1165 (1979); In re
Marriage of Fonstein, 17 Cal. 3d 738, 131 Cal. Rptr. 873, 552 P.2d 1169 (1976); Weinberg v.
Weinberg, 67 Cal. 2d 557, 63 Cal. Rptr. 13, 432 P.2d 709 (1967).
241. See Moore, Conflicting Interests, supra note 6, 603.5. Cf. Carrico & Bondurant, supra
note 149, at 581 (rejecting adjustment when "many factors" must enter into fiduciary's decision).
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27.5829(2) (Callaghan 1980) appears to bar such an adjustment.
242. See Joint Report, supra note 8, at 13. See also Moore, supra note 199, T 1903 (pre-
ERTA); Taggart, supra note 149, at 245 (pre-ERTA). But cf. Moore, Conflicting Interests, supra
note 6, 603.5 (no loss of marital deduction if adjustment required under local law).
243. See I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7)(B)(ii)(I) (1982).
244. Cf. Dobris, supra note 149, at 112-13 n.61 (suggesting that court "might use a fiduciary's
private funds to accomplish a fiduciary adjustment if the beneficiary who received a windfall
squandered it and had no other funds to allow the adjustment to be made").
245. As has been suggested above, the appropriate judicial response to such fiduciary conduct
is surcharge for breach of the fiduciary duty to minimize taxes. See supra notes 183-99 and ac-
companying text.
Moore, supra note 199, 1903, suggests "equitable adjustments" in numerous situations, in-
cluding when the executor elects a higher alternate valuation to achieve "subsequent income tax
savings" to estate beneficiaries who do not bear the increased estate tax. Moore, however, merely
may be referring to the possibility that, as a precondition to engaging in estate-depleting activity,
the executor will obtain reimbursement for the amount of depletion from the person to be bene-
fited. If so, no actual estate depletion will occur and suitable funds will be available for making
true equitable adjustments of the beneficiaries' interests. Estate of Rappaport, 121 Misc. 2d 447,
467 N.Y.S.2d 814 (Sur. Ct. 1983), authorized an I.RC. § 642(g) election that failed to minimize an
estate's overall taxes only when the benefited parties paid into escrow the amount by which taxes
would be increased.
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purpose of prepaying the estate tax. Instead of reducing the potential gross
estate of the surviving spouse, reimbursement would tend to increase it. Thus,
neither an executor nor a court is likely to view an equitable adjustment as
appropriate in the case of a tax-generating partial QTIP election. 246
3. Shifting State Death Taxes to the Beneficiaries of the Surviving Spouse
Section 2207A(a)(1) of the Code gives the estate of the surviving spouse a
right to recover from the recipients of the QTIP the federal estate tax incurred
by inclusion of the QTIP in the survivor's gross estate. That section, however,
provides no right to recover state death taxes similarly incurred. Therefore,
one of the effects of the QTIP election is a shift of the state death taxes on the
first spouse's estate to the beneficiaries of the survivor. A strong argument can
be made that this shift invokes the fiduciary duty of impartiality and requires
an equitable adjustment. Like the shift in deductions giving rise to the Warms
adjustment, 247 an executor's unilateral act shifts tax consequences from the
beneficiaries of the interest that incurred those consequences. Consequently,
some sort of compensation to the beneficiaries of the surviving spouse may be
required. If the Warms pattern were followed, the beneficiaries of the surviv-
ing spouse would be entitled to reimbursement for the state death taxes on the
surviving spouse's estate incurred by inclusion of the QTIP in either the fed-
eral or the state tax base, or both.248
On the other hand, the problem may disappear whenever there is a sur-
viving spouse. Until the death of the surviving spouse, she has neither heirs
nor beneficiaries.249 Thus, the "interests" of such "heirs" and "beneficiaries"
are represented exclusively by the surviving spouse. Since the surviving
spouse is benefited by a full QTIP election, 250 no one is in a position to com-
plain about the shift of state death taxes.251 Moreover, the surviving spouse
frequently serves as executor 252 and thus will personally make the election. If
the surviving spouse dies before the exercise of the QTIP election, however,
the executor will be unable to defend the shift of state death taxes on the basis
of a benefit to the surviving spouse, and an adjustment almost certainly will be
246. See Joint Report, supra note 8, at 13. See also Dobris, supra note 199, at 280, 330 ("Equi-
table adjustments are not required. . . when they are hard to make. . . or too conjectural as to
injury or remedy."). MicH. STAT. ANN. § 27.5829(2) (Callaghan 1980) appears to bar such an
adjustment.
247. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
248. Reference to inclusion in the federal estate tax base is necessary to measure the full extent
by which state death taxes are increased. In sponge-tax states, the state death tax increases as the
federal state death tax credit, which is based on the federal taxable estate, increases. Seegenerally
supra note 68.
249. See Morsman v. Commissioner, 90 F.2d 18, 26 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 701
(1937); Duffield v. Duffield, 268 Ill. 29, 35, 108 N.E. 673, 675 (1915); Avon State Bank v. Commer-
cial & Say. Bank, 49 S.D. 575, 579, 207 N.W. 654, 656 (1926).
250. See supra text accompanying notes 96-99.
251. Is a person whose property may bear an increased tax after her death harmed thereby? If
so, when the probable increase in income and principal made available to the surviving spouse by
a QTIP election is less than the probable increase in state taxes at her death, she might be viewed
as having been harmed by the QTIP election's shift in state death taxes.




C. The Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty
An additional obstacle to the fiduciary's exercise of the QTIP election is
created by the strong possibility that the fiduciary will have a conflict of inter-
est in making the election. 254 Typically, the surviving spouse will be the exec-
utor.255 The QTIP election allows such a fiduciary to favor herself over other
beneficiaries. 256 In choosing to elect QTIP status for the entire amount of the
decedent's estate, less only the credit-shelter amount, a fiduciary not only max-
imizes the surviving spouse's interest but also may decrease substantially the
amount that the QTIP remaindermen eventually will receive at the surviving
spouse's death.257 Therefore, a surviving spouse serving as executor has a per-
sonal financial interest in the election. Although the testator usually will have
desired a significant portion, if not all, of his estate to qualify for the marital
deduction, the surviving spouse conceivably could be disqualified from mak-
ing the QTIP election because of this conflict of interest.
A testator, however, can permit the executor to do what otherwise would
constitute a breach of the duty of loyalty by express provision in his will.258 In
Rosencrans v. Fry259 the testator left corporate shares, which represented the
controlling interest in his business, in trust for the benefit of his wife.260 In his
will he designated his wife and Fry, the manager of the corporation, as cotrust-
ees.261 The testator also granted Fry the right to purchase the trust shares at
par value.2 62 The New Jersey Supreme Court permitted Fry to purchase the
253. If the executor of the first spouse to die elects full deferral in such a case, the executor also
may have failed to minimize taxes (because of the surviving spouse's estate's immediate right of
reimbursement against the estate of the first spouse to die). See supra notes 82-88 and accompany-
ing text. If so, the executor should be surcharged for the amount by which the federal estate tax
and, assuming that the adjustment suggested in the text is required, the state death taxes payable
by the estate of the first spouse to die are increased as a result of failing to "prepay" enough tax to
arrive at the lowest tax result. See generally supra notes 183-99 and accompanying text.
254. "The most fundamental duty owed by the trustee to the beneficiaries of the trust is the
duty of loyalty." 2 A. ScoTT, supra note 147, § 170. See also BOGERT, supra note 147, § 543;
RESTATEMENT, supra note 148, § 170(1) & comment a; Scott, The Trustee's Duty of Loyalty, 49
HARV. L. REV. 521 (1936).
255. An informal survey taken in 1982 at a meeting of the American College of Probate Coun-
sel indicated that attorneys' spouses were named as executors in the attorneys' own wills "a very
high percentage of the time." Lombard & Gother, Choosing Your Executor and Trustee, 8 PROB.
NOTEs 246, 257 (1983). The range was from 81% of lawyers surveyed who were from the West to
58% of lawyers surveyed who were from the Midwest. Id at 259. If the surviving spouse is not the
executor, one or more of the testator's children usually will be the executor. As remaindermen
under a QTIP trust, children would have similar conflicts of interest.
256. See Brackney, supra note 8, at 29; Joint Report, supra note 8, at 9-10; Kurtz, supra note 8,
at 643-44; Moore, New Marital Deduction, supra note 6, 904.
257. See supra notes 64-74 and accompanying text.
258. See BOGERT, supra note 147, § 543(A); 2 A. Scotr, supra note 147, § 170.9; RESTATE-
MENT, supra note 148, § 170, comment t; Scott, supra note 254, at 536-37, 542; UNIFORM PROBATE
CODE § 3-713(1) (West 1982).
259. 12 N.J. 88, 95 A.2d 905 (1953).
260. Id. at 92-93, 95 A.2d at 907-08.
261. Id. at 93, 95 A.2d at 908.
262. Id.
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shares from the trust over Mrs. Rosencrans' objections. 263 The court noted
that the "conflict of interest, if any, . . . was created not by Fry but by the
testator,. . . by whose will he was named co-trustee." 264 The court was un-
willing to deny Fry "that which the will expressly gave him, and if, under the
circumstances, the trustee acted fairly and in good faith, he is not to be
penalized."
265
There also are instances in which courts, in the absence of express author-
ity under the will, have permitted behavior that otherwise would have been
impermissible self-dealing. 266 In Turnbull v. Pomeroy267 the testator directed
his testamentary trustee to continue the testator's manufacturing business "in
the same general manner said business is now carried on."'268 During his life-
time, the testator regularly had consigned "about half' of his business' output
to the firm of the person he designated as trustee.2 69 The Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court, in a opinion by Justice Holmes, permitted the trustee
to continue the testator's practice of consigning a portion of the business' out-
put to the trustee's own firm, despite the fact that he thereby realized "a con-
siderable sum" in commissions.270 The court reasoned that the testator's
authorization to continue the business evidenced his expectation that his past
business dealings with the consignee-trustee would continue. 271 Indeed, if a
testator's will requires a particular activity that necessarily affects the personal
financial interests of the person chosen to act as fiduciary, the required actions
should be permitted, in the absence of abuse,272 just as if the testator had
authorized expressly the self-dealing. 2
73
263. Id at 102-04, 95 A.2d at 913.
264. Id at 102, 95 A.2d at 913.
265. Id at 103, 95 A.2d at 913. See also Bloodworth v. Bloodworth, 224 Ga. 717, 164 S.E.2d
823 (1968).
266. See, e.g., Copley v. Copley, 126 Cal. App. 3d 248, 272-75, 178 Cal. Rptr. 842, 857-59 (Ct.
App. 1981); Goldman v. Rubin, 292 Md. 693, 711-14, 441 A.2d 713, 724-25 (1982). See also 2 A.
Scorr, supra note 147, § 170.9; Ledwith, supra note 199, at 22-23.
267. 140 Mass. 117, 3 N.E. 15 (1885).
268. Id at 117-18, 3 N.E. at 16.
269. Id at 118, 3 N.E. at 16.
270. Id at 117, 3 N.E. at 16.
271. Id at 119, 3 N.E. at 17. See also Vredenburgh v. Jones, 349 A.2d 22 (Del. Ch. 1975).
In Vredenburgh, decedent's will authorized her executor to set up a corporation for the develop-
ment of various mining interests. Id. at 27-28. The court dismissed objections to the executor's
payment of a salary to himself as officer and director of the resulting corporation. Id at 44. The
court reasoned that there was "no thought that if [the executor] formed a corporation he was to
run it in his capacity as executor and be compensated solely through his commissions on the
estate." Id.
272. In In reFlagg's Estate, 365 Pa. 82, 73 A.2d 411 (1950), the court permitted redemption of
corporate shares by cotrustees, one of whom was the controlling shareholder. The court empha-
sized that the testator's will authorized the trustee-shareholder to buy these shares and that diver-
sification of the trust was necessary. Id at 89-91, 73 A.2d at 415-16. The court then reasoned that
"where the power, indeed duty, to engage in self-dealing is necessarily implied in the terms of the
testator's will the valid exercise of that power will not be set aside by this court." Id at 92, 73 A.2d
at 416. Cf. Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Lewis, 317 Mass. 137, 141, 57 N.E.2d 638, 640-41
(1944) ("[W]here the method selected by a testator for the accomplishment of the purpose and
object of the trust cannot be adopted by a trustee without dealing with himself individually, it may
be fairly assumed that such dealing was contemplated by the testator.").
273. See supra note 258 and accompanying text.
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Can a surviving spouse chosen by the testator as his executor exercise the
QTIP election as required by the terms of the testator's will and the Code? If
so, must the surviving spouse exercise it against her own financial interest?
Some authority suggests that the surviving spouse, as fiduciary, must take the
least personally advantageous path.274 Would not such a rule render superflu-
ous the testator's intricate planning and drafting for a marital deduction? Cer-
tainly a testator who executes a will setting forth marital and credit-shelter
shares intends that in at least some circumstances some portion of his estate
should qualify for the marital deduction. This intent would be flouted if the
surviving spouse, as fiduciary, was unable to qualify any portion of the estate
for the marital deduction. 27 5 Such a rule could clash with the fiduciary duty to
minimize taxes, which generally requires the QTIP election with respect to any
property in excess of the unified credit equivalent.276 A rule requiring the
surviving spouse to exercise the QTIP election only to benefit the estate's other
beneficiaries occasionally would require the opposite course of conduct.
277
Other authority argues, by analogy, that the surviving spouse should not
be allowed to exercise the QTIP election at all. A small but growing body of
law indicates that a trustee-beneficiary may not exercise any discretion to pay
income or principal to himself.278  In Armington v. Meyer 279 the Supreme
274. See Estate of Rappaport, 121 Misc. 2d 447, 450,467 N.Y.S.2d 814, 816-17 (Sur. Ct. 1983)
("The... duty to refrain from self-dealing acts... should bar a fiduciary who is also a benefici-
ary from making a tax election unfairly favoring his beneficial interest over that of another benefi-
ciary."); Estate of Colp, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 20, 1976, at 8, cols. 2-3 (Sur. Ct. 1976) (dictum) ("It is
incumbent upon the executors to resolve this issue in such manner as not to benefit one or the
other of them at the expense of [the] life beneficiaries for they do so at their peril."); In re Warm's
Estate, 140 N.Y.S.2d 169, 171 (Sur. Ct. 1955) ('The tax option [-the election, under I.R.C.
§ 642(g), to deduct administration expenses for income tax purposes-] which results in a benefit
to the income beneficiary, especially where she is coexecutrix, should not be exercised to the detri-
ment of the remaindermen."). But see Will of Raible, N.Y.L.J., May 20, 1977, at 14, col. 1 (Sur.
Ct. 1977) (it would "not be imprudent" for widow, serving as coexecutor with "an independent
fiduciary," to exercise the alternate valuation election to increase her marital share); In re Estate
of Fiedler, 55 N.J. Super. 500, 511-12, 151 A.2d 201, 207 (App. Div. 1959) ("True, [the executor]
must be held to a high degree of accountability for his actions, but this is not to say that he must
consider his interest as a beneficiary less than the interest of [other beneficiaries] because of his
appointment as executor.").
Judicial language frequently has admonished executors to subordinate personal interests in
dealing with their estates. For example, in Herman's Estate, 90 Pa. Super. 512 (1927), the court
stated: "Where the personal interests of an executor or other trustee are in conflict with the gen-
eral good of the estate the law will always require him to adopt that course which will benefit the
estate rather than that which will result to his own advantage." Id. at 514. In the typical self-
dealing case, the executor's interests truly are opposed to those of the estate as a whole. In Her-
man's Estate, for example, the executor caused the estate to pay for painting buildings that passed
to him and his heirs. Id. Thus, the expense depleted the estate and was disallowed. Id. In the
case of tax elections, however, the estate as a whole may be benefited by an election that favors the
executor. A rule that always required the executor to make tax elections in his own personal worst
interest therefore sometimes would require payment of unnecessary taxes. In fact, the Surrogate
who wrote Coop has reconsidered this position. See supra note 185.
275. See Joint Report, supra note 8, at 9.
276. See supra notes 183-99 and accompanying text.
277. See supra notes 64-74 and accompanying text. For a case that permitted minimization of
estate taxes despite an administrator-trustee's conflict of interest, see Copley v. Copley, 126 Cal.
App. 3d 248, 272-75, 178 Cal. Rptr. 842, 857-59 (1981).
278. See Garfield v. United States, 80-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) % 13,381 (D. Mass. 1980); Rog-
ers v. Rogers, 11 N.Y. 228, 18 N.E. 636 (1888). Cf. Dana v. Gring, 374 Mass. 109,371 N.E.2d 755
(1977) (construing will to deny the trustee-beneficiary the power to distribute principal to herself).
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Court of Rhode Island held that when the testator had granted cotrustees dis-
cretion to pay income to a group that included the trustees, court approval was
necessary for all payments of income by the cotrustees to themselves.280 Stat-
utes in Indiana, 28 1 New York,2 82 North Carolina,
283 and Wisconsin 284 simi-
larly prohibit the interested trustee-beneficiary from benefiting himself. This
trend, however, if it is a trend, admittedly is a minority position.2 85 In any
event, courts have extended this view only to trustees. One reason why the
view is more applicable to trustees than to executors is that it also responds to
the beneficiary-trustee's problem of merger of title.286 If a sole trustee who
owns legal title to the trust property acquires the entire equitable interest in the
trust, the titles merge and the trust terminates. 2 87 Thus, the issue whether
merger should apply if a trustee has discretion to pay principal to himself
arises. In fact, several of the cases supporting the proposition that a trustee-
beneficiary may not exercise his discretion over income or principal in his own
favor considered this issue.2 88 Since the primary function of an executor is to
administer an estate rather than to hold property for another, merger is not a
problem for an executor. Thus, an estate's sole beneficiary can act as its sole
executor.289 Moreover, the Armington view generally has been limited to situ-
ations involving trustee discretion to pay income or principal to himself.
2 90
Exercise of the QTIP election allows a surviving spouse acting as executor
only the opportunity to avoid depletion of the fund from which his or her
income will be derived. Conferring the right to exercise the QTIP election
upon an interested fiduciary is therefore much less dangerous than conferring
discretion to pay income or principal.
But cf. In re Estate of Seidman, 58 A.D.2d 72, 75-76, 395 N.Y.S.2d 674, 677 (1977). In re Estate of
Seidman directed the Surrogate's Court to appoint a cotrustee to exercise discretion over payment
of principal to the sole trustee-beneficiary. The court, however, noted that although in New York
a trustee-beneficiary is "subject to a statutory provision that a power, vested in a person in his
capacity as trustee of an express trust to distribute principal to himself may not be exercised by
him," the 'fiduciary obligation" of such a trustee-beneficiary requires only that he "confine" his
invasions "within reasonable limits." Id. at 75-76, 395 N.Y.S.2d at 677 (emphasis added).
279. 103 R.I. 211, 236 A.2d 450 (1967).
280. Id. at 222-23, 236 A.2d at 456-57.
281. IND. CODE ANN. § 30-4-3-5 (Bums 1972).
282. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRusTs LAW § 10-10.1 (McKinney 1967).
283. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32-34 (1976).
284. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 701.19(10) (West 1981).
285. See Armington v. Meyer, 103 R.I. 211, 221, 236 A.2d 450, 456 (1967); see generally Bo-
GERT, supra note 147, § 129.
286. See generally BOGERT, supra note 147, § 129.
287. See BOGERT, supra note 147, § 129; RESTATEMENT, supra note 148, §§ 99(5), 115(5); 2 A.
Sconrr, supra note 147, § 99.
288. Eg., Rogers v. Rogers, 111 N.Y. 228, 237, 18 N.E. 636, 638 (1888); In re Estate of Seid-
man, 58 A.D.2d 72, 74, 395 N.Y.S.2d 674, 676 (1977).
289. See T. ATIiNsON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS 611 (2d ed. 1953).
290. Each of the statutes cited supra notes 281-84 applies only to trusts and trustees. Even if
the statutes were construed to include executors, only that of Indiana seems broad enough to cover
a QTIP election. IND. CODE ANN. § 30-4-3-5 (Bums 1972) provides: "If the duty of the trustee in
the exercise of any power conflicts with his individual interest or his interest as trustee of another
trust, the power may be exercised only with court authorization." The others apply only to pay-




Professor Scott, summarizing the duty of loyalty, wrote that a fiduciary
was "not permitted to place himself in a position where it would be for his
own benefit to violate his duty to the beneficiaries."' 29' If a testator and the
Code require an executor to make the QTIP election and the testator neverthe-
less designates his surviving spouse as executor, can the surviving spouse fairly
be viewed as having "placed" herself in a position to benefit herself?. Given
the testator's clear intentions, can the executor owe the other beneficiaries a
duty not to make the election? A case that is more analogous and persuasive
strongly suggests that the surviving spouse as executor is free to exercise the
QTIP election in accordance with her other fiduciary duties, notwithstanding
her self-interest. In re Veith's Estate292 involved another election imposed on
executors by the Code. The court held that an income beneficiary's personal
financial interest in her election to deduct administration expenses for income
tax purposes did not bar her from so electing.293 This holding is consistent
with the premise of Rosencrans and Turnbull; if the testator designates as a
fiduciary one known to have an unavoidable conflicting interest with respect
to an action required of the fiduciary, in the absence of abuse, no self-dealing
can occur.
D. Remission of Fiduciary Duties
Regardless how the courts ultimately resolve these issues of fiduciary con-
duct, each presently involves substantial uncertainty. Estate planning that in-
vites litigation has failed miserably, regardless of outcome.2 94 The use of an
estate planning opportunity with QTIP's appeal, however, cannot be delayed
until the judicial treatment of a fiduciary QTIP election is clear. Because a
testator may authorize his fiduciary to do that which the fiduciary otherwise
would not be permitted to do, 2 95 language expressly dealing with each of these
291. 2 A. ScoTr, supra note 147, § 170.
292. 26 Fla. Supp. 145 (Judges' Ct. 1965).
293. Id at 150.
294. Cf. Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 HARV. L. Pb-v. 489, 524
(1975) ("The counselor's job is to prevent litigation.").
295. See supra notes 258-65 and accompanying text. Professor Scott distinguishes "a provision
in the trust instrument which permits the trustee to do acts which would not otherwise be permissi-
ble" from "a provision which merely relieves the trustee from liability if he does them." 3 A.
Scorr, supra note 147, § 222.1. See also Moore, A Rationalization of Trust Surcharge Cases, 96 U.
PA. L. REv. 647, 674-75 (1948). The former permits a fiduciary to do, without engaging in a
breach of trust, that which the fiduciary otherwise would not be permitted to do. The latter, on the
other hand, merely relieves a fiduciary of liability for doing that which is admittedly a breach of
trust. In practice, the distinction is not always easy to make. See generally Report of the Commit-
tee on Trust Administration and Accounting, Exculpatory Clauses-Their Legal Sign~fcance, 1
REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 530 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Committee Report], particularly the
Appendix, at 541-48, which provides a wealth of sample forms, all designated as "exculpatory
clauses" but consisting not only of both types but also of combinations and blends. See, e.g., id at
546, Form K2.
The language suggested in the text accompanying infra note 297 aims primarily at authoriz-
ing the executor to act rather than at relieving the executor of liability for acting. Regardless
which category the suggested language falls into, however, it should succeed in its primary objec-
tive of avoiding executor liability for exercise of the QTIP election. If viewed as a grant of discre-
tion to exercise the QTIP election, the provision should put the election beyond the court's review,
"except to prevent an abuse." RESTATEMENT, supra note 148, § 187. If viewed as exculpatory, the
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issues should be included in every QTIP document that relies on an executor's
exercise of discretion in making the QTIP election.296 This language might
take the following form:
I hereby authorize my executor, in his sole discretion, to elect that
none, any part, or all of any amount passing under this trust be
treated as qualified terminable interest property for the purposes of
qualifying for the marital deduction allowable in determining the
federal estate tax and any state death tax on my estate, regardless of
the fact that such taxes are thereby increased or that there is a change
in the proportions in which various persons (including my executor)
share in my estate. The decision of my executor shall be binding and
conclusive upon all persons interested in my estate, and my executor
shall have no liability as a result of such decision. 2
97
Although effectiveness of this language cannot be guaranteed, 298 it is designed
to cope with the courts' tendency to construe strictly such provisions. 299 A
court, therefore, probably would respect the suggested language if asked to
review fiduciary conduct in exercising the election.3°°
The suggested language purports to leave the decision whether to elect
QTIP status entirely to the executor; it provides no guidance from the testator.
The testator's intentions, however, are indispensable in deciding how much
marital deduction is appropriate.30' Thus, the testator's intentions should be
the focus of both the executor's and any court's attention. Therefore, the testa-
tor also should apprise the executor of his wishes concerning the QTIP elec-
provision would fall into the lap of plentiful authority enforcing such provisions. See, e.g., Bo-
GERT, supra note 147, § 542; RESTATEMENT, supra note 148, § 222(l); 3 A. ScoTT, supra note 147,
§ 222; Committee Report, supra, at 531; Annot., 158 A.L.R. 616 (1933). Cf. New England Trust
Co. v. Paine, 317 Mass. 542, 550, 59 N.E.2d 263, 269 (1945) (noting that although law does not
"look with special favor" upon exculpatory clauses, they nevertheless are "generally held
effective").
296. See Joint Report, supra note 8, at 15-16; Marital Deduction Problems, supra note 145, at
24; Moore, Conflicting Interests, supra note 6, 603.4; Moore, New Marital Deduction, supra note 6,
904; Stewart, supra note 10, at 28; Suter, Careful Drafting of Apportionment Clause Can Ensure
Tax Burden Will Fall Where Client Intends, 9 EST. PLAN. 156, 162 (1982); Panel Discussion, supra
note 57, 1 52.01[4].
297. For other examples of language remitting fiduciary duty in the context of the QTIP elec-
tion, see H. TWEED & W. PARSONS, LIFETIME AND TESTAMENTARY ESTATE PLANNING 140 (9th
ed. 1983); Comfeld, Marital.Deduction, supra note 71, 11409, Form 14, 1 7; Covey, supra note 8, 1
110.7; Gamble, supra note 52, at 46-47; Keydel, supra note 6, at 5 1; Kurtz, supra note 8, at 643;
Strauss, supra note 6, at 77.
298. See, eg,. BOGERT, supra note 147, § 542 (noting judicial hostility to exculpatory clauses).
Cf. Shinn, Exoneration Clauses in Trust Instruments, 42 YALE L.J. 359 (1933) (criticizing judicial
enforcement of exculpatory clauses); Note, Directory Trusts and the Exculpatory Clause, 65
COLUM. L. REV. 138, 141 (1965) (stating that "the courts have been generally reluctant to endorse
the exoneration of trustees" and "have resorted to not only extremely strict construction of excul-
patory provisions, but also interpretive techniques and fictions to hold trustees answerable"),
299. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 148, § 174 comment d (provisions modifying fiduciary
duties); 3 A. ScoTT, supra note 147, § 222.2 (exculpatory provisions); Committee Report, supra
note 295, at 540 (exculpatory provisions and provisions authorizing fiduciary action).
300. Cf Estate of Rappaport, 121 Misc. 2d 447, 450, 467 N.Y.S.2d 814, 816 (Sur. Ct. 1983)
(permitting failure to minimize taxes where will authorized executors to exercise tax elections
regardless whether the outcome was "the most advantageous one from the point of view of my
estate as an entity").
301. See supra notes 96-141 and accompanying text.
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tion.30 2 Professor Halbach has suggested the following language for a
discretionary trust: "In the creation of this trust, my primary purpose is to
provide for [my spouse's] welfare and happiness, and the interests of all others
hereunder are subordinated to that purpose."303 This language, drafted
twenty years prior to ERTA, could be equally appropriate in the QTIP con-
text. It notifies the executor that the surviving spouse is the testator's over-
whelmingly predominant beneficiary. 304 Another alternative, drafted with the
QTIP election in mind, is:
Without limiting the foregoing discretion, it is my expectation that
my executor will make said election with respect to all of any such
amount unless my [spouse] dies prior to the making of such election
and the combined death taxes in our two estates render such an elec-
tion inappropriate.
Here, too, the executor's course of conduct is clear: although not required, full
deferral is expected. In the case of simultaneous or nearly simultaneous death,
however, the executor is expected to take into account the combined estate
taxes. Thus, the executor is expected to optimize the QTIP remainder only if
the interests of the surviving spouse-the testator's overwhelmingly predomi-
nant beneficiary-are irrelevant.
The dispositive document also could include instructions on equitable ad-
justments.305 Because the appropriate size and the propriety of any such ad-
justment are difficult to determine306 and because of the possibility of loss of
the marital deduction,307 this issue probably is addressed best by language
prohibiting the executor from making any equitable adjustments relating to
the QTIP election.308 The following language should be effective to prohibit
any equitable adjustments by the executor: "My executor shall not make any
adjustment of beneficiaries' interests on account of such election, whether the
election is made in full, in part, or not at all."
302. See Brackney, supra note 8, at 29; Gutierrez, supra, note 8, 1404.1(A); Joint Report,
supra note 8, at 14-15; Moore, Conflicting Interests, supra note 6, 603.4; Moore, New Marital
Deduction, supra note 6, 904; Stewart, supra note 10, at 28.
On the other hand, an important advantage supposedly offered by the typical full-deferral
estate plan is post-mortem flexibility. If the testator undertakes to advise the executor concerning
how to make the QTIP election, the effect likely will be to restrict that flexibility.
303. Halbach, supra note 214, at 1455.
304. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
305. See Joint Report, supra note 8, at 13; Ritchie, supra note 146, at 38, 43; Suter, supra note
296, at 162.
306. See supra notes 236-53 and accompanying text.
307. See supra notes 242-43 and accompanying text.
308. See Moore, Conflicting Interests, supra note 6, 603.5; Panel Discussion, supra note 57,
52.0415]. Cf. Carrico & Bondurant, supra note 149, at 555, 602 ("Most equitable adjustments prob-
ably should be expressly prohibited."); Dobris, supra note 149, at 141-42 n.221 (noting that "so-
phisticated lawyers" try to avoid equitable adjustments); Dobris, supra note 199, at 283, 341
(same); Ritchie, supra note 146, at 43 ("The calculation of the amount of the adjustment is a
herculean task. . . , and most fiduciaries would prefer to have such adjustments waived.").
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V. OTHER ADVERSE TAX CONSEQUENCES OF RELYING ON FIDUCIARY
EXERCISE OF THE QTIP ELECTION
A. Income Tax Implications
An executor can elect QTIP status only if the surviving spouse has a
"qualifying income interest for life."' 30 9 One requirement for such an interest
is that the surviving spouse be "entitled to all the income from the prop-
erty." 310 Many commentators have suggested that all income must continue
to be payable to the surviving spouse even if the executor elects QTIP status
for only a portion of the property.31 ' As a result, an estate plan that relies on
fiduciary exercise of the QTIP election forces all of the QTIP income to be
taxed to the surviving spouse,3 12 even if a partial election is made. If the sur-
viving spouse already is in a high income tax bracket, the result may be waste-
ful income taxation. In any event, such an estate plan foregoes the
opportunity to split income among other family members who may be in
lower income tax brackets31 3 or in greater need of support.
3 14
B. Gift Tax Implications
1. The QTIP Election
Refusal to accept a bequest or an interest in trust generally results in im-
position of the gift tax,3 15 unless the refusal is in the form of a qualified dis-
claimer.3 16 A donee usually must disclaim within nine months of the creation
of the interest.317 The QTIP election, however, need not be made within nine
months of the decedent's date of death.318 If a surviving spouse acts as execu-
tor, the possibility thus exists that she will make the QTIP election more than
309. I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7)(B)(i)(II) (1982).
310. Id § 2056(b)(7)(B)(ii)(I).
311. See, eg., J. PRicE, supra note 6, at 257-58; Blattmachr & Lustgarten, Selected Considera-
tions, supra note 3, at 39,45 n.18; Covey, supra note 8, 110.8; Dirkes, How to Minimize the Tax
Consequences of Shofling Benefcial Interests in Trusts, 9 EsT. PLAN. 336, 336-37 (1982); Horn, supra
note 8, at 23, 31; McCaffrey & Kalik, supra note 8, at 2, col. 5; Moore, New Marital Deduction,
supra note 6, 905; Shattuck, Effective Estate Planning May Mean not Using the Unlimited Marital
Deduction, 28 TAx'WN FOR ACCOUNTANTS 358, 362-63 (1982); Strauss, supra note 6, at 80; Planning
and Drafting for the Unlimited Marital Deduction; 9 COMMUNITY PROP. J. 47, 51 (1982). The
theory is that if the executor's failure to elect QTIP status could cause any portion of the fund to
pass to a trust that did not fit the definition of a qualifying income interest under I.R.C.
2056(b)(7)(B)(ii) (1982), the trust would fail to qualify for the exemption offered by IR.C.
§ 2056(b)(7)(A)(ii) (1982) from the terminable interest rule of I.R.C. § 2056(b)(l)(A) (1982).
Therefore, the entire trust would be a nondeductible terminable interest.
312. See I.R.C. § 652 (1982).
313. For the possibilities of income splitting through use of multiple trusts, see Morris Trusts,
51 T.C. 20 (1968), afdper curiam, 427 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir. 1970). Treas. Reg. § 1.641(a)-0(c)
(1972), which requires a "substantially independent purpose" for multiple trusts created by the
same person for a single beneficiary, has been held invalid in Stephenson Trust, 81 T.C. 283
(1983).
314. See, e.g., J. PRIcE, supra note 6, at 258; Halbach, supra note 70, at 44; Salus, supra note 71;
Shattuck, supra note 
311, at 362.
315. See I.R.C. §§ 2501(a)(1), 2511(a) (1982).
316. See id. § 2518.
317. Seeid §2518(b)(2)(A).
318. See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
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nine months after the death of the first spouse to die. Conceivably, the elec-
tion then could be viewed as a taxable gift if it resulted in prepayment of estate
tax and a corresponding reduction of the surviving spouse's income interest.
Authority in an analogous area is helpful. Exercise of a special power of
appointment generally does not result in imposition of the gift tax.3 19 The
IRS, however, has taken the position that exercise of a special power by a
person entitled to receive the income from the property appointed constitutes a
taxable gift in the amount of the value of the income interest given up.320 Se/f
v. United States32 1 is to the contrary, but the IRS has indicated that it will not
follow Self.
3 22
A surviving spouse who makes the QTIP election and thereby causes pre-
payment of a portion of the estate tax more than nine months after her
spouse's death extinguishes her life income interest in the amount of the pre-
paid taxes, just as the income beneficiary extinguishes his interest when he
exercises a special power of appointment. Thus, the IRS might attempt to
impose a gift tax on a surviving spouse making such an election. 323 No court
is likely to impose gift tax liability on a surviving spouse who depletes her
income interest by using the QTIP election to cause prepayment of the estate
tax.324 Nonetheless, the possibility that the IRS will view such an exercise as a
taxable gift is another disincentive for the surviving spouse serving as executor
to elect other than full deferral.
2. During the Surviving Spouse's Lifetime
The entire value of a QTIP trust, not merely the value of the surviving
spouse's income interest, qualifies for the marital deduction in the estate of the
first spouse to die.325 Consequently, section 2044 includes the value of the
entire QTIP in the gross estate of the surviving spouse. ERTA provided a
similar innovation, section 2519, to ensure that a lifetime transfer of the QTIP
income interest also would subject the value of the QTIP remainder to the gift
tax. Unfortunately, section 2519 as originally enacted 326 and explained in the
legislative history,327 and especially as amended by the Technical Corrections
319. See I.R.C. § 2514(b), (c) (1982).
320. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2514-1(b)(2) (1981).
321. 142 F. Supp. 939 (Ct. CI. 1956). Self is criticized strongly in Note, Special Powers of
Appointment and the G#f Tax. The Impact of Self v. United States, 3 VAL. U.L. REv. 284 (1969).
322. See Rev. Rul. 79-327, 1979-2 C.B. 342.
323. Presumably, the amount, of such a gift would be the actuarial value of the surviving
spouse's foregone income from the prepaid taxes.
324. Cf Covey, supra note 8, 110.7 (paying tax early does not involve a taxable gift); Horn,
supra note 8, at 31 (no taxable transfer when spouse-executor decreased marital deduction by
deducting administration costs for estate tax purposes).
325. See I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7) (1982).
326. Id. § 2519(a) (amended 1983).
327. H.R. REP. No. 201, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 161 (1981), reprinted in 1981-2 C.B. 352, 378;
STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 97 TH CONG., 2D SEss., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE
ECONOMIC REcovERY TAX ACT OF 1981 (Joint Comm. Print 1981) [hereinafter cited as JOINT
COMMITTEE].
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Act of 1982,328 considers an assignment of any portion of the QTIP income
interest as a taxable gift of the entire QTIP remainder by the surviving
spouse.329 It is unlikely that final regulations will correct the problem; as a
result, estate planning for the surviving spouse whose only interests are in a
QTIP trust will be difficult. Although full deferral deliberately stacks both
spouses' property into the surviving spouse's gross estate, concurrent use of
QTIP virtually locks the surviving spouse into the tax consequences. Conse-
quently, the surviving spouse's only viable means of depleting her gross estate
are disposition of income as paid and exercise of any limited right of with-
drawal. Trustee discretion to invade principal on behalf of the surviving
spouse may be promising in some situations, but fiduciary, personal, or institu-
tional concerns often will prevent the trustee from invading principal to the
extent necessary to meet the surviving spouse's estate planning goals, espe-
cially if the surviving spouse's intended donees differ from the QTIP remain-
dermen. Thus, estate planning by QTIP election largely strips the surviving
spouse of the ability to plan her own estate.330
C Estate Tax Implications
The value of a QTIP trust at the death of a surviving spouse will be in-
cluded in her gross estate.331 Good estate planning dictates that withdrawals
and invasions of principal during the life of the surviving spouse come from
the marital share to reduce the estate tax payable at the survivor's death.
332
Many commentators have expressed doubts, however, whether rights of with-
drawal or powers of invasion can be limited to that portion of the marital trust
for which the executor elects QTIP status.333 If, as seems likely under the
Temporary Regulations, 334 such a limitation presently is not available, princi-
328. Technical Corrections Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-448, § 104(a)(3)(A), 96 Stat, 2365, 2380
(1983) (amending I.R.C. § 2519(a) (1982)).
329. See, e.g., Covey, supra note 89, 1102; Silverman, Technical Corrections Act Affects QTIP
Property, PROB. & PROP., Summer 1983, at 13, 14. Whatever the obvious unfairness of such an
approach, it is at least easy to administer.
330. On the other hand, the popularity of the typical full-deferral estate plan in large part is
attributable to the fact that, by preventing the surviving spouse from disposing of QTIP, it allows
the testator to control the ultimate disposition of his property. See supra text accompanying notes
14-24.
331. See I.R.C. § 2044 (1982).
332. See, e.g., Kurtz, supra note 8, at 647.
333. See supra note 311; see also Adams, Questions andAnswers on the Tax Act of1981, TR. &
EsT., Apr. 1982, at 53, 55-56; id Sept. 1982, at 47, 52; id Nov. 1982, at 47, 48; Id. Dec. 1982, at 53,
55; id Jan. 1983, at 51, 54; id. May 1983, at 53, 55. But seeGutierrez & Hirsch, Partial Electionfor
QTIP Treatment, PROB. & PROP., Fall 1982, at 41 (arguing that "it should be permissible" to make
invasions from only the elected part).
334. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 22.2056-1(b), T.D. 7833 (1982), which allows partial QTIP elections,
requires that they "relate to a fractional or percentile share of the property so that the elective part
will reflect its proportionate share of the increment or decline in the whole of the property for
purposes of applying sections 2044 or 2519." Allowing withdrawals or invasions to come from the
elected part would defeat the Treasury's effort to ensure that all subsequent changes in value are
reflected in the ultimately taxable amount in the same proportion as the election. But see Gutier-
rez & Hirsch, supra note 333, at 41 ("It seems unlikely that the IRS intended such a literal reading
of the Temporary Regulation."); Joint Report, supra note 8, at 8 ("One can only hope that the
language of the temporary regulations is inadvertent and will be corrected . . ").
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pal withdrawn during the surviving spouse's lifetime will deplete pro rata not
only that portion of the QTIP that will be taxed at the death of the surviving
spouse, but also that portion free from taxation.335 Thus, estate planning by
QTIP election eliminates the opportunity to deplete the surviving spouse's es-
tate by the full amount of any principal that she spends.
VI. AN ALTERNATIVE TO RELIANCE ON THE QTIP ELECTION TO PLAN
THE ESTATES OF THE DEAD
One of the major problems with relying on the QTIP election for post-
mortem flexibility is that fiduciary duties may make exercise of that election
impracticable.336 Directing the executor by will to make the QTIP election
either in whole or part neatly avoids the problem; 337 it frees the fiduciary from
liability for making the decision whether to elect QTIP status.338 It also ties
the executor's hands, however, on the basis of information that may be inaccu-
rate at the time of the election.339 Planning for one or more disclaimers340 by
the surviving spouse,341 however, makes direction of the executor a viable and
335. Could this problem be solved by creating multiple QTIP trusts, some of which have with-
drawal or invasion features and some of which do not? If the executor determined that a partial
election was appropriate, he presumably would elect full QTIP status with respect to the QTIP
trusts that had withdrawal or invasion features and fail to make the election with respect to the
other QTIP trusts. See Gutierrez, supra note 8, 1 1404.1(B). Temp. Treas. Reg. § 22.2056-1(b),
T.D. 7833 (1982) does not address the issue. See McCaffrey & Kalik, supra note 8, at 2, col 5.
336. See supra notes 144-293 and accompanying text.
337. See, e.g., J. PRicE, supra note 6, at 259; Adams, Sweet & Herpe, supra note 44, at 29;
Brackney, supra note 8, at 29; Gamble, supra note 52, at 44, 47; Kurtz, supra note 8, at 643; Led-
with, supra note 199, at 25; Moore, Conflicting Interests, supra note 6, 1 603.4; Moore, New Marital
Deduction, supra note 6, 1 904; Strauss, supra note 6, at 77. Joint Report, supra note 8, at 13,
however, states that "[t]he testator would not be well advised to tie the executor's hands concern-
ing the election .... " Besides the lock-in effect of a directed election, the only reason provided
for the Joint Report's conclusion is that "section 2056(b)(7)(B)(v) vests the discretion to make or
forego the election squarely in the executor, and it is subject to question whether a testator can
remove such power from an executor's control." Id at 14. The author does not share the view
that the possibility of a directed election is questionable. JoiNT COMMITrEE, supra note 327, at
235, states that the QTIP election "can be made by the executor whether or not the decedent's will
instructs the executor to make the election."
338. Cf. Note, supra note 298 (arguing that courts generally should enforce exculpatory lan-
guage where trustees have been directed to follow others' investment advice).
339. See Moore, New Marital Deduction, supra note 6, 1 904; Moore, Conflicting Interests,
supra note 6, T 603.4.
Some commentators have offered the suggestion that the executor be directed by will to fol-
low a third party's instructions as to the exercise of the QTIP election. See, e.g., Adams, Sweet &
Herpe, supra note 44, at 29; Gutierrez, supra note 8, 1 1401.1; Kurtz, supra note 8, at 644; Moore,
New Marital Deduction, supra note 6, 1 904. But cf. Moore, Conflicting Interests, supra note 6, $
603.3 (arguing that person directing executor's election also would be subject to fiduciary
obligations).
340. See generally Frimmer, Disclaimers After the Tax Reform Act of 1976: Chaos out of Dis-
order, 31 MAJOR TAX PLAN. 811 (1979) (including analysis of the disclaimer cases and statutes of
numerous states); Frimmer, The Federal Disclaimer Rules-E Pluribus Unum , 14 INST. OrN EST.
PLAN. 400 (1980) (same); Martin, supra note 145; Melvoin, Disclaimers: The Time Is Rioe, But Is
It Reasonable?, 16 INST. ON EsT. PLAN. 400 (1982); Wenig, Recent Developments in Estate and
Gift Taxes: Disclaimer-The Proposed Regulations, 15 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 743 (1980).
341. See, e.g., Gutierrez, supra note 8, 11 1402, 1403.1, 1403.3.
I.R.C. § 2518(b)(4)(A) (1982) provides that the fact that a disclaimed interest "passes" to the
surviving spouse does not disqualify the disclaimer. For example, Prop. Treas. Reg. § 25.2518-
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attractive alternative.34 2 The right of a beneficiary to disclaim his interest ap-
parently is not saddled by fiduciary obligations.343 Moreover, the surviving
spouse usually is the testator's primary beneficiary and most trusted confidant.
Therefore, the testator can leave the decision as to how much marital deduc-
tion is desirable in the hands of the surviving spouse. Additionally, this place-
ment also is appropriate from the surviving spouse's point of view, because the
surviving spouse's financial stake in the decedent's estate is linked directly to
the amount of the marital deduction.
Disclaimer planning can assume an infinite variety of forms. The sim-
plest is no planning. A disclaimer by a surviving spouse of a QTIP income
interest should bar the marital deduction, even if the executor has elected
QTIP status.344 This possibility, however, makes a disclaimer a very expen-
sive proposition for the surviving spouse, who thereby loses her entire interest
in the trust. Moreover, the typical surviving spouse's intense fear of exhaust-
ing available assets can make parting with any significant amount of property
difficult. Additionally, a disclaimer may accelerate remainders to individuals
who are not deemed old enough to manage the property properly. Finally, for
emotional reasons, the surviving spouse may be unwilling to disclaim property
that her dearly departed mate left to her. For all these reasons, reliance on
disclaimers to fine-tune the estate plan may at first seem misplaced.
Careful planning and drafting, however, can increase the odds of a dis-
claimer. First, the disclaimer can be made much less expensive. Drafting to
cause any disclaimed trust property to pass to another trust in which the sur-
viving spouse has a similar interest is one means to that end.34 5 The credit-
2(e)(2) & (5) ex. 4 (1980) allows a surviving spouse to disclaim although obtaining an almost
identical interest as a result of the disclaimer.
.Disclaimer planning as a means of tailoring the marital deduction predates ERTA. See, e.g.,
Lewis, Uncertainty in Disclaimer Laws Creates Problems for Estate Planners, 34 OKLA. L. REv.
419, 464-69 (1981); Moore, Drafting in Contemplation of Disclaimer, I 1 INsT. ON EST. PLAN. 1
900, 903.5 (1977).
342. See Blazek & O'Donoghue, supra note 3, 7.05[4][b]; Carpenter & Hanna, Disclaimers.- A
Pre-Mortem Estate Planning Tool, TR. & EsT., Aug. 1982, at 47, 48, 50; Moore, New Marital De-
duction, supra note 6, 906. But see Joint Report, supra note 8, at 18, which counsels that,
the estate planner should not rely solely on the use of disclaimers to implement the estate
plan. It would be prudent, instead, to deal directly with the problems of the election and
allow the estate plan to function without the necessity of utilizing disclaimers. Then the
added flexibility permitted under the disclaimer laws would further enhance the options
available in connection with the testator's estate.
343. See Joint Report, supra note 8, at 17. Later, the executor of the surviving spouse's estate
may have an almost incurable fiduciary problem if asked to disclaim when the beneficiaries of the
spouses' estates differ. See Dobris, supra note 3, at 829 n.242; Ketchum & Johnson, supra note 8,
at 93; Stewart, supra note 10, at 28. Even if the estates' beneficiaries are the same, the executor's
authority to disclaim may be questionable. See Frimmer, Disclaimers After the Tax Reform Act of
1976.: Chaos out of Disorder, supra note 340, at 868-69 nn.173-74; Stewart, supra note 10, at 28;
UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-801(a) (West 1982) (authorizing disclaimers on behalf of the inca-
pacitated but not the dead).
344. The IRS already has so ruled. Rev. Rul. 83-26, 1983-1 C.B. 234. Why did this fact
pattern develop? Was the executor unwilling to elect other than full deferral because of fiduciary
restraints?
345. Drafting for a disclaimer by the surviving spouse ensures that if a disclaimer occurs the
property in which the disclaimed income interest existed will not pass simply as though the surviv-
ing spouse had predeceased the first spouse to die, as otherwise would occur under state law. For
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shelter trust is the simplest choice for a disclaimer receptacle. Although this
trust will not be included in the surviving spouse's gross estate, she usually will
have at least a discretionary income interest in the trust. In other instances,
however, a separate disclaimer trust may be more appropriate. 346 The surviv-
ing spouse's interests in the disclaimer receptacle could include the right to
receive all of the income 347 and the right to receive discretionary principal
payments.348 Thus, the financial disincentive to disclaim would be limited to
the decreased income flow resulting from the prepayment of the estate taxes,
and the surviving spouse's fear of exhausting her assets thus would be pla-
cated. This plan also would prevent the trust property from reaching the
QTIP remaindermen prematurely. The impulse to keep what the decedent
"left to me" should be decreased by the presence in the dispositive document
of an elaborate disclaimer mechanism. Strong precatory language is an addi-
tional method of notifying the survivor that the testator intends to leave to the
survivor not only the right to receive the QTIP income but also the burden of
deciding how much marital deduction is appropriate.349 Inclusion of both
spouses in planning conferences that include candid discussions of disclaimer
planning helps educate the survivor about the need to evaluate seriously the
possibility of disclaimers.350 Each of these suggestions increases the viability
of spousal disclaimers as a means of fine-tuning a full-deferral estate plan.
Disclaimer planning can avoid all the potential tax problems discussed.
351
In providing for the disposition of disclaimed property, the testator can permit
a spreading of the income tax burden. If the surviving spouse remains the sole
income beneficiary of the disclaimer trust, she will continue to be taxed on all
a survey of state disclaimer laws, see Note, Federal Taxation: Section 2518 Disclaimers-Anything
But Uniorm, 31 U. FLA. L. REv. 188 (1978). Instead, disclaimer drafting requires that trust prin-
cipal subject to a disclaimer pass to a disclaimer trust. See Blattmachr & Lustgarten, Selected
Considerations, supra note 3, at 39.
346. See, e.g., Katz & Blessing, Marital Deduction Estate Planning After the Economic Recovery
TaxAct of 1981, 37 J. OF Mo. B. 503, 508 (1981). Restrictions imposed by Proposed Treas. Reg.
§ 25.2518-2(e)(2) (1980) may make disclaimer into the credit-shelter trust inappropriate. For ex-
ample, Proposed Treas. Reg. § 25.2518-2(e)(5) (1980) denies a qualified disclaimer if the dis-
claimant retains a special power of appointment over the disclaimed property. Such a power is
common in credit-shelter trusts. Retention of a right of withdrawal-a five and five power-
similarly may disqualify the disclaimer. See, e.g., Covey, Recent Developments Concerning Estate,
Git andIncome Taxation-1980, 15 INST. ON EST. PLAN. 100, 136.2 (1981); Mulligan, supra
note 52, at 10-11. But see Wenig, supra note 340, at 772-73. Even a power over beneficial enjoy-
ment exercisable by the surviving spouse as trustee of the disclaimer trust would prevent a quali-
fied disclaimer. See Proposed Treas. Reg. § 25.2518-2(d)(1)(ii) (1980).
347. In addition to encouraging the surviving spouse to disclaim, an all-income-to-the-surviv-
ing-spouse disclaimer trust serves another important function if the decision to prepay any estate
tax is made. Such a trust would qualify, in the surviving spouse's estate, for the credit for property
previously taxed under I.R.C. § 2013 (1982). SeeTreas. Reg. § 20.2013-5(a) (1973); Rev. Rul. 59-
9, 1959-1 C.B. 232; Moore, New Marital Deduction, supra note 6, 1 906.
If the surviving spouse is to be entitled to all of the trust income, a potential QTiP trust may
exist. If so, the executor should be directed not to elect QTIP status for the disclaimer trust.
348. See Proposed Treas. Reg. § 25.2518-2(e)(5) ex. 6 (1980).
349. See Stewart, supra note 10, at 28.
350. Such inclusion would ease greatly the surviving spouse's lack of knowledge. This lack of
knowledge is cited by Carpenter & Hanna, supra note 342, at 50, as an important reason why the
disclaimer can appear to the surviving spouse as a "'no-win' situation."
351. See supra notes 309-35 and accompanying text.
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of the income.352 If the trustee is authorized to accumulate income or to dis-
tribute income among other beneficiaries, however, the surviving spouse will
be taxed only on her share of the disclaimer trust's distributable net income.
353
Thus, disclaimer planning has the potential to avoid wasteful income taxation
during the life of the surviving spouse.
Disclaimer planning also completely avoids both of the gift tax problems
discussed above.354 Qualified disclaimers generate no gift tax when made. In
addition, since section 2519 applies only to QTIP interests, a taxable transfer
by the surviving spouse of her income interest in a disclaimer trust does not
constitute a taxable gift of the disclaimer trust remainder.
Finally, in planning for disclaimers the testator can provide that dis-
claimed property passes to a disclaimer trust in which no withdrawals or inva-
sions are possible until the principal of the QTIP is exhausted. With this
provision, any depletion during the surviving spouse's lifetime would reduce
the estate taxes due at her death.
The testator contemplating disclaimer planning, however, must keep in
mind the possibility that the spousal disclaimer never may be used.355 Indeed,
one of the principal reasons for placing the ultimate decision in the hands of
the surviving spouse, rather than those of an executor, is that she is the testa-
tor's overwhelmingly predominant beneficiary. Consequently, the testator
should be satisfied with any decision his surviving spouse makes. If this is not
the case, disclaimer planning must not be relied on to fine-tune a full-deferral
estate plan.35 6
VII. CONCLUSION
Because full deferral deliberately foregoes the opportunity to utilize the
lowest estate tax brackets available to the estate of the first spouse to die, it can
deplete the family wealth that remains after the death of the surviving spouse.
If the spouses' combined taxable wealth increases after the death of the first
spouse to die, full deferral can cause an especially severe depletion because it
also deliberately foregoes the opportunity to "freeze" the surviving spouse's
estate. But since prepayment of estate tax accelerates a tax that is not due and
thereby deprives the surviving spouse of income and access to principal, the
vast majority of clients nevertheless opt for full deferral as a primary estate
plan. Those who are advised that full deferral can be very costly to their ulti-
352. See I.R.C. § 652 (1982).
353. See id. § 662. Distributable net income is defined in id § 643(a).
354. See supra notes 315-30 and accompanying text.
355. One reason, in addition to those mentioned in the text, why the disclaimer never may be
used is that the surviving spouse may be incompetent at or shortly after the death of the first
spouse to die. In such a situation, almost irresolvable conflicts might arise, and the authority of
the surviving spouse's legal representative to disclaim might be put into issue, as in the case of the
deceased surviving spouse. See supra note 343. The surviving spouse's legal representative obvi-
ously would be concerned primarily with providing fully for the possibly huge but potentially
short-lived needs of his ward.
356. One situation in which spousal disclaimers should not be relied on is that involving a
second (or later) marriage if there are children by a prior marriage. See generally supra note 21.
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mate beneficiaries nevertheless may choose full deferral because they also are
advised that their executors will decide whether prepayment of the tax is ap-
propriate by electing or failing to elect QTIP status.
Examination of the questions implicit in the considerations relevant to
making the QTIP election, however, reveals that the great majority of those
questions properly can be answered only by the testator. Even if the questions
involved administrative rather than dispositive issues, the QTIP election
would raise difficult issues of fiduciary conduct. Many of the questions, how-
ever, require dispositive answers.
An executor who causes an estate to prepay the estate tax, even in a good-
faith effort to optimize the QTIP remainder, probably breaches the fiduciary
duty to minimize taxes. The fiduciary also will worry whether he has failed to
treat the estate's beneficiaries impartially. On the other hand, a surviving
spouse or QTIP remainderman acting as executor may hesitate to exercise the
QTIP election for fear that she might breach the fiduciary duty of loyalty by
favoring herself. Even if the duty to minimize taxes, the duty to treat benefi-
ciaries impartially, and the duty of loyalty are remitted expressly by the testa-
tor, tax-generating partial QTIP elections still will be extraordinarily rare.
35 7
Therefore, reliance on fiduciary exercise of the QTIP election is likely to fail
miserably as an option for achieving post-mortem flexibility. Moreover, reli-
ance on fiduciary exercise of the QTIP election creates income, gift, and estate
tax problems that may offset substantially the supposed advantage gained by
the theoretical possibility of a partial QTIP election.
An attractive alternative is to direct the executor to make the QTIP elec-
tion, while providing for disclaimers by the surviving spouse. But because
surviving spouses often are unwilling to disclaim property recently left them
by their spouses, such a route must be undertaken only when the surviving
spouse is the client's overwhelmingly predominant beneficiary or when the
client implicitly trusts the surviving spouse with the responsibility of deciding
how much marital deduction is appropriate.
The ultimate failure of both fiduciary exercise of the QTIP election and
spousal disclaimers to provide post-mortem flexibility derives from the fact
that only the testator can determine how much marital deduction is appropri-
ate. The answer necessarily must be a bit of a guess in some cases, and if the
testator could make the decision after his death, the answer might be some-
what better. An executor, however, is incapable of answering whether the sur-
viving spouse is the overwhelmingly predominant beneficiary and whether the
family business eventually should pass intact to the children. Thus, it is hardly
surprising that the executor saddled with such a burden would take the easy
way out by electing full deferral and thereby minimize present taxes in favor
357. "Trust legal counsel will have to carefully analyze the will or trust that is designed to take
advantage of the qualified terminable interest property deduction to ascertain whether it contains
sufficient safeguards for the professional fiduciary in exercising that election." Ritchie, supra note
146, at 38. See also Gutierrez, supra note 8, % 1404.1(a) (executors will tend to elect full QTIP to
minimize current taxes); supra note 235.
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of the surviving spouse. Similarly, a surviving spouse, only recently separated
from the testator, understandably assumes that no disclaimer is necessary to
effectuate the testator's wishes.
Post-mortem estate planning unquestionably serves an important func-
tion. It has, however, been performed only haltingly even in the relatively
simple administrative context of deciding whether to deduct administration
expenses for income or estate tax purposes or to use the alternate valuation
election, situations in which comparison of tax brackets or valuations gener-
ally answers the question. Expanding post-mortem estate planning to include
the decision whether a marital deduction should be claimed requires the exec-
utor to decide whether up to one-half of the estate immediately will be con-
ceded to the federal government. This decision is qualitatively different from
anything previously described as post-mortem estate planning; it partakes of
planning the estates of the dead. As a general rule, the dead should have been
required to plan their own estates.
